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Abstract   
 
In 2021, High Representative of the EU, Josep Borrell, stated that; “25 years after the Barcelona 
Declaration and 10 years after the Arab Spring, challenges in the Mediterranean – many of 
which resulting from global trends – remain daunting (EC 2021c)”. Has the EU failed in its 
most plausible attempt to create democracy in its neighborhoods?  
To attempt an answer to this question, this study investigates how the nature of the EU as an 
actor in world affairs affects its ability to promote democracy in its neighborhoods. Normative 
Power Europe (NPE) has been one of the most cited theories when explaining the EU’s role in 
world affairs, and this thesis investigates to what extent NPE can explain the EU’s role as a 
foreign policy actor in the Maghreb. The thesis applies a comparative historical approach of 
the (1) Moroccan, (2) Algerian and (3) Tunisian case. The analysis is based on document 
analysis of primary and secondary sources as well as conducted interviews with local and 
European functionaries in the region.  
This thesis concludes that the large gaps in rhetoric and practice reinforce the perceived nature 
of the EU by not fulfilling its promises in protecting human rights and promoting democracy, 
hindering its ability to be a normative power. However, the analysis shows that the EU has the 
possibility to take a sui generis role, because the EU does not have the same colonial baggage 
as many of its member countries. Nonetheless, for this to function the EU would need to solve 
problems of coherency and mend the gap between rhetoric and practice. This understanding of 
the EU as a foreign actor in its neighborhoods can help adapt the policies towards the region 
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I. Introduction  
 
“Europeans must deal with the world as it is, not as they wish it to be. And that 
means relearning the language of power and combining the European Union's 
resources in a way that maximizes their geopolitical impact (Borrell 2020)”.  
 
These words coming from Josep Borrell, the High Representative (HR) for the European 
Union, represent a new symbolization of the EU as a global power. Borrell seems to believe 
that Europeans must relearn the ‘language of power’, which indicates that this language is 
something that the EU has been lacking before. The European Union was created as a peace 
building project, which over time came to identify itself with values such as human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law. This understanding of the EU as a democracy promoter and 
protector of human rights is its own proper definition of itself. However, is this 
conceptualization of its own image compatible with this new language of power that Europe 
must learn?  
 The idea of Europe as an actor in world affairs is not new, but it is however a role, 
which is still in evolution, attempting to find its way in a very complex world order. The role 
of the EU as a foreign policy actor has caused much confusion for politicians and diplomats all 
around the world. American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, famously asked in 1983 who 
he should call when he wanted to discuss international politics with ‘Europe’; an affair that 
became known as the Kissinger problem. While some find that this problem is solved, others 
believe it to be equally problematic today. The EU’s foreign policy is therefore, as has been 
stated by Tonra and Christiansen, an ‘ongoing puzzle’ (2004, 1). With the intent of solving this 
puzzle, the rise of political theories have been marked by extremes, with the EU being a 
superpower on the one side and as a power in decline on the other. In the middle, with a specific 
view of its nature, there is the Normative Power Europe (NPE) theory, which has been one of 
the most influential ones, basing itself on the EU as a unique power able to shape conceptions 
of what is normal on the international stage.  
Regardless of these extremities, it is clear that during its history as a foreign policy 
actor, there has been an increased focus on wanting to bring democracy to its neighbors - and 
an important test came in 2011 with the Arab Awakening. As ten years have passed since the 
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unfolding of events in the south, democratic development in the North African states has 
achieved different results. This thesis seeks to evaluate the role of the EU before, during and 
after these events in the Maghreb, and to what extent the ‘language of power’, or lack thereof, 
can be said to have acted with the EU’s own ‘normative base values’.  
 The EU and the Maghreb are linked by geography and a complex history. The Maghreb 
countries have strong connections to the EU, but with different terms and conditions. Key EU 
member states, such as France, Spain and Italy maintained enormous influence over the North 
African countries in the post-colonial period, but the EU as an institution has had difficulties 
devising one clear policy for the area. Before the Arab Uprisings, the EU maintained a strategy 
of securing stability by supporting incumbent authoritarian leaders, such as Ben Ali in Tunisia, 
Mubarak in Egypt and Qaddafi in Libya. The Arab Awakening forced the EU to reassess their 
position. These changes have led to revised EU policy initiatives and strategies that have 
focused on promoting democracy to a larger extent. The reasoning behind these policy changes 
is, however, not very clear and the EU is still being criticized for inconsistency in its dealings 
with the region. The question that becomes interesting is therefore whether these new policy 
initiatives have changed the perception of the EU in the region, and if so, how this position can 
influence the EUs ability to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the 
neighborhood.  
The analysis will focus on how we can understand the EU as a foreign policy actor in 
the region, and whether it can be understood as a democracy promoter, or if it is simply posing 
as one, viewing the EU more as Tartuffe, the hypocrite in Molière’s most famous play, the 
Impostor.  This thesis targets a geographic specificity, namely, the Maghreb region, and how 
the EU’s policy towards the area functions together with its perceived identity. By studying 
two important axes, (1) the practices versus the rhetoric of the EU in Maghreb, and (2) the 
perceived role of the EU as foreign policy actor, this thesis will attempt to understand how 
these axes influence the EU’s ability to promote democracy in the region. A comparative 
historical approach of three cases, based on document analysis and interviews with European 
functionaries as well as functionaries in the region will be the foundation for analyzing the 
thesis question. The interviews help understand the evolution of the role of the EU in retrospect 
from an external perspective, while the primary documents help to enlighten the case from its 
own time.  
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I.I Thesis question and operationalization  
Based on the introduction, this thesis will attempt to break down the resultant complexity of 
EU foreign policy in the Maghreb, and analyze the EU’s influence in the region by focusing 
on the following thesis question:  
How does the nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor affect its ability to promote 
democracy in the Maghreb?  
How does the nature of the EU as a global actor, both in material and ideational terms, affect 
its ability to diffuse its ‘normative base’ of human rights, democracy and the rule of law? Are 
there conditions which make it easier or more difficult for the EU to have a positive effect on 
democratic development? While some North African countries have slid into instability and 
authoritarianism after the Arab Awakening, other states have been able to focus on creating 
more stable systems which attempt to promote democratic interests. Has the ‘success’ of the 
Tunisian case been influenced by the EU? What has the role been in Morocco’s path towards 
a more democratic system? Or in the case of Algeria, where a new ‘awakening’ took place in 
2019? Moreover, how does the EU’s handling of the migration crisis impact these conceptions 
and perceptions of the EUs nature? 
Operationalizing the research question will entail an understanding of the constitution 
of the EU as an actor in foreign affairs. The policy-making procedure in the EU is composed 
of many actors having their say, amongst them, the member states, the Commission, the 
Council, the HR, the Parliament, and the Courts. The critique of EU foreign policy as being 
incoherent is a recurring one, hence, a comprehension of the different power dynamics is 
therefore a must. Moreover, could the EU even be said to have a foreign policy, and is it at all 
possible to have one as an ‘unidentifiable political object’? This thesis will focus on different 
EU policy-initiatives towards the region for an understanding of the EUs involvement as a 
foreign policy actor, attempting a justification of why these policies are important or not.  
Finally, the complex causality of such a question requires good knowledge of the North 
African cases being studied. Understanding how the region has developed over the decades 
will be of great importance. In this sense, this thesis will attempt to contribute to literature on 
EU foreign policy, as well as to the field of democratization in North Africa.  
 




“As we are prisoners … prisoners of the words we pick, we had better pick them 
well (Gerring 1999, 357)” 
 
In this study, the concept of the Maghreb implies the following countries: (1) Morocco, (2) 
Algeria and (3) Tunisia, and not the Great Maghreb, which includes Libya and Egypt. The 
Maghreb and North Africa will sometimes be applied interchangeably, but this thesis refers to 
the three countries mentioned above. Conceptual clarifications about the Maghreb will be 
presented in the third chapter.  
A terminological debate has occurred about which expressions that can best explain the 
events that have occurred since December 2010 in the Arab World. Ramadan (2012, 7) and 
Pace and Cavatorta (2012, 136) have argued that ‘Arab Awakening’ and ‘Arab Uprisings’, are 
the terms that can best describe these events. The debate has revolved around the possibility of 
the term ‘Arab Spring’ having an orientalist connotation to it. This thesis will apply the terms 
‘Arab Uprisings’ and ‘Arab Awakening’ somewhat interchangeably, as the thesis attempts to 
get an understanding of the EU’s role in a region where critiques have arisen towards this 
concept.   
Democracy is applied as a term to understand how the case studies can be said to have 
moved towards a more democratic society, and the role of the EU in this development. This 
thesis will not concern itself with conceptual discussions of democratization and what 
democracy is. Rather, it will follow the understanding of democratic development as a process 
towards a democratic system, following Robert A. Dahls mainstream definition of democracy. 
According to Dahl, democracy must allow for open competition and provide free and fair 
elections (Dahl 1971). The state must also be able to secure basic rights for its population.   
  
Previous findings and the contribution of this study  
There is comprehensive research on the EU as a foreign policy actor as it is an actor in constant 
change. As mentioned, the most influential theory on the nature of the EU would be the 
Normative Power Europe (NPE) theory by Ian Manners, viewing the EU as a unique actor 
diffusing norms into its dealings with third actors (Manners 2002, 2006b, 2008). Others have 
focused on the EU’s difficulties in combining values and interests, finding that security seems 
   
 
5 
to be of the highest importance (Seeberg 2009, Hyde-Price 2006, Romeo 1998, Pollack 2012, 
Scott and Scott 2020). Specifically, the response of the EU towards the Arab Uprisings has 
been studied, and the recurring critique is that the EU has been incoherent in its response to the 
events (Pace 2014, 2009, Noureddine 2016, Johansson-Nogués and Rivera Escartin 2020).  
Separately, there has been a debate on the external perceptions of the EU as a global 
actor, showing that perceptions of the EU are important for its ability to influence or ‘diffuse 
norms’ (Larsen 2014, Pardo 2015, Chaban et al. 2013). This thesis will therefore attempt to 
bridge the external perceptions perspective with the study of the EU as a normative power. By 
focusing on these two axes, the thesis will contribute to the larger discussion on the EU’s nature 
as a global actor. More specifically, it will contribute to the discussion of Normative Power 
Europe, by focusing on how the implication of external perceptions guide the EU’s ability to 
influence and ‘diffuse’ its normative base.  
 
I.II Structure of thesis  
Chapter I, which has now been presented, has introduced the theme of the EU as a foreign 
policy actor and emphasized the importance of gaining a better understanding of EU foreign 
policy in global affairs today. Chapter II will present the background of the EU as an actor in 
world affairs and why this is interesting specifically in the case of the Maghreb. Chapter III 
maps out the scholarly debate revolving around the EU as a global actor. It reviews the 
Normative Power Europe (NPE) perspective, and its critiques. Chapter IV presents 
methodology, namely the method of comparative historical analysis (CHA) and the case study 
method. In addition, chapter IV clarifies the way data has been collected by document analysis 
and interviews. Chapter V presents the empirical analysis of the three cases chosen in this 
study: (1) Morocco, (2) Algeria, and (3) Tunisia, through a periodical diachronic perspective. 
Chapter VI analyzes firstly, in a periodical comparative context, how and/or why these cases 
vary in relation to each other and as a region. The second part of the chapter focuses on a 
thematic analysis of paradoxes that have arisen during the periodical analysis and from the 
interviews. Lastly, chapter VII summarizes the findings of the thesis and makes some 
concluding remarks which also outlines implications for further research.  
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II The European Union and its foreign policy 
Former President of the European Commission, Jaques Delors, used to call the EU an 
‘unidentified political object’. The debate around the identity of the EU seems as much of an 
unresolved puzzle today as it was in the early stages of the European Economic Community 
(EEC). When attempting to understand the EU it is, however, essential to comprehend that the 
EU is a system that was forged by history. In the words of Costa and Brack (2014, 13); “[…] 
We need to consider the EU as the result of a Darwinian evolutionary process and not one of 
intelligent design.” This chapter will seek to shed some light on this reflection, and more to the 
point, discuss some important prerequisites, before presenting theory and methodology.  
First, the definition of the EU is discussed. Second, the historical background and the 
evolution of EU foreign policy until present-day is presented. Finally, a historical overview of 
the EU as an actor in the Maghreb is conferred as it will contextualize the role of Europe, and 
specifically the EU, in this region. This chapter presents the context and the history of the EU 
as a foreign policy actor, and hence, lays the foundation for an analysis of the thesis question 
in a structured manner. 
 
II.I Defining the EU   
Defining the EU seems to be a difficult task, not only for researchers of political science, but 
also for the average European. Three out of four Europeans acknowledge that they have poor 
understanding of the EU, while one in eight confess that they have no understanding of it 
whatsoever (McCormick 2002, xii). What the EU is, and what it does, still seems to have a 
mythical aspect to it. Is it best described as an international organization of 27 states, or is it a 
whole new form of political organization that the world has not witnessed before?  
 
“In the simplest of terms, the European Union (EU) is an international 
organization, founded on treaties between European states. But such a 
description does not do justice to a body that has grown and developed since the 
1950s to cover many areas of public policy and to reach deep into the political, 
economic, and social lives of its peoples (Usherwood and Pinder 2018, 1)” 
 
It should be remembered that the EEC was constructed because of the special circumstances 
during the aftermath of the Second World War, and that the context during which it was given 
birth to, is quite different than the present-day landscape. This has resulted in the EU becoming 
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some sort of a paradox, being a new form of political unit both during its very creation, as well 
as today. In many ways one can argue that the very nature of the EU is fundamentally 
ambiguous (Costa and Brack 2014, 18), namely because of the complexity of its political 
system and how it was created as a meeting point of national interests, external policies and 
economic pressures. The current system not only requires 27 nation states attempting to work 
together within one framework, but it also entails a system based on the cooperation of a 
multitude of different institutions (such as the Commission, the Parliament, the European 
Courts, and the Council). This ambiguity makes the question of definition difficult. Is the EU 
an international organization or a quasi-federal political institution? Is the main objective that 
of trade or to create values and develop direct links with citizens? In whichever way one 
decides to argue these positions, the EU could be said to have a supplément d’âme (addition of 
soul)  (Costa and Brack 2014, 247). Through this “addition of soul”, the EU has; (1) objectives 
and values which are typical of a state and not an international organization; (2) institutions 
that are not directly controlled by the member states, and that also cannot be removed by them; 
and (3) EU citizenship and favoring the creation of European political parties. In sum, the 
definition of the EU will be different depending on the aspects one takes into account.  
 Costa and Brack (2014, 241)  argue that the EU is grounded in this double inspiration, 
between an international regime and a political regime. As an international regime, the EU has 
the ability to work together collectively based on its common institutions, policies and sets of 
norms, which makes it easier to solve certain problems collectively rather than individually; 
while as a political regime, the EU takes the shape of a typical state government. However, it 
should be remembered that even though there has been much validation of the acquis 
communautaires (EU body of law) in the Courts as well as massive treaty reforms over recent 
years, the EU is still vulnerable to the possibilities of regression and rupture. If anything, the 
latest crises with the Euro, Brexit, and the issue of ‘democratic deficit’ provide evidence to 
these claims. Regardless of how one feels about the EU’s handling of these crises, the next 
query would be how the EU construes itself, be it either despite of or because of these 
challenges.  
The EU defines itself as a ‘unique economic and political union between 27 countries 
that together cover much of the continent’, whose goals are to promote peace and the well-
being of its citizens. Moreover, it states that; “the EU plays an important role in diplomacy and 
works to foster stability, security and prosperity, democracy, fundamental freedoms and the 
rule of law at international level (EC 2020a).” The EU, therefore, neither explains itself as a 
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political system nor as an international regime, but simply as a unique economic and political 
union, putting emphasis on the word unique. Nonetheless, it is namely this definition, that the 
EU has of itself as a unique political structure and as a democracy promoter that will be 
investigated in this thesis. Whether these objectives, by which the Union defines itself, are 
applicable in the North African cases.  
 
II.II The origins of European Union Foreign Policy   
To address the question of whether the EU is a normative power in the world, one must first 
understand whether it indeed has the mechanisms and tools to be one. The foreign policy of 
the EU has been developing accordingly with the general development of the Union. Initially, 
the EEC did not have a coherent foreign policy in the stricto senso, but it did make important 
contributions to external relations which became increasingly important with time (Bindi and 
Angelescu 2010, 13). This section will focus on the history and evolvement of EU foreign 
policy, as to get a better understanding of its conceptualization. Moreover, this will allow for 
comprehension of the role of the different EU member states and their involvement in the early 
development.  
The creation of a European Community was based on the idea of securing peace in an 
unstable region, which is a foreign policy statement in itself. In 1962, Walter Hallstein’s 
statement indicated this point further: “One reason for creating the European Community [was] 
to enable Europe to play its full part in world affairs… [It is] vital for the Community to be 
able to speak with one voice and to act as one (Hallstein 1962, 79). Even as early as 1950, the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) discussed the creation of an integrated 
operational structure in Europe. The French government proposed the creation of a common 
European army that would be placed under the control of a European ministry of defense (Bindi 
and Angelescu 2010, 4). This plan was named the Pleven Plan, and would imply that soldiers 
from different European countries were to be merged into a common European Army, with the 
purpose of creating a common defense tied to the political institutions of a united Europe 
(Gegout 2010, 6). Even though the Pleven Plan ended up failing, it did result in another treaty, 
the European Defense Community (EDC), which was signed on May 27th in 1952 (Bindi and 
Angelescu 2010, 14). Even though it was France that initiated the process, the EDC was never 
ratified in France, and therefore failed to become EU policy. Due to the large discussion about 
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rearmament of the German army after the Second World War, a common European defense 
policy became a taboo, and was not discussed much in the decades to come.  
The agreement on the European Economic Community (EEC), also known as the 
Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, did however establish some foreign competences. These  
capacities included a common external trade tariff, external trades, the establishment of a free 
trade area between some territories, as well as the creation of a European Fund for 
Development (Bindi and Angelescu 2010, 16). The language used in article 110 in the EEC 
shows that its primary focus was the liberalization of trade: “to the harmonious development 
of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade, and the reduction 
of customs barriers (EEC 1957, 92).” These capacities, which were focused on la politique 
commerciale formed the commencement of a foreign policy.  
In 1992, the Treaty on European Union (TEU), also known as the Maastricht Treaty, 
established the foundation for European foreign policy through the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). The objectives of the CFSP were to; (1) safeguard the common values 
and interests of the Union; (2) strengthen the security of the Union and its members; (3) 
preserve peace and strengthen international security following the UN Charter; (4) promote 
international cooperation; and (5) develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, the 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (TEU 1992, 58-61). Moreover, the High 
Representative (HR) gained an established role in the European Council in 1999.  
The Treaty of Nice, from 2003, gave the Political and Security Committee the power to 
strategically direct crisis management operations as well as to exercise political control. At this 
point there were still many uncertainties about the actual role of the HR and its team. It was 
not until the Treaty of Lisbon that the external service received a legal personality and a proper 
institutional structure. The year 2003 also saw the creation of the European Security Strategy 
(ESS), which for the first time laid out clear objectives for advancing the EU’s interests in 
global affairs. Javier Solana, the HR at the time, starts the ESS by stating that: 
“Europe has never been so prosperous so secure nor so free. […] The creation 
of the European Union has been central to this development.  Over this period, 
the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian 
regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies (ESS 2003, 3).”  
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The EES was criticised for its idealistic approach, and specifically so towards its neighbours 
(Ghafar and Jacobs 2019, 8). The ESS focused on democracy promotion as an important tool 
for securing stability and building safer surroundings. 
With the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU stated: “the so-called Kissinger issue is now 
solved.” (Brunnstrom 2009). It was believed it had now become clear whom foreign ministers 
were to call when they wanted to talk to Europe; the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy. With the Lisbon Treaty, the HR received its current name and would also 
serve as the Vice-President of the European Commission as well as a member of the Council 
of Ministers. Moreover, the treaty established the European External Action Service (EEAS), 
which is the diplomatic, foreign and defence ministry of the EU. The Lisbon Treaty also 
recognized democracy as a fundamental value of the Union and guiding principal for its foreign 
policy (Zamfir and Dobreva 2019, 4). Today, foreign affairs ministers, the High 
Representative, state diplomats as well as military representatives meet in the Council of the 
EU to discuss foreign affairs on a regular basis, and they have the right to deploy troops within 
and outside the borders of the EU. 
In 2016, the EU launched a new Global Strategy for the EU’s foreign and Security 
Policy (EUGS), which replaces the European Security Strategy from 2003. Where the ESS 
went in a clear direction of the normative stance of the EU, the Global Strategy was more 
focused on strategy and ambition, probably as an attempt to adjust to the multipolar world 
order, which is increasingly driven by power politics (Lehne 2017, 1). The language used in 
the Global Strategy, particularly the first words, written by Federica Mogherini, the HR of the 
time, shows that there seemed to be some sort of a newfound realism in the EU’s approach to 
the global state of affairs; “ The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned. 
[…]  The crises within and beyond our borders are affecting directly our citizens’ lives. This 
is no time for uncertainty (EUGS 2016, 3).” 
“To engage responsibly with the world, credibility is essential. In this fragile 
world, soft power is not enough.”(EUGS 2016, 44).” 
 
Even though the Global Strategy has put more focus on the strategic ambitions of the EU, the 
values of the Union are still present and considered as an important part of the policy. 
Nonetheless, it does mean that the EU is moving away from the more idealistic and normative 
approach that the ESS put in place in 2003 (Keukeleire and Delreux 2017, 3). The guiding 
principles put forward by the EUGS suggest that; “Principled pragmatism will guide our 
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external action in the years ahead (EUGS 2016, 16)”. Of course this requires a comprehension 
of what ‘principled pragmastism’ really means, and whether it is at all possible for the EU to 
subscribe to this oxymoron as a guiding principle. Can EU foreign policy be principled, 
meaning ‘behaving in an honest and moral way’, and at the same time be pragmatic, by 
‘behaving in a sensible way that suits conditions, rather than following fixed ideas’ (Mihalache 
2016, 3)?  
 
II.III EU foreign policy towards North Africa  
The ties between Europe and North Africa symbolize a complex relationship which is linked 
by history and geography. Europe has seen its time of Moorish rule in the Iberian Peninsula 
and parts of northern France from the 8th century until the 15th century. North Africa, on the 
other hand, saw European colonization from the 18th and 19th century up until the last half of 
the 20th century, when most of the colonies became independent (except Western Sahara1). The 
Maghreb countries studied in this thesis (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) have been under 
French rule, while Morocco has seen both Spanish and Portuguese occupation as well. It is 
important to remember these ties, and the effects that this period of colonial rule could have 
introduced. After decolonization, Tunisia and Morocco made bilateral agreements with France 
of continued cooperation, while Algeria decided to break much contact. The reasoning behind 
these choices will be described further within the case studies. Nonetheless, these ties shared 
with Europe, for better or worse, have laid the foundation for these countries’ dealings with 
Europe as we know it today.  
The first signs of official agreements between the EU as an institution and the North 
African countries occurred in 1995 with the initiation of the Barcelona Process, also known as 
the European Mediterranean Partnership Initiative (EMPI). Trade relations as well as political 
and security affairs were central to this strategy. This agreement was the first major multilateral 
framework that the region had seen. Nonetheless, viewing this agreement in retrospect, the 
unbalances between the EU and the North African states were quite clear, as it mostly 
privileged European industry over that of the AMCs (Ghafar and Jacobs 2019, 3). With the 
 
1 Western Sahara is a disputed territory north of Mauritania and south of Morocco. It was a Spanish colony up 
until 1975, and it is today occupied by Morocco which has made claim to the territory.  
   
 
12 
‘War on Terror’ after 2001, the EU ended up giving more support to authoritarian leaders in 
the region. It seems like the incumbent authoritarian leaders became a way to secure the borders 
from global terrorism and large migration flows.  
In 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS), laid out the new foreign policy approach 
of the Union, therewithin, the EU’s relationship with its neighbors. This policy revealed the 
normative focus while striving for;  “effective, economic, security and cultural cooperation in 
the framework of the Barcelona Process (ESS 2003, 10)”.  It also stated that the Union was to 
contend for the “spreading of good governance supporting social and political reform and 
dealing with corruptions and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human 
rights (ESS 2003, 12)”. 
After years of discussing a new policy towards Eastern Europe and their Southern 
Neighbors, the EU initiated the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2003, with the aim 
of creating a “ring of friendly, stable and prosperous countries around the European Union in 
order to guarantee stability along the outer borders of the EU (Wesselink and Boschma 2012, 
6)”. An important aspect of this policy was the Action Plans (APs), whose aim was to create a 
more bilateral approach with specific reform packages and demands for each country. Based 
on this observation, one can say that the ENP removed the multilateral approach that was 
present from the Barcelona Process. If the conditions presented in the APs were met, the EU 
would engage in closer economic deals and aid packages. However, the EU would not be 
sanctioning if conditions were not met (Ghafar and Jacobs 2019, 5) 
The year 2008 saw another attempt at creating better relations with its southern 
neighbors through the Union for the Mediterranean (UFM). The aim of the Union was to 
promote stability and integration throughout the Mediterranean region. Today, it is a forum for 
discussing regional strategic issues, based on the principles of shared ownership, shared 
decision-making, and shared responsibility between the two shores of the Mediterranean, mare 
nostrum. Its main goal is to increase both North-South and South-South integration in the 
region, to support the countries' socioeconomic development and ensure stability. The 
institution, through its course of action, focuses on two main pillars: (1) fostering human 
development and (2) promoting sustainable development (UFM 2020). To this end, it identifies 
and supports regional projects and initiatives of different sizes following a consensual decision 
among the 43 countries.  
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Leading up to the Arab Uprisings, security measures became the most important thing 
on the EUs agenda. The growing concern in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) made 
democratization, human rights and the rule of law come second place to the objectives of the 
Union. Having good allies in the MENA region became increasingly important, and Morocco, 
Algeria, and Tunisia, remained very important partners for the EU and the rest of the West. 
Ghafar and Jacobs (2019, 7) have stated that this seems like the result of politics of convenience 
for the EU. Then, in December 2010, crisis broke out in Tunisia after the self-immolation of a 
vegetable seller in Sidi Bouzid. A series of protests and demonstrations spread to other parts 
of the country which ended with the escape of authoritarian leader, Ben Ali, to Saudi Arabia. 
With it, Europe and the West had lost, what at the time, seemed like a leader and a partner that 
could secure stability in the most turbulent of times.  
The months after the crisis broke out in Tunisia, the EU seemed somewhat 
uncoordinated in their response. Some EU politicians wanted to send military aid to Ben Ali, 
while others called it a much-needed democratization. The French foreign minister, Michèle 
Alliot Marie, offered to Ben Ali to send troops to help with the situation, while an Italian 
foreign ministry spokeswoman stated that ‘Ben Ali probably did not realize that the country 
had been asking for help, and that history will give him credit for the economic development 
the country had seen (Pace 2014, 977)”. It took several months until the EU could unite, and 
in March 2011, they officially showed their support for the democratic movements:  
“We believe that it is time for a qualitative step forward in the relations between 
the EU and its Southern neighbors. This new approach should be rooted 
unambiguously in a joint commitment to common values. The demand for 
political participation, dignity, freedom, and employment opportunities 
expressed in recent weeks can only be addressed through faster and more 
ambitious political and economic reforms. The EU is ready to support all its 
Southern neighbors who are able and willing to embark on such reforms through 
a “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity […] Despite some 
commonalities, no country in the region is the same so we must react to 
specificities of each of them (EC 2011a, 2)”.  
 
These words are a turning point in the EU’s approach to the region, or it is at least such, on 
paper; democracy seemingly became more important than stability. The EU needed a new 
vision, which came later that year, in the form of a new policy that was already in the works.  
The Revised version of the European Neighborhood Policy became this new approach. 
The new framework built on the “3Ms”; (1) Money; (2) Markets; and (3) Mobility, which the 
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North African states would receive if they undertook genuine political reform in governance 
and human rights. This policy was in the driver’s seat until 2015, when a newly revised version 
of the ENP, directed by the EEAS, refocused the policy by stating that: “Differentiation and 
greater mutual ownership will be the hallmark of the new ENP (EC 2015, 2)”, while 
recognizing that not all partners aspire to EU rules and standards as well as reflecting the wishes 
of each country concerning the nature and focus of its partnership with the EU.  
The uncertainty of North African relations was nonetheless not secured with the new 
changes. The political and economic reforms that the region underwent led to growing concerns 
about migration and terrorism. Islamist parties became victorious in many elections, both 
locally and nationally. The Global Strategy from 2016, which laid out new strategical 
objectives for foreign policy did somehow reflect this position. The EUGS removed the earlier 
normative strategy and replaced it with a more realist assessment. Ghafar and Jacobs (2019, 8) 
state that this new strategy has caused the EU to become; “more aware than ever of its 
limitations in promoting reforms in its neighborhood; hence the slow demise of the older, 
values-driven ENP framework”.  
 
II.IV Assessing the role of EU foreign policy in North Africa 
This chapter has laid out the background of the EU as a foreign policy actor in North Africa. 
The very definition of the EU has shown itself to be a debate, and with it, EU foreign policy. 
What remains clear is that EU foreign policy is a result of a historical molding, which has been 
through many different phases and is still in development. The EU is attempting to find its 
place in world affairs, which has resulted in different outcomes regarding the EUs foreign 
policy towards North Africa. The foreign policy of today is supposed to be guided by a 
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III Theory    
This chapter will map the scholarly debate revolving around the nature and impact of EU 
foreign policy. How do we conceptualize the EU’s identity as an international actor? Since 
Henry Kissinger famously asked who he should call when he wanted to discuss international 
politics with ‘Europe’, there has been a large discussion that rests on the identity and structure 
of a specific EU foreign policy. The academic community has attempted to find a solution to 
this puzzle of the EU as a foreign policy actor, but it should be stated that even though there is 
much literature on the subject, there is not a consensus in the answer.  
One of the most influential theories is the idea of a ‘Normative Power Europe’(NPE), 
a term coined by political scientist Ian Manners. Manners is behind the article Normative 
Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? which was published in the Journal of Common 
Market Studies in 2002. The normative power approach is a critical social theory which bases 
itself on the fact that the EU is a unique actor in world affairs because of its hybrid polity, 
historical context, and political-legal constitution. The norms and shared principles are part of 
the acquis communautaire, the EU’s body of law, and they are diffused through different 
channels. This implies that the EU, instead of using traditional military power, has the power 
to shape conceptions of what is normal in world affairs. Manners’ article is one of the most 
cited articles in EU studies and has received equal amounts of praise as it has critiques. In 2006, 
the Journal of European Public Policy directed a kind of power the EU is, a volume in which 
much of the space was dedicated to critiquing or supporting the idea of NPE. Departing from 
the NPE theory, this section will focus on this polarized debate hinging on the identity of EU 
foreign policy and its ability to influence international affairs.  
First, the historical foundation of the theoretical framework is presented through visions 
of the EU as a civilizing or military power. Second, the theory of NPE is presented, departing 
from Manner’s work. Third, different types of critiques and alternative explanations will be 
put forward. Finally, a summarizing section will discuss the implications for the theoretical 
framework of this thesis and the empirical expectations it can yield.  
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III.I Civilian Power Europe (CPE) or Military Power 
Europe (MPE)? 
Realist, E.H Carr, wrote in The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919 -1939, about the possibility of 
making necessary changes happen, namely ‘peaceful change’, without it leading to war. When 
explaining power in international politics, he made the distinction between (1) military power; 
(2) economic power and; (3) power over opinion (Carr 2016 [1939], 97-130). The idea of a 
power that could shape conceptions and opinions was hence viewed as an important part of the 
power of states and was conceptualized as such. Nonetheless, Carr’s distinction was not to be 
understood as an absolute one, as he found that they were all closely interdependent; since 
imagining a state possessing only one kind of power in isolation from the others is quite 
difficult (Carr 2016 [1939], 102). The idea of power over opinion sparked important questions 
regarding the role of different actors in world affairs. More to the point, what type of power 
could the EU represent?   
François Duchêne suggested in 1972, that the old type of military power had to make 
way for the more progressive civilian power as a means of exerting power in international 
relations; something he clearly thought was the case for Europe, which he believed was long 
on economic power, but relatively short on armed force (Duchêne 1972, 19). As defined by 
Twitchett and Maull, there are three key features of a civilian power; (1) the importance of 
economic power as a way to achieve national goals; (2) the centrality of diplomatic co-
operation to solve international problems; and (3) the eagerness to use legally-binding 
supranational institutions to achieve this international progress (Manners 2002, 236 - 237). 
Hedley Bull did not seem to agree with Duchêne and other scholars who focused on the idea 
of a CPE. Instead, it seemed that he was uncertain of the EUs role as an international player at 
all: 
“[…] ”Europe” is not an actor in international affairs and does not seem likely 
to be one (Bull 1982, 151)”.  
 
Bull did not believe that the notion of a civilian power was of importance, and certainly not 
that Europe pertained such power. Rather he stated that Europe needed to develop a more 
political and strategic union, because without it, everything remained uncertain. He wrote that 
this idea of the ‘Western European nations constituting a security community as a way of 
securing peace’, simply was a mere idea of wishful thinking (Bull 1982, 163). The prospect of 
Europe having transformative power would only be possible if the military pressure was 
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already in place, therefore, he found CPE to be a contradiction in terms. Are military- and 
civilian powers mutually exclusive? In 1999, the EU started  the process of acquiring a rapid 
reaction force (RRF) of 60 000 men, a process which sparked many different reactions (Longo 
2010, 75). Would this trend towards military power cultivate a ‘state-building’ project and 
would it weaken the EU’s distinct profile of having a civilian international identity? These 
questions that arose after the initiation of the RRF process are still questions searching to be 
answered. Hence, the original disagreements between Duchêne and Bull show the polarization 
of this debate during the early evolution of the EU as well as the basis for the continuing 
discussions of today’s situation. This dispute in EU studies could therefore be said to represent 
the larger theoretical debate one sees in international relations theory, which mainly constitutes 
of the discussion between that of constructivist approaches on the one hand, and realist and 
rationalist accounts on the other.  
 
III.II  Normative Power Europe  
Ian Manners finds that the EU’s role in global affairs is something unique (Manners 2002, 
2006a, 2008, 2010, 2012). He argues that we should conceive the EU as a normative power 
that diffuses norms to actors it is dealing with, rather than applying power of empirical force. 
Manners is attempting to refocus analysis away from the empirical emphasis on the EU by 
displacing the state as the center of concern, and sees the EU as having the ability to shape 
conceptions in international relations of what is ‘normal’. Because of its historical evolution, 
its hybrid polity and its constitutional configuration, the EU has a normatively different basis 
for its relations with the world. The role of the EU in international relations is therefore viewed 
as sui generis.  
Based on the declarations, treaties and policies that the EU has developed over the last 
50 years, one can identify its normative basis by five ‘core norms’; (1) peace; (2) liberty; (3) 
rule of law; (4) human rights; and (5) democracy (Manners 2002, 242-243). These core norms 
are central in the writings of the acquis communautaires and acquis politiques. One can also 
identify four ‘minor’ norms that can be found in the constitutions and practices of the EU, even 
though they are less contested than the core norms; (1) social solidarity; (2) anti-discrimination; 
(3) sustainable development; and (4) good governance (Manners 2002, 243). These norms have 
become part of the EU over time and culminate the basis for the argument of the EU as a unique 
actor.  
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Nonetheless, one can accept the normative basis of the EU without agreeing to the fact 
that the EU is a normative actor having transformative power. Therefore, Manners (2002, 244-
245) argues that EU influence stems from six factors through which the EU seeks to 
‘normalize’ elements  in the international arena. The first diffusion occurs by (1) contagion 
and is an unintentional diffusion of ideas from the EU to other political actors. Diffusion by (2) 
information is the second factor which implies specific strategic communications such as 
declaratory communications and new policy initiatives. The third means of diffusion is (3) 
procedural and entails the institutionalization of the relationship between the EU and a third 
party, as for example the process of EU enlargement. The fourth means of diffusion is by (4) 
transference, which is a type of diffusion that takes place when the EU trades, offers aid or 
technical assistance to third parties. This type of diffusion can be the result of a carrot-stick 
approach, where financial rewards lie in sight for the third party.  The fifth type of diffusion is 
(5) overt and occurs as a result of the physical presence of the EU in a state or an organization. 
The final and sixth means of diffusion happens though a (6) cultural filter, which is based on 
the fact that international norms and political learning in third states lead to learning, adaptation 
or in some cases, the rejection of norms. In sum, the diffusion of EU norms can therefore 
happen through contagion, information, procedures, transference, overt presence or cultural 
filters (Manners 2002, 244-245). The support the EU has shown for the International Criminal 
Court and the abolition of the death penalty are examples to illustrate this process (Manners 
2006b).  
The NPE theory originated in 2002 and has been developed by Manners himself and by 
many others over the years. The theory of normative power can be seen as a type of resurrection 
of the idea of Europe as a civilizing power, but Manners emphasizes that the EU in itself 
‘changes the normality’ of international relations, based on its normative foundation (Manners 
2008, 45); it does not simply do this to support its own interests, but also binds itself to 
international law, whether it is in its interest or not (Diez 2013, 197, Diez and Manners 2007). 
Numerous scholars state that this theory has been the most influential theory over the 
last decade in the field of European studies (Pace 2014, Lenz 2013, Wagner 2017, Del Sarto 
2016), which the large number of references to ‘Normative Power Europe’ confirms. 
Nonetheless, as many as have praised this theory, others have remained quite critical to the 
idea of the EU’s pre-requisite uniqueness as a normative transformative influencer. Hyde-Price 
(2006) argues that the EU is not a normative, but a realist power that is in pursuit of its own 
interests, by which the member states work collectively to secure and shape its external milieu 
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(Hyde-Price 2006, 222). Other critiques are that the EU might seem normative, but that it 
simply does so to secure its stability and economic interests (Pollack 2012, Seeberg 2009). The 
debate has in some ways become a dichotomy between the EU as either being ‘norm-driven’ 
or ‘interests-driven’. Sharon Pardo (2015, xix) argues that NPE only can be upheld if norms 
and economic interests are being separated, because of the discursive practice of NPE. 
Therefore, the question arises whether it is at all possible to incorporate a theory that can bridge 
these two conceptions, and it is indeed, an alleged dichotomy. Thomas Diez (2013, 194) 
suggests that by applying the concept of hegemony to the debate, one can avoid the divide 
between interests and norms, which has resulted in these debates on EU foreign policy.  
Moreover, it is important to remain aware of the paradox of this normative conception.  
It is argued that EU politicians and diplomats are not au courant of the dangers of post-colonial 
hegemony. A quote from the American political scientist, Richard Rosecrance, explains quite 
well the paradox of this conception. 
 
“It is perhaps a paradox to note that the continent which once ruled the world 
through the physical impositions of imperialism is now coming to set world 
standards in normative terms (Manners 2002, 238 [Rosecrance1998, 22])”. 
 
This paradox also leads to the question of whether military and normative powers are 
compatible. The debate revolving around EU military missions poses as an example here, as it 
has created a debate around the EU’s ability to be a normative power while basing itself on 
military power. Are normative conceptions compatible with the use of force at all? Manners 
(2006b, 194) argues that Europe acquiring military capacity in itself is not enough to undermine 
the normative power of the EU. Nonetheless, militarization could result in the EU becoming 
more tempted to use short-term military responses, instead of the traditional long-term structure 
as its way to solve conflicts. Moreover, introducing military forces in certain settings, in which 
EU civilian staff have worked and are working, can undermine the peaceful normative power 
they entail and risk the actual impact in the minds of receiving populations. The mixing of 
military power and normative power therefore has its inconveniences, even if it might be 
tempting to think that the EU can ‘have-its-cake-and-eat-it-too’ (Manners 2006b, 182). There 
have been many studies that show the double standards of EU foreign policy in different cases 
and conflicts (Wagner 2017, 1408). This is based on the fact that if the EU is a normative 
power, why does it not intervene more when questions of human rights violations and 
ethnopolitical violence arise? Are there other interests that hide themselves behind such 
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external policy decisions? If so, what kind of interests are these? The arguments from NPE 
scholars could be that of specific ad hoc situations, which are not compatible with the rest of 
the EUs foreign identity. This, however, can sometimes come up short as an acceptable answer. 
These critiques have resulted in many authors underlining the need to understand NPE as an 
‘ideal type’ actor (Forsberg 2011, 1199). Manners would reply that the way in which the EU 
acts in general is not the most important aspect to retain, but rather, he would remind us to not 
lose sight of the implications of the uniqueness of the EU.  
“The most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what 
it does or what it says, but what it is. Thus my presentation of the EU as a 
normative power has an ontological quality to it – that the EU can be 
conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system; a positivist 
quantity to it – that the EU acts to change norms in the international system; and 
a normative quality to it – that the EU should act to extend its norms into the 
international system (Manners 2002, 252).” 
 
For Manners, NPE is a statement of what the EU is believed to be, further creating a discourse 
into what the EU can and should be as well (Manners 2006a, 168). As a critical theorist, 
Manners takes issue with the forced dichotomizing of normative and value-neutral political 
science and he finds that this dichotomization of structural IR results in many questions being 
unanswered about the interrelationship of material and non-material forms of power (Manners 
2015, 300). Applying an NPE approach, makes it, according to Manners; “ […] possible to 
explain, understand and judge the EU in global politics (Manners 2013, 304)”.  Nonetheless, 
there are empirical problems that are difficult for any analyst to prescribe to, specifically 
because the EU often only is one of many possible factors that can explain change (Diez 2013, 
198).  
Helene Sjursen (2006) states that there is a need to identify criteria and assess standards 
to be able to qualify, substantiate or reject such claims put forward by NPE. The problem is 
that normative power lacks precision and is normatively based (Sjursen 2006, 236). Moreover, 
she states that one danger of the NPE debate, is the fact that the conception of the EU as 
normative, is quite similar to the EU definition of its own international role. Is there a danger 
of NPE becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy? If this is the case, are we mere contributors to this 
conception?  
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Normative Power Europe as a self-fulfilling ‘force for good’ prophecy 
Michelle Pace discusses the idea of the EU as a ‘force for good’ in the world (Pace 2007, 2008, 
2009). She finds that NPE is becoming a self-fulfilling prophesy, where EU politicians and 
diplomats see themselves as a ‘force for good’ in the world because of this normative debate, 
therefore reinforcing this image. Hence, what drives EU actors is their own self-representation 
of the EU as something positive; it becomes a process of forming a self-maintaining European 
epistemic foundation.  
 
“EU actors are part of, and their practices replicate an epistemic community. 
Policy-makers working in Brussels accept an optimistic version of the narrative 
of the EU as a ‘force for good’, which they continuously validate produce and 
reproduce (Pace 2008, 203)”.   
 
Pace states that conception can be problematic, and that researchers are a part of the problem. 
There is a need for academics to distance themselves from the very subjects of investigation 
and their self-descriptions. The ‘force for good’ perspective allows for an understanding of the 
way in which policymakers see themselves as a part of the process of policy making, and how 
they view the role of the EU in the world. Pace (2008, 204) shows that there are differences in 
the way Commissioners and Council officials portray and relate to the different impacts. 
Whereas Commissioners relate more to the connecting impact and regularly portray the EU as 
the best possible thing for world politics, Council officials are more likely to use compulsory 
impact by applying pressure on dialogue. It is therefore important to pay attention to these 
power dynamics. 
 
Normative Power Europe through integration and association  
The EU in border conflicts can be understood as a puzzle of integration and peace (Diez, 
Stetter, and Albert 2006), which in many ways is the very raison d’être of the EU, namely, 
peace through integration. However, this integration is only possible for those states that are 
within the geopolitical borders of Europe, so what happens to the bordering states that the EU 
deals with? Do border countries become more “democratic” just by being “associated” with 
the EU through trade, commerce, and cultural exchange? Diez, Stetter and Albert (2006, 236),  
argue that some association, even if this does not include a full integration with the hope of EU 
membership, can have an impact on border conflicts. However, they also state that there are 
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situations where the potential for integration and association can lead to an intensification of 
border conflicts. The Israel/Palestine conflict can be taken into an account here, as an example 
of the ambivalence of EU impact through association, specifically because of the way the 
different conflict parties view the EU (Yacobi and Newman 2008, 174). The presence of the 
EU has been important to establish a sustainable cooperation with the EMP, while the negative 
perceptions of the EU in Israel have decreased the already limited effect the EU could have in 
this conflict. In sum, the integration and association aspect can have both negative and positive 
effects.  
Hiski Haukkala (2008) argues to the contrary, that the EU does not have the ability to 
influence when EU membership is not on the table. He states that the EU does not function 
well, from a normative point of view, when the promise of enlargement and participation in 
the decision-making process, is not included in the deal. After the ‘Big Bang’ of the Eastern 
enlargement to the EU, it seems that the project of a ‘European Community’ is reaching 
geographical limits, and because of this, the EU seems to have issues with the idea of ceasing 
to enlarge (Haukkala 2008, 1617). This becomes interesting when considering how the EU acts 
towards its neighbors, since they are outside of the geographical area, but still close enough to 
being forced into some sort of a relationship with the EU. The first external policies the EU 
adapted were towards the Eastern Neighbors, whom were not part of the Union originally, but 
that, nonetheless, always remained within the geographic scope of possible enlargement. It was 
always within the frame of opportunity for them to become members, which is also why the 
Eastern enlargement happened as ‘quickly’ as it did. With tangible carrots in sight, specifically 
membership, the Eastern neighbors adapted all the necessary acquis. The question that 
becomes important in this case, is however, how a neighborhood policy, which was based on 
the Eastern enlargement, works in a place where enlargement is not possible?  
 
“The paradox of the EU's own pan-European rhetoric is that its application of 
the Lukesian third dimension of power has resulted in its neighbours wanting 
the wrong thing: they want the full institutional membership in the Union when 
the EU would only want them to have the same norms and values that the Union 
promotes (Haukkala 2008, 1618).” 
 
Based on these reflections, the ENP will not be able to achieve what it is meant for unless there 
are clear instructions and specificities that allow for an integration of some sort. What can the 
EU give in form of carrots when full integration simply is not possible? In the words of 
Haukkala: “It is the enlargement that is the key to the Union’s normative power in Europe and 
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any neighborhood policy that fails to take this issue into account is doomed to be a sub-optimal 
one (Haukkala 2008, 1617)”. Does the ENP towards the Southern Neighbors suffer from such 
a sub-optimality? Whether influence and association decrease with the lack of tangible carrots 
is therefore an important aspect to retain when analyzing the EU’s policy towards North Africa. 
The Action Plans (APs) would be important, as they are the initiatives and bilateral agreements 
that the EU has with the AMCs. Do the current AP’s offer sufficient association for them to be 
effective?  
 
Normative Power Europe and External Perceptions  
Henrik Larsen (2014) writes in The EU as a Normative Power and the Research on External 
Perceptions: The Missing Link that we must understand both external perceptions as well as 
the normative power aspect to have a full comprehensive picture. The analysis of the way in 
which other actors represent EU-sponsored norms can provide insights into the EU’s potential 
to play the role of a normative power. What seems striking is the fact that; “references to NPE 
can be found in the literature on perceptions of the EU (but not the other way round) where it 
is stressed that the findings have relevance for the discussion about the EU as a normative 
power” (Larsen 2014, 898). Perceptions and narratives are important because they can serve as 
‘road maps’ and ‘focal points’, indicating to external observers how to define a certain situation 
and how it can affect the decision-making processes of that set actor (Chaban, Miskimmon, 
and O’Loughlin 2019, 235). The understanding of this construction of the images of the ‘Self’ 
and the ‘Other’ will therefore be important to comprehend how the EU constructs its identity.   
As argued by Müller (2019, 253), it is important to be aware of the fact that NPE is not 
just about the attraction of the EU’s “normative model’, but also; “the broader story through 
which this model is articulated and promoted”.  The importance of understanding the narratives 
that are being created around the EU’s nature is of high importance, and within this conception 
the general designation of the EU’s character comes to show. Sharon Pardo (2015) also 
highlights the importance of this dual conception:  
 
“Actorness is also critically dependent upon the expectations and constructions 
of other international actors. […] the relationship between internal 
coherence/constituency and perceptions of the EU’s presence [is] of central 
importance (Pardo 2015, xvii).” 
 
   
 
24 
Whether third states that deal with the EU see the Union as a democracy promoter, protector 
of human rights and supporter of the rule of law is important for its ability to influence the 
same ideas. The external perceptions literature has up until this point focused largely on the 
economic power of the EU, which seems to be the side of the EU that has the most positive 
connotations to it. One side of the analysis represents EU policy, while the other is the 
perceived expectations of that same policy. If the EU is only able to have normative power 
when there are economic interests being used as carrots, is the EU even normative? The way 
in which third parties perceive the identity of the EU therefore become an important departure 
point for analysis.  
In this way, the EU’ ability to be a sucessful democracy promoter in third countries 
depends on a fit between internal and external perceptions. The way in which target countries 
view the EU’s efforts in promoting democracy will heavily influence whether the policies will 
be sucessful or not (Mišík 2019, 38). This follows the same argument made by Gordon and 
Pardo (2015, 424), stating that normative power becomes powerless devoid of visibility. It is 
necessary to understand how the EU is viewed in the state where it seeks to ‘normalize’ affairs, 
and if there is a dissonance between the internal and external views of the role of the EU, the 
EU might end up being less influential.  
It has been argued that the external perceptions literature has largely focused on a one-
dimensional vision of the EU as a global power, and that there is a need to understand 
perceptions as highly “issue-specific, multilayered and differentiating (Chaban et al. 2013, 
433)”. The external perceptions literature, fronted by Chaban et al. (2019, 2013) and Larsen 
(2020, 2014), therefore point to the importance of geographical variation as a prerequisite for 
our understanding of the EU’s foreign policy nature. They further argue that this side of EU 
studies has been under researched and that there is a need to understand this phenomenon 
better. Therefore, a focus on these geographical differences, also to understand the general 
designation of NPE, seems warranted.  
As this study focuses on the Maghreb, it will be particularly important to consider how 
colonial lenses as well as other perspectives can impact the notion of NPE. In light of the 
Kissinger phone call, who would Morocco call when wanting to talk to Europe? Would it be 
the EU, or would it be France? These perceptions play an essential part in understanding how 
NPE is perceived. What do these countries see when they see the EU? Is it a normative power 
or is it merely an imperial power whom the countries in question have no other choice but to 
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listen to, making the EU a mechanism of control for former colonizers? This question requires 
an understanding of whether the EU can be understood as a power which hinders the ambitions 
and possibilities of former colonies, or if the EU, on the contrary, can be used as a tool for 
former colonies to develop.  
 
III.III EU foreign policy as imperial  
Jan Zielonka (Zielonka 2008, 2013) discusses the imperial aspect of the EU, and its foreign 
policy. Specifically, he states that the language behind EU foreign policy in its neighborhoods 
resembles that of the ‘civilizing missions’ from the French imperial ages during the 
Enlightenment. Zielonka defines the EU as a modern empire, which even though it does not 
resemble the big predecessors of that of 19th century Russia or Britain, still shares many 
common characteristics with them. The EU resembles an empire based on its vast territory 
which has the ability to influence or manipulate the international agenda in various parts of the 
word, therewithin, its neighborhoods (Zielonka 2013, 36). The specificity of the modern empire 
is the civilizing missions, that are the tools the empire uses to convince the peripheries that the 
imperial policies carried by the empire are also good for the periphery, not only the imperial 
center. A civilizing mission can be viewed as successful when the metropolis and the periphery 
both view them as credible and desirable. To sum up, the EU could therefore be seen as using 
normative power through these civilizing missions to legitimize imperial policies in the 
neighborhoods, more specifically, as a ‘normative power’ that is ‘civilizing’ other parts of the 
world. A quote from Nicolas de Condorcet, who was one of the key figures of the French 
Enlightenment, shows the interesting parallels that can be drawn from the enlightenment 
philosophers and their civilizing missions:  
 
“[we have] a holy duty to help those peoples which, to civilize themselves, wait 
only to receive the means from us, to find brothers amongst Europeans and to 
become their friends and disciples (Zielonka 2013, 50)”.  
 
The language used by Nicolas de Condorcet in the 17th century reminds us to a certain extent 
of the idea of the European Neighborhood Policy and its mission of creating a ‘ring of friends’ 
amongst its neighbors. As Zielonka (2013, 50) so correctly has pointed out, it seems that the 
eastern neighborhoods have turned into ‘friends’, while it is still unknown what the southern 
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neighbors will become to Europe, and to the EU specifically. Again, the question arises of 
whom Morocco, Tunisia or Algeria will call when there is a need to talk to Europe. 
 
EU foreign policy as Normative Empire Europe  
Raffaella Del Sarto (2016) seemingly agrees with Zielonka’s view of the EU as imperial, as he 
argues that we should define the EU as a ‘Normative Empire Europe’. He finds that by using 
this conceptualization, we can best explain European foreign policy in a global as well as a 
regional perspective. Del Sarto takes issue with both the normative conception of the EU, as 
well as the constructivist-rationalist divide in IR-theory. The conceptualization of Europe as 
an empire, a vast, composite and ever-expanding entity with ‘fuzzy’ borders, bridges these 
divides (Del Sarto 2016, 215). The EU is indeed engaged in normative activity, but these 
activities are in large to serve as security for the European borders as well as its economic 
interests: 
 
“By conceptualizing the EU as an empire, we may conceive of the EU’s 
exporting of rules and practices to neighboring states as the modus operandi of 
empires in pursuit of their own interests; this modus operandi also serves the 
construction of a normative identity (Del Sarto 2016, 216).” 
 
Applying such a definition would eliminate the recurring problem of contradictions between 
the EU serving as normative in some cases, while appearing only interested in securing its 
political and economic interests at the same time. Del Sarto (2016, 228) argues that there are 
cases in which the norm-driven behavior is simply a utility-maximizing strategy in itself. EU 
policies can seem contradictory, such as the rhetorical commitment to human rights while 
advancing trade relations with authoritarian regimes, but according to Del Sarto, this simply 
reflects the interests of the European Empire.  
 
EU foreign policy as neo-Kantian and Eurocentric   
Ueli Staeger (2016, 981) also finds that the EU works as an imperial force, and takes it further 
by stating that this makes EU foreign policy a neo-Kantian, Eurocentric discourse that 
‘reinvigorates an outdated European moral paternalism’. Staeger argues that the EU indeed is 
attempting to be a post-imperial, non-colonial normative power, but that it simply does not 
achieve this goal, specifically in its EU-Africa relations. The current idea that European 
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normativity rests on claims of universality cannot withhold scrutiny from a decolonial point of 
view (Staeger 2016, 995). Staeger does not attempt to diminish the possible value of NPE as a 
force for good in world politics, but nonetheless, that it is possible Eurocentric construction 
would have to be reconsidered and understood. There is a need for scholars in EU studies to 
pay attention to Eurocentric knowledge and the way it is being produced.  
 
EU foreign policy and decolonization theory    
 
“One doesn’t leave one’s own self behind as easily as all that (Kohn and 
McBride 2011, 55)”. Alberto Memmi.  
 
To discuss the EU as a foreign policy actor in North Africa without having discussed theory of 
decolonization and post colonialism seems rather problematic. Article 1(2) of the UN charter 
states that the UN and it’s member states shall have : “respect for the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen 
universal peace (UN 1973)”. The guiding principle of self-determination is the foundation of 
the way the international system has been built after the war. Although it is a guiding principle, 
it has proved to be enduringly difficult to theorize (Stilz 2015, 2). The post-war period has been 
marked by many different territorial disputes and questions have arisen to what extent self-
determination applies only to overseas dependencies or also to internal minorities. Moreover, 
whether democratic governance is a prerequisite for self-determination or if it is compatible 
with non-democratic entities, is another important aspect.  
 Kohn and McBride (2011) state that postcolonial perspectives are underrepresented in 
political science and that they can be used to enlighten many issues in contemporary politics. 
Looking at the political regimes and case studies in this thesis, it seems appropriate to keep in 
mind this perspective. Postcolonialism as a concept has been critiqued from many stances, and 
there is not one universally applied definition. This thesis will use the definition of Kohn and 
McBride (2011, 8), on postcolonialism as a branch which; “encompasses the critique of 
colonialism, the movements for national liberation and the ongoing struggles with the legacies 
of colonialism”. Therefore, postcolonialism is not a linear critique of a colonial time which has 
ended, but rather a critique of the emergence of the new world which colonialism created.  
 Theory of decolonization also attempts to deconstruct the difficulties of revolutions and 
democratic development in postcolonial states. Frantz Fanon and Ho Chi Minh, both important 
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contributors to the study of postcolonialism, inherently distrusted state power itself (Kohn and 
McBride 2011, 56). Keeping in mind that revolutions are primarily concerned with a disruption 
of powers, these postcolonial theorists revealed a need for creating long-lasting political 
freedoms and not just a simple change of regime. Revolutions in postcolonial states therefore 
carried quite a complex relation to the concept of revolutions; a distrust of state power itself. 
The important question therefore becomes what this entails for states in which much of the 
political system has been created and based upon the systems of the colonial powers, such as 
in the three cases studied in this thesis. Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, which were all under 
French rule and had most of their territorial borders defined by France.  
 
III.IV EU foreign policy as realist   
Adrian Hyde-Price (2006) critiques the idea of NPE from a realist point of view. He finds that 
structural realist theory can explain the reasoning behind the actions of the member-states to 
cooperate in creating a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). By looking at the 
emergence of the bipolar landscape, he argues that it was the bipolar distribution of power that 
laid the foundation for European integration; following IP theory stating that bipolar systems 
are easier to co-operate within than multipolar ones. So, when the international system became 
bipolar after the Second World War, Europe found it easier to shape its environment and secure 
“milieu goals” by co-operating (Hyde-Price 2006, 224). The main argument is therefore that 
the EU works as a collective instrument, created by the member-states, to shape the external 
milieu by using both soft and hard power.  
Mark A. Pollack (Pollack 2012) also critiques NPE for holding a naïve view of the EU, 
and that the EU is much more complex than presumed in this theory. Normative Power Europe, 
in Pollack´s words, would therefore be an ideal-type actor that illuminates some of the more 
admirable features of the EU as a global actor. Moreover, he states that it could be argued that 
the EU is ‘posing’ with a normative stand just to secure its political and economic interests, 
and that there are many different studies that show the paradoxes of that conception. This 
conception is also shared by Peter Seeberg (2009, 81) who categorizes the EU as a ‘realist actor 
dressed in normative clothes’. So, even though the EU could be seen as ‘normative’ in some 
cases, it does not mean that it is, nor does it make it into a ‘Normative Power Europe’.  
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It can be somewhat strange to see neorealist theory applied to the study of the EU, as 
structural realism is very preoccupied with hard power, state-centrism, problems of co-
operation under anarchy and so forth. Many realist scholars seem to have avoided EU studies 
for these reasons, in addition to the fact that EU scholars tend to empathize closely with their 
research. However, even though structural realism cannot fully explain the CFSP, it can shed 
light on the ‘systematic pressures’ behind the member states of the EU in seeking international 
cooperation (Hyde-Price 2006, 219).  
 
III.V EU foreign policy as a result of productive ambiguity   
The EU is often critiqued for having a lack of coherence and consistency in its foreign policies 
(Noureddine 2016, Pace 2014), which the handling of Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011 are 
examples of. Is the idea of the EU as a normative power that has transformative impacts outside 
of its borders still plausible after the EU’s handling of these conflicts? While many critical 
voices would answer ‘yes’ to this question, Ahrens (2018, 209) would say that this ambiguity 
in EU foreign policy is a driving force for the EU’s ability to have a transformative agenda. 
She argues that the ambiguities that the social world entails is a fact, and that this ambiguity 
does not impinge the ability of the EU to have transformative powers, by stating that:  
 
“the EU’s own ambiguous structure and the fact that it necessarily had to acquire 
tremendous expertise in negotiating opposing positions is conducive to its 
transformative agenda because by this means, the EU is much better able to 
consider, reflect and embrace the normative tensions and ambiguities that come 
with any sort of transformation (Ahrens 2018, 202).”  
 
Ahrens therefore sees ambiguity as a specific potential for the EU to pursue a transformative 
agenda on the international stage. The structure of the EU is based on the parallel existence of 
both societal and classical state-centric structures, and these dimensions are constantly present. 
This means that there is dualism and undecidability in the very structures of the EU (Ahrens 
2018, 201).  
Moreover, there is the case of normative ambiguity, which is based on the belief that 
normative change and norms, in themselves, are inherently ambiguous. These two dimensions 
form the foundation of the EU’s inherent ambiguity, making the EU an expert in dealing with 
opposing positions. Ahrens argues that this expertise is an asset in normative change that is 
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contested, and that it can prove beneficial because it enables the EU to embrace such 
contestation, which furthermore allows for greater legitimacy in processes of change (Ahrens 
2018, 205-206). Instead of fleeing from the ‘Flight from Ambiguity’, Ahrens proposes that one 
should embrace and accept this duality, since it has the power to contribute to change. The 
complexity of issues in global affairs makes it difficult to expect definite and unambiguous 
answers, therefore, a certain ‘sensitivity to contingency’ is necessary. 
 
III.VI The idea of NPE – a contradiction in terms?  
As reviewed in this chapter, the debate that hinges on the role of the EU in world affairs is an 
ample one, resting on many different assumptions and possible routes of explanation. The 
discussion began with the distinction of Europe as a holder of military power, civilian power 
and/or power over opinion. Bull (1982, 163) thought that the idea of Europe as a civilian power 
was a contradiction, because the civilian power of an actor always rests upon its military 
capacity. However, as previously discussed, the act of having military power in itself does not 
mean that holding normative power is impossible, but that it might be undermining its effect.   
This division of powers culminated in the theory of the EU as a normative power that 
can shape conceptions of what is considered normal. According to NPE, the EU holds power 
over opinion specifically because of its unique historical creation, hybrid polity and political 
and legal foundation. This sui generis character enables the EU to have a unique ability to 
communicate in world affairs. The different critiques were then presented, fruitfully so, as to 
require a better understanding of NPE but also to understand its limitations. 
The critiques have been multifaceted. First, the NPE perspective can become a self-
fulfilling prophecy that is being reproduced by EU officials and academics, which implies great 
responsibility when undertaking research on the EU. Second, there is a need to better 
understand the external perceptions of the EU as an international actor, before fully 
understanding how the EU can influence third parties. Third, the EU’s ability to have normative 
influence can depend on whether integration or association are plausible carrots for the EU to 
use in negotiations. Fourth, the ability to ‘diffuse’ norms might simply base itself upon the 
imperial element of the EU in its dealings with its neighbors. Fifth, the EU might simply pose 
as a normative power while striving to secure its proper interests as a realist actor disguised in 
normative clothes. Sixth, the EU’s ability to have normative impact might also rest upon its 
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ambiguous structure, which in its construction allows it to have a better reflection around 
normative tensions. There are in other words, many different observations, and limitations one 
must be aware of when considering the validity of normative influence of the EU.    
Based on the preceding sections, this thesis will consider the validity of the NPE 
perspective in the Maghreb. NPE will therefore be used as a point of departure, to “explain, 
understand and judge the EU in global politics (Manners 2013, 304)”. However, some 
clarifications should be made. The thesis will not attempt to make a statement about what the 
EU should be or how it should act, instead it will focus on how the EU is indeed acting in its 
southern neighborhood. This thesis is therefore focusing on the exercise of power rather than 
a general understanding of the characteristics of the actor, since all actors could be said to have 
some sort of a normative foundation to their foreign policies (Larsen 2014, 898). The cases 
studied will be used to understand how the EU acts with its neighbors that do not have the 
possibility to fully integrate, but still are intimately close with the Union. As this thesis seeks 
to explain the role of the EU as a democracy promoter in the Maghreb, a comprehension of 
ideational as well as material types of power will be of importance. Therefore, instead of 
focusing on the wide normative space, this thesis will consider the EU’s role, specifically in 
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IV Methodology  
This study is a comparative historical analysis (CHA) of the EU as a foreign policy actor in 
three North African cases; (1) Morocco, (2) Algeria and (3) Tunisia. The aim is to understand 
how the EU acts, and is perceived, as a global actor in these states, and whether there are 
similarities or differences between the cases. The analysis is based upon data collected through 
documents and interviews. This chapter attempts to clarify these methodological choices and 
seeks to explain the reasoning behind the chosen form of data collection.  
First, the comparative historical method is presented and discussed. Second, case 
studies are examined as well as the intentions behind the case selection. Third, the data that has 
been collected is then clarified. Finally, some concluding thoughts on reliability and validity 
are considered.   
 
IV.I Comparative historical analysis 
Applying a comparative historical approach serves to understand differences or similarities in 
EU approaches, and how and whether they have changed with time. Application of CHA allows 
for a juxtaposition of historical patterns across the Northern African cases, which serves to 
understand the roles of actors in space and time. Mahoney and Rueshemeyer (2003, 6) find that 
CHA; “is defined by a concern with causal analysis, an emphasis on processes over time, and 
the use of systematic and contextualized comparison”. This approach is appealing because it 
can shed light on contemporary policies by placing contemporary issues in a historical context 
to elucidate cross-sectional differences. As EU foreign policy has been described as an ongoing 
puzzle, applying a case-based historical comparison that, specifically, will allow for an 
understanding of real-world puzzles does seem appropriate. Viewing the EU as a foreign policy 
actor through historical lenses in different cases will therefore allow for a better understanding 
of how the EU functions as a global actor today.  
 To the present-day, the works of Tocqueville, Marx, Durkheim and Weber remain 
some of the most cited works in political science, all of whom pursued CHA as a central mode 
of research (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 3).  In recent years there has also been a surge  
in literature focusing on comparative historical approaches (Mahoney 2004, 81).   
“ [...] CHA has been robust because the best work in this tradition remains true 
to core features that link it to the classics and that continue to define CHA as an 
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approach – its focus on macroconfigurational explanation, its emphasis on deep 
case-based research, and its attention to process and the temporal dimensions of 
politics (Mahoney and Thelen 2015, 28)”. 
 
Moreover, Mahoney and Ruchmeyer (2003, 10-13) state that CHA has three specific 
characteristics that separate it from other historical methods, namely; (1) its concern with 
identifying causal configurations that produce major outcomes; (2) its comprehension of 
historical sequences and processes unfolding over time; and finally (3) its focus on specific 
case-knowledge, which allows for a higher level of conceptual and measurement validity than 
with large case studies. This is not to say that there are no challenges with this approach. 
Problems of unresolved epistemological issues and the tension between structuralism and 
culturalism are some examples (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 5).  
CHA is fundamentally concerned with identifying causal configurations, and puts 
causal arguments at the heart of analysis (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 11). Achieving a 
good causal analysis requires selecting and testing specific causal propositions. However, 
studying ideational diffusion can be problematic. Making causal claims about the EU ideational 
diffusion is quite difficult, and one should therefore be careful with making harsh claims. Lenz 
(2013, 223) finds that because of these difficulties, one should judge the causal claims by their 
plausibility as “establishing ‘real’ causality is largely out of reach”. EU influence occurs in 
many ways, and indirect influence is simply one of them.  
Process tracing has become an important tool for identifying causal mechanisms in 
qualitative analysis over the last decades (Collier 2011, Mahoney and Thelen 2015). Collier 
(2011, 823) defines process tracing as “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence 
selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator”. 
This application of pattern making is often used by researchers who study few cases, as to 
avoid problems of spurious correlations (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 363). However, 
the recurring problems of most methods, such as missing variables and measurement errors, 
are also challenges faced within this method.  
 
Periodization  
Ira Katznelson (2003, 271) describes the importance of applying a periodization on temporal 
projects and that they should, implicitly or explicitly, rest on assumptions about structurally 
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inscribed historical dynamics. The periodization allows for an understanding of how the EU as 
a global actor functions in the political landscape of that set time, keeping in mind critical 
junctures and specific events. Using periodization will also make it easier to cross-examine the 
cases.   
The temporal aspects are divided into three periods; (1) Pre-Arab Uprisings from 1992 
– 2010; (2) The Arab Awakening 2011 – 2014; and (3) Post-Arab Uprisings and Migration 
Crisis from 2015 until today.  Period I is characterized by the EU supporting incumbent 
authoritarian leaders in North Africa (Ghafar 2019, Jaidane 2019, Pace 2014, 2009). Period II 
marked a shift with the Arab Awakening taking place, and the EU seemingly shifts its approach 
towards the region. Finally, period III is marked by the aftereffects of the Arab Uprisings, with 




1992 – 2010 
Period II 
2011 – 2014 
Period III 
2015 - 2021 




The end of the cold war and 
the 9/11 attacks.   
Democratic awakening – the 
belief in change and ideals.  
Economic difficulties. The 
migration wave hits Europe.  
Table 1: Historical Periodization 
 
 
IV.II Case studies 
Case studies are a methodological design that allows for an in-depth and detailed examination 
of one or multiple cases. Researching multiple cases makes it possible to examine similarities 
and differences between cases by seeking to understand variation. Even though case studies 
have a long tradition in comparative politics, there is no golden standard of application.  
Consequently, there are many ways to define the case study. John Gerring (2004, 342) states 
that a case study is best understood as an “intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of 
understanding a larger class of (similar) units”. Robert Yin (2014, 16), on the other hand, argues 
that a case study “investigates a contemporary phenomenon in its real-world context.” The 
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definitions are many, and the comprehension of what a case is varies, therefore, clarifications 
are in order.  
As the thesis question revolves around an understanding of the EU’s role as a global 
actor in third states, there are many factors that must be taken into account. The attention to 
detail is essential in this analysis, and a case study therefore seems appropriate. This will 
require an in-depth understanding of the historical foundations of each case. George and Bennet 
(2005, 5) state that a case study is; “a detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode 
to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events”. It is, 
however, important to be aware of the ‘may’, as one should be careful to generalize based on 
a few number of cases. This adds on to a recurring issue in research, namely, the trade-off 
between parsimony and generality (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, 20).  
The difference in the number of cases has been discussed as an important factor when 
putting statistical methods up against case studies. Even though it could be argued that case 
studies are all kinds of studies that include cases in research, understanding case studies as 
‘small-n’ studies has been the principled definition over the last few years. Whereas large-N is 
defined as statical methods, case studies have been characterized as small-n. George and 
Bennet (2005, 39) argue that the belief from the “bigger is better” culture, which implies that 
statistical methods are always preferable when there is sufficient data, is not valuable; each 
method can answer and justify different questions. Nonetheless, it is important to retain that 
even if one can find casual connections within a case or between a few cases, it does not mean 
that it can inform about the causal effect across the population (Fearon and Laitin 2008, 756). 
Awareness of the generalizability of each study is a must. However, it should be stated that this 
thesis does not seek to create universalized knowledge that is generalizable to everything in 
time and space. Rather, it aims to yield meaningful advice concerning contemporary politics 
and possibilities.  
Where formal models and statistical methods are weak, case studies tend to be strong. 
George and Bennet argue that case studies have four strong advantages. First (1), they have the 
ability to contribute with conceptual validity by finding indicators that can represent the 
theoretical concept in the best possible way. Contextual factors are very important when 
studying variables that most political scientists are interested in, namely democracy and power. 
Attention to detail and context in a case study minimizes the chance of ‘conceptual stretching’, 
which is risky in statistical methods. Second (2), case studies have strong procedures for 
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fostering new hypotheses. During the examination of outlier- or deviant cases and field work, 
there is always the possibility of identifying new variables and hypotheses. Third (3), case 
studies explore causal mechanisms. The detailed examination within cases allows for an 
inductive observation of the conditions under which a causal mechanism is operating. Finally 
(4), the case study has the capacity to assess complex causal relations by considering 
interaction effects and path-dependency. Nonetheless, the generalizations produced by case 
studies tend to be narrower and more contingent than statistical methods. Middle-range theories 
as such can be of great value. However, others might find that theories should be more 
generalizable, even if this in some cases might mean that they are more vague or prone to 
counterexamples (George and Bennett 2005, 93). 
There are limitations to the case studies method. It is important to be aware of the typical 
trade-offs that can occur between parsimony and richness and between wanting to achieve high 
internal validity and seeking broad generalizations (George and Bennett 2005, 95). This study 
combines within-case analysis and cross-case comparison, as there has been a growing 
consensus that this type of study has the strongest means to draw inferences (George and 
Bennett 2005, 39).  
 
Case selection 
For a successful application of case studies, it is imperative to clarify and argue the justification 
of the selection process. Case studies have many strengths, as seen in the section above, but 
can also be misused and misrepresented. Bogaards (2019, 71) finds that most empirical 
research on democratization applying case studies, use the method implicitly, rather than 
explicitly. This is problematic because it makes it difficult to evaluate the different 
contributions to the literature. It also reflects the problem of definitions and conceptualizations 
(Gerring 2004, Bogaards 2019, George and Bennet 2005). Hence, the section below will clarify 
the reasoning behind choosing Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia as the cases selected in this study.   
The cases have been selected by a most-similar sample, based on their somewhat similar 
background and characteristics. The EU has an established relation with their Eastern and 
Southern neighbors through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Most of the MENA 
region is accounted for as Southern Neighbors. The EU’s relationship with its Eastern 
Neighbors has been researched extensively due to their integration process. Southern 
Neighbors are, however, not integrable. Moreover, the countries of the Maghreb tend to 
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become somewhat lost when discussing the MENA-region. There is a need to better understand 
the role of the EU in North Africa.    
Out of the all the North African countries, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco could be 
argued to be the most similar cases with different outcomes. All three cases share many of the 
same historical, linguistic, and cultural similarities as well as their colonial history. However, 
the three cases exhibit different outcomes along the theoretical and periodical frame of interest. 
They have seen different democratic developments after their independence, and the EU has 
been present as an actor since the very beginning. The three countries have their peculiarities 
but share a common foundation, and together, they make up the Maghreb.   
 
The Maghreb  
“All these countries, and in particular Tunisia, are very dependent on the EU 
economy so that the persistent weakness in the latter has continued to limit their 
capacity to recover (Arroyo 2015, 1)”.  
 
The thesis will focus on how the EU functions as a foreign policy actor in the Maghreb, namely 
because of this specific and complex relationship that Europe shares with the region, attempting 
to unpuzzle Arroyo’s quote. Firstly, (1) the geographical situation renders these Northern 
African states important to the EU. The Arab Mediterranean Countries (AMCs) represent the 
southern gate to Europe across the Mediterranean, which poses many different security 
problems. Securing stability in the region has always been of big importance for the EU, trying 
to avoid large migration flows amongst others. Secondly, (2) the Maghreb shares a long and 
complex colonial history with Europe, which has resulted in cultural and linguistic influence 
flows between the actors. Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria have been under French, Spanish, and 
Portuguese rule during different points in time. This is an important aspect, because France and 
Spain are both big players in the EU, which in turn underlines the importance of understanding 
how these two states take part in the development of the EU foreign policy towards the region. 
These shared colonial, cultural, religious as well as linguistical similarities make up the three 
cases.   
In its purest form, the most-similar method, is based on the selection of cases similar  
in all the measured independent variables, except from the independent variable of interest 
(Seawright and Gerring 2008, 304). However, in an imperfect world, having three states that 
are perfectly identical in background is simply not possible. Knowledge of the area allows 
   
 
38 
nonetheless for an understanding of these three cases as the most similar with difference in 
outcomes, compared to the rest of the region. When compared to the rest of North Africa, these 
three cases are the most similar in background conditions. There is variation in outcomes 
between the three cases of the sample, but when the totality of the sample is compared to the 
rest of the AMC’s the outcomes become more similar. Notably, the democratization process 
could be said to be more successful in the Maghreb, than the rest of the AMCs.  
It should also be stated that the two remaining North African states, Libya, and Egypt, 
do not take part in the study because they have different historical and cultural foundations. 
Libya and Egypt were under Italian and British rule and one can therefore avoid variation of 
colonial inheritances. Focusing on Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria makes it possible to study the 
cases in detail and consider the many complexities of their relationships with the EU. This 
sample of three cases with similar backgrounds but with variation in outcome will allow for a 
possibility of the generation of hypotheses about causality and possible causes of the outcomes 
that vary (Gerring 2011, 52).   
«Reference to history is doubly important in the case of the Maghreb since the precise 
nature and impact of the historical heritage remains an important part of contemporary 
political debate in the region and frequently goes a long way to explaining current 
political alignments, disputes or practices (Willis 2014, 9).» 
 
 
Selection bias  
Selection bias can sometimes occur from the selection process made by the investigator and is 
seen as a reappearing problem in qualitative research (Collier and Mahoney 1996, Geddes 
2003). The selection bias problem is a recurring critique of case studies but also against 
statistical methods. Whereas statistical researchers cannot select cases on the dependent 
variable, it might be appropriate for some purposes in case studies. Case study researchers can 
select cases based on outcomes, to help identify conditions and potential casual paths to that 
outcome, and it can thereafter be tested up against other cases where variation is observed on 
the dependent variable.  
 The researcher’s foreknowledge is also discussed as a problem, as the researcher might 
have cognitive bias in favor of a certain hypothesis. However, without any kind of 
foreknowledge, one would not be able to choose cases based on the most-similar or most-
different method. Moreover, by being aware of one’s owns cultural lenses one can attempt to 
avoid these biases. The cultural filters through which each of us sees the world can become 
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problematic if the researcher herself has not reflected upon her own (Aase and Fossåskaret 
2007, 111). It could be argued that these conceptions are even more important when studying 
EU foreign policy, as it is a field that has been critiqued for researchers being too close to their 
research, engaging in the construction of a specific meta-narrative of the EU as an ‘ideal power’ 
(Cebeci 2012, Pace 2008). Parallelly, it is important to be aware of the lenses through which 
one as a European study European-Arab relations; attempting to avoid the pitfall of Eurocentric 
approaches (Bauer 2015, Staeger 2016).  
 
 
IV.III Data collection  
The study will be founded upon both primary and secondary sources with data collected 
through document analysis and interviews with functionaries in the region. The primary 
sources are official documents stemming from the actors themselves and the interviews, 
whereas the secondary sources will be the already existing academic literature used to enlighten 
the cases (Thagaard 2013, 58).  Being able to collect data and providing the study with its 
proper primary sources, have been important to enlighten parts of the thesis that would not 
have been possible otherwise.  In addition, the extensive searches for literature have given deep 
insight into former studies and has made it possible to form a thesis based upon the works of 
others.  
Applying a triangulation therefore serves to get a more comprehensive understanding 
of the phenomenon. The interviews help understand the evolution of the role of the EU in 
retrospect, while the primary documents will help enlighten the case from its own time. The 
documents serve to understand the historical context, while the interviews will awake personal 
reflections and experiences around these events. This combination can provide an interesting 
and nuanced empirical analysis of the evolution of these political processes (Tjora 2017, 190).  
 
Document analysis  
Document analysis has a long tradition in qualitative research, which implies the analysis of 
documents that have not been written for the purpose of the proposed research project 
(Thagaard 2013, 59, Tjora 2017, 182). An analysis relying solely on secondary sources can be 
equally problematic as one simply focusing on primary sources since researchers that have 
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already analyzed certain sources might have revealed specific aspects of that source, aspects 
that the researcher herself would not be able to do. By using diverse sources in a study one is 
able to reveal the different sides of a problem, and therefore piece together a more complete 
picture of the phenomenon (Gerring 2017, 174).  
The analysis of pre-existing documents can illuminate a certain case or phenomenon 
from a specific point of time or place (Tjora 2017, 183). This implies that the documents are 
written within a context that the researcher must be aware of and recognize. Therefore, one 
should attempt to understand the context in which each document is formed. There is always 
the potential for sources to be biased. When selecting documents and analyzing them, the 
researcher should carefully judge how this can impact the conclusions made, even though 
judgements about sources rarely are definite (Gerring 2017, 177). Moreover, selecting 
academic works that are peer reviewed can ease this burden (Bårnes and Løkse 2011, 38).  
The challenge with each document analysis is to come to an agreement with the amount 
of documents to use in the analysis. As in the words of Jean Paul Sartre, there is always the 
choice, but that one should know that by not making a choice, a choice is indeed being made 
(Bårnes and Løkse 2011, 15). A proper literature review helps with such a quest.  
The words: ‘EU’, ‘foreign policy’, ‘Maghreb’, ‘North-Africa’, ‘MENA’, ‘Arab 
Spring/Uprisings’ were used as key search words when attempting to find sources on Oria 
through various institutions and google scholar. The key words were also searched for in 
Spanish and French. There were various sources in French and Spanish, but most of the relative 
sources were written in English, also by researchers from these countries. Departing from these 
searches, the early literature review revealed both central and more peripheric sources that 
needed attention. The collection of documents began with the most recently published peer-
reviewed articles on the EU as a foreign actor. Thereafter, the references used in each piece 
were then reviewed to find new relevant sources (Thagaard 2013, 60). This document analysis 
rests primarily on official documents of EU institutions and peer reviewed academic articles, 
whereas some newspaper articles are referred to, to discuss very recent events that have impact 
for the analysis.  
 




Interviews can contribute with important information about how the EU is perceived and 
understood, both from within – and an outside perspective. Interviews make it possible to 
understand and study the opinions and experiences connected to the role of the EU in the 
countries in question. These opinions and experiences allow for an understanding of the world 
viewed from the place of the informant (Tjora 2017, 114, Rubin and Rubin 2012, 4). Interviews 
can be an essential part of understanding a political phenomenon and can shed light on aspects 
that the researcher could not have been aware of otherwise. Moreover, the possibility of 
identifying causal mechanisms that are not evident in other forms of data, can also be 
enlightened by interviews (Mosley 2013, 5). By holding interviews to gather data on the 
informal behaviors that lead to certain outcomes, and the informants understandings of these 
outcomes can be a central mean of producing innovative political science research (Mosley 
2013, 8).  
Semi structured interviews are the most commonly used within qualitative research 
(Thagaard 2013, 98, Tjora 2017, 113); used to get specific information about a certain topic 
(Rubin and Rubin 2012, 31). By holding semi-structured interviews, the researcher is able to 
get specific information from the informant, but it also allows the informant to speak somewhat 
freely (Thagaard 2013, 98). The informant is therefore able to contribute with information that 
the researcher herself might not have thought to ask about. In addition, the structural aspect of 
the interview makes it possible to compare results across the sample.  
A key aspect for having success with semi-structured interviews is maintaining a 
balanced interview situation where the informant feels comfortable enough to share 
information, and for the researcher to be able to establish structure (Tjora 2017, 119). There 
needs to be trust and confidence between the informant and the researcher, and understanding 
the social context is therefore pertinent. The researcher has the responsibility to create a 
comfortable and relaxed situation where the informant feels empowered to share. Moreover, 
the interview should not be too long as to exhaust the informants. The informants have 
therefore been told in advance that the interviews can be expected to last about thirty to sixty 
minutes. By recording the interviews, the researcher can be more interactive with the 
interviewee and focus on the task at hand without stressing about losing information (Tjora 
2017, 166). The study has been accepted by the Norwegian Center for Research and the data 
stored safely in UiB’s secure system (UiB Safe).  
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The informants have been selected by a non-random sample; carefully considered for 
participation. The interviewees have been chosen purposively because of the standing within 
their community, be that either academic, bureaucratic, or political. Because of their expertise, 
the informants have also been valuable to find new literature on the subject (Gerring 2011, 51).  
 
 Overview of informants 
 Background Interview form Interview date 
I Former French diplomat in Morocco Telephone 
(French) 
11.03.21 
II Spanish migration expert in the region  Video conference 
(Spanish) 
16.03.21 
III Spanish diplomat in Tunisia Video conference 
(Spanish) 
21.03.21 
IV Algerian political scientist Video conference 
(English) 
25.03.21 
V Moroccan NGO leader Video conference 
(English) 
26.03.21 
VI Former minister of Tunisia   Video conference 
(French) 
31.03.21 
VII Spanish academic expert on the Maghreb  Video conference 
(Spanish) 
08.04.21 
VIII Moroccan academic expert on EU-Algerian affairs Video conference 
(Spanish) 
05.05.21 
Table 2 Overview of informants 
 
However, difficulties around networks and access can be a problem when sampling, 
specifically when field work is not possible. Gaining access to and finding the knowledgeable 
individuals one is looking for can be complicated. Thanks to a persistent network, interviews 
were possible. Moreover, the snow-ball effect was used, by asking each of the informants if 
they knew of others who could fit the profile and who would be interested in participating in 
the project. The danger of the snowball effect can be that it might lead to a sampling bias of 
interviews, where the interviewees represent the same sides of the topic. To avoid this, having 
different points of departure has been important.   
Interview guides are pertinent to creating structured interviews (Tjora 2017, 153). The 
interview has been divided into three sections; introduction; main theme and concluding 
remarks. The main questions have been made clear in the interview guide, followed by the 
most valuable follow-up questions. The interviewer should always be ready to  follow up 
questions, because it is namely in these types of questions one can aim to find the more detailed 
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and nuanced information (Thagaard 2013, 101). Rubin and Rubin (2012, 124) propose an 
interview structure which resembles the main branches of a tree, where the main branches each 
correspond to a part of the research question. The goal is therefore to get detailed information 
on each branch, which together make up the whole of the research question. There must be 
clear coherence between the branches, and it can be of help to illuminate these in the interview 
if it does not seem clear in the interview guide.   
Conducting interviews also has its methodological difficulties, and the epistemological 
discussion between a positivist and interpretivist orientation of the discipline remains 
problematic (Mosley 2013, 10). This thesis will treat the interviews as a means of generating 
knowledge and attempt to identify causal processes that generate outcomes. Regardless of 
epistemological background, as an interviewer it is important to understand that one’s 
individual traits can affect the interview process. Being aware of these “interviewer effects” is 
important for both the analysis and the interpretation of the data (Mosley 2013, 12). Moreover, 
there are difficulties such as language barriers and cultural lenses that must be taken into 
account when interviewing informants and analyzing data across nationalities and cultures 
(Aase and Fossåskaret 2007, 111). The cultural language in itself can also be problematic. 
Staying updated about the situation of the interviewee, before, during and after the interview 
is a must to avoid ethical difficulties and simply to remain professional.  
 
IV.IV Reliability and validity  
Every research design must be evaluated for consistency and accuracy; it is important that the 
study correctly measures what it is supposed to do. As this thesis seeks to yield meaningful 
advice on the EU’s role as a foreign policy actor, both for academia and for policy makers, it 
is important that the study is reliable and valid (Walt 2005). 
Reliability usually refers to the idea of the precision of a measurement and the 
confidence one can place upon this measurement (Mosley 2013, 24). Properly capturing the 
information received in the interviews will be made easier when there is an effective way to 
record the data of the interviews. All the interviews are recorded, and notes are taken during 
the interview to avoid losing precision. This is important because it makes it possible to address 
uncertainties about translation. Moreover, there is always the problem of different scholars 
getting different answers in interview situations (Mosley 2013, 25). Even though it might be 
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impossible to ever remove this problem of reliability, as a researcher, one can attempt to 
compare results across the same scope.  
Empirical research has as the ultimate objective to accurately test a theory or argument, 
an accuracy which rests on validity (Gerring 2011, 81). The validity of a study implies to what 
extent the study actually measures what it is attempting to measure. The notion of validity is 
not only referring to the findings of a study but can also refer to the research design and the 
technique by which data is being collected. This suggests that the whole process and all the 
phases of the research are all subject to the same requirements of accuracy and validity. 
Moreover, one should be aware of the two levels of precision, internal validity and external 
validity (Gerring 2011, 84). Internal validity is based on the ability to draw the correct 
conclusions of causal inference from the chosen sample, while external validity refers to 
whether these causal inferences can be generalized to other phenomena. A study can therefore 
be internally valid, and still lack external validity.  
 The internal validity of this study is hence based on whether the findings are precise 
and correct for the cases chosen. Reflecting on problems that might arise in regard to this, one 
should be aware that the internal validity might be threatened by the way documents are 
collected as there are dangers of excluding important materials that could not be reached. The 
risk of lacking important information is always a problem in such studies, and could be argued 
even more so in this thesis, since there will be documents from the foreign ministries and 
diplomatic agreements that will not be possible to reach. Moreover, even though the interviews 
are conducted in French, Spanish, and English; French or Spanish, being the first languages to 
some interviewees, it is important to note that the lack of Arabic is problematic, as it also is the 
maternal language of some informants. 
 Regarding external validity, this thesis aims to provide information on EU foreign 
policy, and then specifically how EU foreign policy impacts the neighbors that are outside the 
scope of a comprehensive EU integration. Even though the thesis studies only three cases, it 
can still bear fruitful results that could help understand the role of the EU as a foreign affairs 
actor in a global aspect. It should also be noted that the issue of external validity is not provable 
by definition, which implies that it rests at the level of assumption, since all empirical 
knowledge to an extent is uncertain (Gerring 2011, 83). This understanding implies that the 
findings, if reliable, can give advice and inspiration for future studies that can test upcoming 
assumptions. 
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V Empirical Analysis  
In this chapter the cases of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria are analyzed in a historical 
comparative perspective. The relationship between the EU as a foreign policy actor and 
democracy promoter will be investigated in each case and then compared in an analytical 
discussion in the following chapter. Starting from West to East, Morocco will be the first case 
presented, then Algeria and finally Tunisia.  
Each case is analyzed by periods. The first period, (1) Pre-Arab Uprisings from 1992 
– 2010, is marked by a change in the international system. The cold war is over, and the bipolar 
world order is transforming into a more unipolar world. Human rights, democratic development 
and international cooperation become increasingly important. The second period, (2) The Arab 
Awakening from 2011 – 2014, begins with the intifada2 taking place in Tunisia in December 
of 2010. The movement spreads quickly around the Arab world, leading to large protests in 
most of the AMCs. The period therefore studies the reaction of the EU, both considering the 
rhetorical responses as well as the policy responses towards the events. Period three, (3) Post-
Arab Uprisings from 2015 until 2021, is characterized by the after effects of the Arab 
Uprisings. The large protests have led to instability in many of the AMCs, where some have 
been more successful in their democratic transition than others. There is a high rise in the 
number of migrants attempting to make their way over the Mediterranean, which becomes the 
epicenter of the crisis.  
The analysis will attempt to see the role of the EU through periodical historical lenses. 
By analyzing the cases periodically, a systemized comparison will naturally take place in the 





2 Tunisians themselves refer to the uprisings in 2010 as the intifada, which in Arabic means a legitimate 
resistance movement revolting against oppression. English speakers often refer to it as the Jasmin Revolution.  
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V.I The Moroccan Case 
The Strait of Gibraltar divides Europe and Africa, with only 13 kilometers separating the 
Kingdom of Morocco and Spain. Morocco’s geopolitical status makes it a very important 
partner for Europe. Morocco has been viewed as one of the Arab countries that is closest to the 
West, as an ’havire de paix’, an island of peace and stability, in a region of uncertainty 
(Vermeren 2016, 3). Some have even gone as far as naming Morocco a “European model 
student” following Europe’s goal of securing a stable political system in the region (Fakir 2019, 
53).  
Nonetheless, Morocco has seen troubling times of colonization by the Arabs and the 
Europeans up until its independence in 1954. The Arab Uprisings also saw its day in Morocco 
in 2011, even though the protests were of smaller degree than in other AMC’s. King 
Mohammed VI attempted to avoid further protests and responded to the protest movements 
with the promise of constitutional reform. The reforms promised a stronger parliamentary 
power and governmental power, ostensibly offering a more adequate balance with the 
monarchy (Ghafar and Jacobs 2019, 7). After the elections in 2011, which gave power to the 
Islamist fraction of the Parliament, the monarchy has slowly tightened its grip on the political 
situation yet again (Fakir 2019, 54).  
 The trade picture of Moroccan – EU relations is quite similar to that of the other 
countries of the Maghreb. The largest trading partner of Morocco is the EU, which accounted 
for 59.4% of its trade in 2017 (EC 2020d). Out of all the exports of Morocco, 64.6% went to 
the EU, while 56.5% of Morocco’s imports came from the EU. In the year 2000 the two actors 
signed an Association Agreement which created a Free Trade Area by providing tariff-free 
two-way trade of industrial products combined with a liberalization. Morocco therefore shares 
heavy ties with the EU, and the periods will investigate this relationship more profoundly.  
 
Period I – Pre-Arab Uprising  
The strong relationship between the West and Morocco can be traced back to 1777, when the 
Kingdom of Morocco became the first country to recognize the independence of the United 
States. By 1912, Morocco was divided into Spanish and French protectorates, with the famous 
international zone in Tangiers. Morocco has kept a strong relationship with its former 
colonizers, and with the US, a fact that became important when choosing sides during the Cold 
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War. However, with the end of the Cold War came the hope of a new international order, in 
which international cooperation was to become a key factor. The first diplomatic ties with the 
EU appear as early as 1969, when a trade agreement came into force. However, the first legally 
binding policy takes place in 1995 with the Barcelona Process (EC 2013, 8).  
 The Barcelona Process inaugurated the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMPI) in 
1995. EMPI was based on Association Agreements (AA) between the EU and the country in 
question. Morocco and the EU signed such an association agreement, which put emphasis on 
expanding bilateral agreements for cooperation on social and political issues, as well as 
migration and security. The AA with Morocco was signed in 2000 and is the foundation upon 
which the whole relationship between the EU and Morocco is built.  
King Hassan II, the father of current King Mohammad VI, drove a highly repressive 
regime in Morocco between 1961 and 1999. The years under King Hassan II became known 
as the Years of Led, under which there were brutal human rights violations and political 
oppression (Fakir 2019, 55). The US and Europe attempted to apply diplomatic and financial 
pressure on Morocco to move away from these policies, and Europe was eager when King 
Mohammed VI succeeded to the throne in 1999; with the hopes that he would reform the 
country from the authoritarian conservatism of his father (Abdelmoumni 2013, 123). The first 
five years of his reign, the famous family reform, Mudawana, came into place, which expanded 
rights for women and children. He also established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
which was supposed to investigate any human rights violations the state had made. In addition, 
he focused on bettering the cooperation between the EU and Morocco, on political issues, 
cultural understandings and trade liberation (Fakir 2019, 56).   
 When the ESS came in 2003, with the following ENP, focusing on democratic 
principles and development, it took EU-Moroccan relations further, with Action Plans (AP) on 
how to pursue these objectives, culminating in a new privileged partnership. A few years later, 
in 2008, Morocco received an ‘Advanced Status’ from the EU. According to a working 
document from the EU-Moroccan Association Council, the status was supposed to:  
“translate into a reinforcement of political cooperation between Morocco and 
the EU in order to better take into consideration their respective strategic 
priorities, and into a progressive integration of Morocco in the EU’s common 
market, in particular with an appropriate financial support commensurate with 
the scope and the ambition of this new development  (Martín 2009, 239)”. 
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The advanced status therefore promised a greater integration into the common market and was 
supposed to make Morocco feel like a special partner and added to such a perception that it 
was. The EU stated that Morocco was getting this status because it had made important reforms 
over the years, after implementing the ENP. Morocco had in this way contributed to prosperity, 
shared security, and shared values for the EU.  
 
Period II – The Arab Awakening 
The Arab Awakening spread to Morocco after Ben Ali escaped from Tunisia, and the protests 
started manifesting in Cairo. On 20th of February 2011,  several hundred thousand people 
protested in different villages and cities, occupied by the Moroccan Association for Human 
Rights (Abdelmoumni 2013, 131). The movement was largely launched by the young 
generation and social media was an important factor for the spreading of these ideas. The 
protest movement was overall united without specific party division, but after a while 
differences arose between the Islamists and the Modernists. The Islamists wanted a stronger 
civil State with democratic rights, limited mandates, and popular sovereignty. On the other 
side, the modernists were afraid that the Islamist model had too much Iranian theocratical 
influence, seeking to use democracy to gain power, and thereafter changing the functioning 
principles (Nordenson 2018, 173). These lines are still important divides in Moroccan politics.  
In general, the protesters came from all spheres of society, keeping in mind that many 
Moroccans wanted to change the political reality, but not forcibly to a radical extent. Most of 
the movement was not against the monarchy per se; but more specifically against the power it 
held over political institutions. Based on what happened in Tunisia and Cairo, King 
Mohammad VI, advised by the French and the Moroccan Intelligence Services, decided to 
tolerate the protests and give it some time before negotiating (Abdelmoumni 2013, 134). The 
King communicated that there would be constitutional change with new elections taking place 
that same year (MohammadVII 2011). The constitutional change entailed giving more power 
to the prime minister, and allowing the party that achieved the largest amounts of votes the 
right to form government (Nordenson 2018, 173). The moderate Islamist Party, Parti Justice 
et Développment, PJD [Progress and Justice Party], won the most seats and formed 
government. They are still in power today.  
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 Even though the revised ENP of 2011 had been in the making for a few years, it did 
become the EU’s response to the events in the neighborhood. The new ENP -  A New Response 
to a Changing Neighborhood (EC 2011b) focalized on the need for more nascent democratic 
and reform processes, by referring to Morocco’s constitutional reform. Stronger support for 
civil society organization and more social cooperation were also important factors in addition 
to the security dimensions (Fakir 2019, 56). After the agreement on the advanced status of 
Morocco in EU relations, there was a need for a new Association Agreement (AA). In 2013 
the EU and Morocco signed a new AP, with the intent to implement this new relationship 
(2013-2017), which reflected the special partnership between the two actors (EC 2013, 4). The 
importance of this relationship was also echoed in the European Neighborhood Instrument 
(ENI) aid and loan packages towards Morocco, which during the period of 2014-2020 received 
around €1.3  to €1.6 billion (EC 2021b).  
 
Period III – Post Arab Uprising    
After the promises of King Mohammad VI in 2011, the situation in Morocco calmed down. 
However, because of larger problems in the region as well as other domestic issues within 
Morocco, the aftermath also had large impacts on Moroccan society. The PDJ was reelected in 
2016, after having held power since 2011. All the same, the coalition government has been 
rather weak, formed of many palace allies, which has restricted the influence of the government 
on the monarchy. The freedom of expression and of the press, has slowly been reduced (Fakir 
2019, 57). Protests have occurred, yet again, because of this and because of the economic strain 
that the country is going through, especially in its rural areas. These domestic issues in 
Morocco, as well as the more serious problems with its neighbors forced the EU, yet again to 
review their position.  
The revised 2015 ENP framework put emphasis on the need for more proactive 
solutions to the growing problems of stability in the region. The instability led to large 
migration flows towards Europe and the growth of terrorism and extremism. For Europe, the 
large migration flows, and the lack of energy sources became problematic. This was reflected 
in the reviewed ENP, where political stabilization became the main political priority (EC 2015, 
2)”, in which Morocco has been the most important partner.  
In the aftermath of the Arab Uprising, Morocco has been vital for the EU in supporting 
stability at their borders by stopping migration. In 2018 and 2019, Morocco prevented 135 000 
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migrants from crossing the borders, 38 000 have been rescued at sea and 300 people-smuggling 
networks have been dismantled (Moran 2019). Whereas Tunisia and Algeria have been going 
through political changes of system, Morocco has been standing more at ease. The large focus 
on anti-terrorism campaigns has been very important in the dismantling of multiple terrorism 
cells in Europe.  
Morocco and the EU started negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Area (DCFTA) in 2013, but an agreement has yet to be reached. The overall goal of the DCFTA 
is to facilitate Morocco’s transition into the single market, but there seem to be disagreement 
between the actors as to how fast this transition is to be. The advanced status has been argued 
to be a status for optics, rather than actual ties (Martín 2009). Henceforth, even though there 
seems to be a privileged partnership between the actors, there might be uncertainty about what 
that actually entails from each side, signalizing a lack of common understanding.  
Morocco has over recent years opened its diplomatic ties, attempting to make itself less 
dependent on the EU. There has been a focus on creating a larger diplomatic environment and 
network while maintaining close ties to the US. The success of Morocco was made clear, when 
Donald Trump tweeted that he would support Morocco in the Western Sahara conflict3 in 
December 2020 (Huddleston, Ghoorhoo, and Sardon 2021). The U.S has been an important 
partner for Morocco in this conflict, but they never took sides. Needless to say, Trump’s tweet 
came as a surprise to most people that have worked in the region. As MENA-expert, Eugene 
Rogan, so well has pointed out; even though the Arabs have been colonized and controlled by 
others during most of their history, they have always been very good at taking advantage of the 
different political climates (Rogan and Nyquist 2011, 15). It could seem that Donald Trump 
became another pawn in Morocco’s claim to the Western Sahara.  
 Morocco has also started looking South of the Sahel for more possibilities (Dworkin 
2020). Morocco’s rejoining of the African Union (AU) in 2017 was a very important foreign 
 
3 Shortly explained the Western Sahara is the disputed territory of the former Spanish colony, Spanish Sahara. In 
1973, the Polisario was founded to fight against its Spanish oppressors. The UN demanded that the Sahrawis (the 
local population) were to decide their future in a referendum. However, Morocco marched with 350 000 civilian 
and military personnel, into the territory in 1975. The UN condemned the march. A week later, Francisco Franco 
signed the Madrid Accords, while lying on his death bed, giving administrative responsibility of the area to 
Morocco and Mauritania. The accords have not been deemed valid by the UN, which means that today, Spain still 
carries the administrative responsibility for the territory. In 1988, the parties both signed the ‘Settlement Plan’, 
stating that Morocco was to hold a referendum. However, the referendum has not taken place, hence the conflict. 
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policy achievement for the country. Morocco left the AU in 1984, when the Union admitted 
the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a member state. SADR is the proclaimed 
part of Western Sahara that belongs to the Polisario movement. The dispute over Western 
Sahara might be the most serious problem that the region is facing, specifically because of the 
increased tensions it has created between Algeria and Morocco. Algeria supports the Polisario 
and the Sahrawis, hosting refugee camps and the headquarters of the Polisario. The other Arab 
countries have also supported the Sahrawis wish for freedom, which posed a big problem for 
Morocco in the African Union and the Arab League; the unresolvedness has created major 
problems for Morocco’s foreign policy (Zoubir and Benabdallah-Gambier 2004, 49). It 
therefore seems that Morocco is seeking to make international contacts and allies to secure its 
position on the Western Sahara issue, as the EU has been rather ambiguous on this issue 
(Grande-Gascón and Ruiz-Seisdedos 2017, Fernández-Molina 2017 ).  
Even though the Moroccan Kingdom has started looking South for more opportunities, 
this has, until now, not lessened the economic dependency that the EU represents in Moroccan 
relations (Teevan 2019a, b). The latest agreement in place between Morocco and the EU was 
reached in the Association Council in the end of 2019, focusing on the need to find common 
ground in expectations (Lenzu 2019), with the objective of giving new ‘impetus’ to the 
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V.II The Algerian Case 
Algeria, the largest country by area in Africa and the Arab world, is a pivotal energy and 
security partner for the EU, being amongst Europe’s top three gas suppliers (Ghanem 2019, 
17). Out of the three cases presented in this study, Algeria is the country in which the Arab 
Uprisings seemed the least threatening to the regime, which survived the uprisings without too 
many difficulties. However, it could have been the calm before the storm which occurred in 
2019 when the people awakened in protest after president Bouteflika decided to run for another 
term, having held power over the last twenty years.  
Algeria’s relationship with Europe is complex, specifically because of the heavy history 
that Algeria shares with France. In I870, Algeria became an official part of France, and by the 
1920s over 800 000 French citizens settled in the area (Nordenson 2018, 58). Even though 
Morocco and Tunisia were French colonies as well, only Algeria became a settlement colony, 
with all the political administration that entailed. In comparison to the independence processes 
in Tunisia and Morocco, the Algerian War for independence became very bloody, lasting from 
the first insurrections in 1954 until the final formal independence in 1962. The eight-year long 
brutal war left Algerian and French relations with an ‘intensely emotional and complex 
relationship’ (Willis 2014, 294). The French administrative structure of Algeria, and the one 
million French citizens living in Algeria at the time, did however ensure that all ties were not 
broken.  
The first connection between Algeria and the EU dates to 1969 when the EEC signed a 
cooperation agreement with the country. In 1976, a broader cooperation that included finance 
and trade came into place (Ghanem 2019, 20). The EU is, equally as in the case of Morocco 
and Tunisia, the largest trading partner for Algeria, accounting for 50.3% of all international 
trade (EC 2020c). In 2019, 67% of all exports went to the EU, whereas the EU represented 
44% of all Algerian imports. Due to the decrease in oil-prices between 2015-2016, the Algerian 
economy took quite a hit, resulting in a decrease in EU-Algeria trade by 13.3%. When 
considering Algerian goods imported by the EU, it becomes clear that 95.7% were that of fuel 
and mining products. The ties between the EU and Algeria are therefore based on strong 
economic dependency and that of a complex historical and political relationship.   
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Period I – Pre-Arab Uprising  
Algeria experienced large difficulties during the 1990s, with a civil war raging in the country. 
After Islamists won the elections in 1992, the army decided to take control of the state. The 
regime fought against the Islamists over many years, a war that would cost the lives of a 
100 000 Algerians (Nordenson 2018, 118). Even though Algeria suffered from serious 
domestic problems, they were still participating on the international stage. They became a part 
of the Barcelona Process in 1995, but it took years of negotiation before there was a legal 
foundation of EU-Algerian relations. 
In 2005, the Association Agreement (AA) was reached and entered into force, which is 
the key legal basis of EU-Algeria relations (EC 2021a). The objective was to consolidate the 
economic, political and cultural bonds between the two actors, while focusing on securing 
human rights and democratic development (EC 2005). Another important aspect was for the 
EU to support the diversification of the Algerian economy, based on the heavy reliance that 
Algeria had on gas and petroleum. The AA did however receive critique for being unbalanced 
and not actually aiding Algeria in its need to diversify (Ghanem 2019, 22). Algeria’s halt in 
wanting to sign the association agreement therefore had its reasoning.  
In 2008, the AA was deepened on the basis of the ENP framework. However, Algeria 
did not want to sign the ENP Action Plan, which laid out specific points on what democratic 
reforms Algeria was to undergo. Even though the AP was not reached, the EU did decide to 
make a specific agreement on energy with Algeria, which came into force in 2013, showing 
the importance that Algeria represents as an energy source partner for the EU.  
 
Period II – The Arab Awakening 
In January 2011, the Arab Awakening spread to Algeria. The protests were largely driven by 
the same factors as those seen in Tunisia, striving for better human rights, democratic 
development, ending corruption and oppression. Even though Algeria has had large gas and 
petroleum resources, the ruling elite had not been able to secure jobs and economic 
development for the country (Nordenson 2018, 183). The 73-year-old President Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika had been in power since 1999 and the youth wanted change. However, the protests 
in Algeria died out quite quickly, mostly because the regime did not harshly oppose the 
protests, which ended without strong involvement from the state. Fresh in the memory of the 
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Algerians could have been the civil war during the 90s, with a wish to avoid a similar situation. 
In addition, the regime did make some changes, such as lowering the price on basic necessities 
in addition to lifting the 19 year-long state of emergency (Nordenson 2018, 183). A new 
Constitution came into force in 2016, which amongst others, limited the president’s ability to 
run for more than two terms.  
 The EU’s response to the Arab Awakening in Algeria was based on the same 
communications the EU had towards the other countries in the Maghreb in February 2011. The 
EU did set up different types of programs for the coming period, the most important program 
being the Youth-Employment Support Program which was supposed to help the younger 
generation to participate in society and encourage the implementation of a National youth 
Policy (Ghanem 2019, 21). The Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth 
(SPRING) was another project, aimed at supporting democratic reform, amounting to €20 
million. An important democratic factor was the observer mission, sent by the EU to oversee 
the 2012 elections, which was the first time an observational unit had been sent to Algeria. 
There were continuous attempts over the years of 2012-2014 to reach an agreement on a new 
AP, but it took until 2017, when the “Partnership Priority Agreement”, came into place (EC 
2017a).   
   
 Period III – Post Arab Uprising    
As a response to the AMC’s wish for democratic reform, the EU initiated the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which was designed to aid civil 
society’s push for political reforms. The EIDHR in Algeria received around €8 million from 
2015-2020 but was critiqued for leaving the finance to the ruling elite. This left civil society 
organizations dependent on what came to be ‘perceived’ as state funding, even though it came 
from EU funds. The attempt to support civil society organizations did not seem to have effect. 
In 2012 a law on association was passed by the Algerian government, which generated further 
restrictions, resulting in a drop in the number of civil society organizations in Algeria by about 
40% (Ghanem 2019, 31).    
The EU - Algeria Association Council adopted new policies to enhance political and 
economic cooperation through the ‘Partnership Priorities Agreement’ in 2017. Diversification 
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of the economy and participatory democracy were yet again important words on the agenda 
(EC 2017a). The agreement was nonetheless heavily critiqued:   
“Rather than mitigating the imbalance, some directives in the Association 
Agreement increased it. […].  Even if this arrangement seemed favorable to 
Algeria, it was not going to stimulate its imports, for two key reasons; first, the 
EU granted that privilege to several other countries, and hence, duty-free access 
to the EU marked became a standard, and second, this agreement would have 
boosted Algerian imports only if they were truly competitive in quality and 
price, which is not the case (Ghanem 2019, 23)”.  
 
In March 2019, the sitting president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced that he would 
run for a fifth term, having held power for 19 years, even though the 2016 Constitution limited 
the presidential terms to two. The announcement sparked large discontentment within the 
population, which ended up protesting every Friday for almost a year. Hundreds of thousands 
went to the streets, if not millions, to raise their demands. The protesters became known as the 
Hirak movement (Joffé 2020, 163). Bouteflika responded to the protests, stating he would not 
run for another term. However, this was not sufficient for the Hirak. The protests became more 
similar to the larger protests in 2011, demanding a radical change of Algerian politics as a 
whole, by creating measures to prevent cronyism, obscurantism and corruption.  
After the protests and the denouncement of Bouteflika’s intention to run, an interim 
government came into place until new elections could be held on December 12th, when the new 
President, Abdelmajid Tebboune was elected with 58% of the votes (Joffé 2020, 160). 
Moreover, the coverage of the 2019/2020 protests was very silent on the international scene, 
even though Algeria was the actual birthplace of the Arab Uprisings in 1980 (Joffé 2020, 159). 
In addition, the covid-19 pandemic complicated matters further (EC 2020b, 17), as it also has 
for all of the cases.  
In regards to the EU’s reaction to these new protests, Spokeswoman for the European 
Commission, Maja Kocjancic, stated in March 2019, that the rights to freedom of expression 
and assembly were enshrined in the Algerian Constitution, and that the EU expected these 
rights to be respected (Le Figaro 2019). In November 2019, the European Parliament (EP), 
passed a resolution supporting the protestors and the need for democratic regime change (EP 
2019). However, the leaders of the Hirak movement as well the interim regime announced they 
did not need nor want the support of the EP, and that it, on the other hand, showed strong 
European arrogance by ‘ruling on the current political process’ in  their country (Ghanmi 
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2019). Even though the EP passed a resolution, and the spokeswoman for the Commission 
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V.III The Tunisian Case 
The small country of Tunisia, with its 11 million inhabitants, has become somewhat of a 
laboratory subject for democratization after the intifada and the following constitution of 2014; 
making Tunisia one of the, if not the most democratic country in the Arab World (Aziz 2018, 
7). Tunisian ‘exceptionalism’ is not completely new. In 1956, President Habib Bourguiba 
initiated family reform, which gave women rights that were unspoken for in any other Muslim 
country at the time. The golden era of the Phoenicians with Carthage as the most important city 
in the Mediterranean still stands as a proud moment in history for Tunisians, a fact they often 
like to use in negotiations with Europe. Following, in the VII century, the Arabs took over the 
country and established Tunis as the capital known today.  
The first Tunisian constitution came into place in 1861, formed by the liberal ottoman 
beys. However, Tunisia could not escape the French colonization which took place twenty 
years later, in 1881, making the country a French protectorate (Nordenson 2018, 59). In 1956, 
as a part of the larger French decolonization, Tunisia became independent. The first president, 
Habib Bourguiba, launched a modernization campaign, giving Tunisian women and men equal 
civil and juridical rights. Even though Bourguiba became an Arab leader of ‘exception’, he 
ended up proclaiming himself president for life in 1975 (Aziz 2018, 8). Over the next decade, 
Bourguiba’s health declined, and wars of succession were on the rise. Prime minister, Ben Ali, 
carried out a peaceful coup d’état in 1987 and held power up until the Intifada in 2011, when 
he was forced to escape the country. Over the last ten years, Tunisia has attempted a 
comprehensive democratization process whilst fighting terrorist attacks, Islamism, and 
economic difficulties.  
Tunisia has a long-standing relationship with Europe, having been one of the more 
progressive states out of the AMCs, even during the authoritarian years of Bourguiba and Ben 
Ali. The latter having been defined as ‘Europe’s preferred dictator’ (Cherif 2019, 88). In 1957, 
the first year after Tunisian independence, the first treaty was signed with the EEC. In this deal 
Tunisia was reserved ‘special treatment’ in the trading of goods. The agreement was secured 
by France, as way to secure their postcolonial legacy (Cherif 2019, 88). The first Association 
Agreement (AA) came into place in 1969, well before any of the other Maghreb countries. 
Tunisia also took part in the Barcelona Process with the result of a new AA, signed in 1995 
(EU 1998) on which all EU-Tunisian relations are built.   
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The EU is Tunisia’s most important trade partner, accounting for 69.7% of all Tunisian 
exports while the EU represented 52.1% of all Tunisian imports (EC 2020e). There is a deep 
dependency on exporting to the EU from the Tunisian perspective. In addition, Tunisia receives 
EU funding through the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI), which during the period 
from 2017 until 2020, accumulated over €1.1 billion (EU 2020d). Coupled with the large flows 
of foreign direct investments from Europe, the dependency on the EU from the Tunisian 
perspective is quite clear.  
 
Period I – Pre-Arab Uprising  
The idea of Tunisian exceptionalism has been significant in its relationship with the EU. In 
many agreements, Tunisia has been the first out of the AMCs to sign (Jaidane 2019, 137). With 
the Barcelona Process, Tunisia and the EU agreed on a new AA, which would end up being 
the guiding document for all EU-Tunisian relations (EU 1998). The most important aspect of 
the agreement was that Tunisian products would enter the European market tariff-free and that 
European products would have the same advantage in the Tunisian market. The ultimate goal 
of creating a DCFTA between the two actors by 2010 has however, not been successful. In the 
same manner as its Maghrebien neighbors, Tunisia has suffered from an unequal trade picture 
with the EU. In large, Tunisian products are agricultural products, but because of the 
protectionist specificities the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, Tunisian products cannot 
compete with European ones. In the words of Youssef Cherif (2019, 89): “Tunisia opened its 
borders to Europe, but Europe did not reciprocate”. Tunisia also attempted many calls for the 
EU to open its borders to facilitate human mobility, something the EU never agreed to.  
‘Europe’s preferred dictator’, Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, had a very close relationship 
with France all throughout this period. It was a relationship in which France was willing to 
support Ben Ali because of his importance in securing stability and fighting terrorism, even 
though he led an oppressive regime (Wood 2002, 108). Tunisia’s exceptionalism started 
deteriorating with Ben Ali leading the state, and even though he had close ties with Europe, he 
started to refuse the democratic reforms that were parts of the AAs. In 2008, the EU decided 
to freeze the reinforced partnership negotiations that were happening with Tunisia. Even 
though there were some problems in EU-Tunisian relations, the incremental role of Ben Ali as 
a ‘safe’ dictator, being able to make business flow and secure European borders, therefore 
seemed of higher importance than promoting democracy (Powel 2009, 207).  




Period II – The Arab Awakening  
17th of December 2010, the 26-year-old vegetable seller Mohamed Bouazizi lit himself on fire 
in front of the administrative building of his hometown, Sidi Bouzid. Bouazizi felt he had been 
unjustly treated by the authorities, a corrupt and authoritarian rule that felt difficult to overcome 
(Nordenson 2018, 19). Few might have been able to imagine the enormous repercussions of 
this event. Tunisians wanted justice for Bouazizi and real change in the Tunisian political 
system. The authoritarian hand of Ben Ali had increased over many years, creating room for 
himself to sit as president for life. The protests augmented in size quite quickly with Ben Ali 
escaping the country 14th of January 2011. The Tunisian uprisings were successful, and the 
symbolism of that success became very important, spreading quickly to most of the other Arab 
countries.   
 The rapid fall of Ben Ali’s regime was a surprise, and specifically so, for Europe, 
clarified by the uncoordinated response. Tunisia was already an important partner for Europe 
and became even more so after the Arab Uprisings. The European HR of the time, Catherine 
Ashton, visited Tunisia as early as February 2011 to show support. Europe and the rest of the 
world watched with awe as the first democratically elected government, the Troika 
government, started laying out the foundation of the new Constitution, which came into place 
in 2014.  
The 2011 “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern 
Mediterranean (EC 2011a)”, as well as the new revised ENP (EC 2011b) became the two 
guiding documents for the new relationship with Tunisia. Democracy promotion was of high 
importance in these documents, since the path to democracy seemed more achievable in 
Tunisia, than in the other countries of the region, the EU focused heavily on aiding Tunisia in 
this process. In 2012, Tunisia obtained a ‘Privileged Partner’ status in the new AP, within the 
ENP framework (EEAS 2012).  
 
“The EU is determined to make a long-term commitment alongside the Tunisian 
democratic transition […]. Support for the Tunisian transition constitutes, in fact, a 
historic opportunity for the European Union to respond in a substantial, effective and 
positive way to the challenges posed both to Tunisia and by the "Arab Spring", in 
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accordance with the reorientation of the neighborhood policy decided in 2011 (EEAS 
2012, 3) ». 4 
 
The shift in EU rhetoric was clear with the reference to the 2011 ‘Prosperity’ document as well 
as the revised ENP. The meaning behind this new status was to engage Tunisia in negotiations 
for a DCFTA with the EU as well, but which similarly as for its neighbors, have not reached 
agreement.    
 
Period III – Post Arab Uprising    
The period after the Arab Uprisings has seen an intensified relationship between the EU and 
Tunisia. The 2012 ‘Privileged Partnership’ agreement set out an ambitious plan for the 
implementation of this ‘new’ partnership, showing the EU’s willingness to invest in the 
transition and attempt to aid in the consolidation of democracy. The political dialogue since 
then has seen many high-level political exchanges (EC 2017b).  
 In 2014, the Mobility Partnership provided a framework for cooperation on migration , 
with the goal to; “facilitate the movement of people between the EU and Tunisia and to promote 
a common and responsible management of existing migratory flows, including by simplifying 
procedures for granting visas (EC 2014)”. Between 2015 and 2019, 4100 Tunisian students or 
university staff moved to Europe, while 1900 European counterparts moved to Tunisia (EU 
2020d). The mobility agreements can be seen as an example of the of the ‘carrot’ – ‘stick´ 
approach implemented in the ENP, showing this agreement as a result of the transitions that 
Tunisia had been making.  
 In 2016, the EU and Tunisia sent out a joint communication on “Strengthened EU 
support for Tunisia”. The emphasis was put on the strategic importance of supporting Tunisia’s 
transition, attempting to tailor policy towards the country, to avoid a general policy towards 
the southern neighborhoods. The conclusion being that Tunisia would benefit from a more 
involved EU in the short and medium term (EC 2016, 14).  
 
4  Original quote : « L’UE est déterminée à s’engager sur le long terme à côté de la transition démocratique 
tunisienne, [...] L’appui à la transition tunisienne constitue, en effet, une opportunité historique pour l’Union 
européenne afin de répondre de manière substantielle, efficace et positive aux défis posés tant à la Tunisie que par 
le « Printemps arabe », conformément à la réorientation de la politique de voisinage décidée en 2011 ». 
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The years after the Arab Uprisings saw a rise in terrorist attacks in Europe, which could 
be traced back to Tunisian nationals or Europeans with Tunisian origins. The Nice and Berlin 
attacks in 2016 were both carried out by Tunisians (Dworkin and Malki 2018, 16). Tunisia 
experienced multiple terrorist attacks within its own borders as well, struggling with a large 
number of radicalized youths. The augmentation of these security threats frightened Europe, 
keeping in mind that Tunisia was in a fragile state, in democratic transition. Simultaneously, 
debates started growing in Europe about the compatibility of Islam and democracy, which 
resulted in the growth of right-wing populism. The new European populist parties have 
declared their interests in EU foreign policy, and specifically so, towards the Southern 
Neighborhoods (Rivera Escartin 2020).  
In 2018, the ‘Strategic Priorities 2018-2020’ document was adopted (Council 2018) 
with the objective of institutionalizing and strengthening EU support for Tunisia again. The 
document laid out specificities on democracy and human rights, which includes the 
‘reinforcement of the institution of parliament’, ‘the establishment of the Constitutional Court’ 
and ‘reform of the judicial system, an approximation to international standards including those 
of the Council of Europe’(Council 2018, 5). Security is also an incremental part of the plan, 
with the outlining of certain aspects pertaining to migration and terrorist-threats. 
Table 5  Periodization Tunisia 
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1995: The Barcelona Process 
1995: Association Agreement 
2003: European 
Neighborhood Policy 





2015: Revised ENP 
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for Tunisia’.   
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the AMC’s. The migration wave hits 
Europe.  
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V.IV Summary of empirical analysis  
The empirical analysis of the three cases; Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, has shown that the 
EU has different policies towards the countries of the Maghreb. Tunisia and Morocco have had 
a more present relationship with the EU than Algeria. Algeria finalized its Association 
Agreement with the EU ten years after Tunisia, and five years after Morocco.  
During Period I: Pre-Arab Uprisings (1992-2010), after the fall of the Berlin wall, the 
Barcelona Process set out to treat equally the countries of the Southern Neighborhood. The 
French initiated idea, lost traction and was set back because of differences between the 
Maghreb countries. The second half of Period I sees the effects of the War on Terror with an 
increased focus on security. The ENP had as a goal to include and create a better relationship 
with the southern neighborhoods. The first ENP did however, continue to focus on the idea of 
the southern Mediterranean as one unit, without much differentiation in policy. Period I also 
shows that there is a clear rhetoric on supporting human rights and promoting democracy. 
There is, nonetheless, a lack of evidence to support the rhetoric. There was continuous trade 
and cooperation with authoritarian leaders, equally with King Hassan II and Mohammad VI in 
Morocco, with Ben Ali in Tunisia and with Bouteflika in Algeria.  
 Period II: The Arab Awakening (2011-2014) is clearly affected by the events unfolding 
in the south. The EU struggles to give a coordinated response until some months later. The EU 
then responds with a revised ENP and Prosperity Plan, aimed at focusing more on the 
specificities of each country. The revised ENP created Action Plans for each country, with 
different goals and conditionalities connected to each one. The critiques are however 
multifaceted, showing that the differentiation is not specific enough. The rhetoric in EU 
documents focus to a larger extent than before, on democracy and human rights, and clarify 
that the EU seeks to aid the countries in their transition. All three states did make changes to 
their political system after the Arab Awakening, but to different extents. Whereas Tunisia had 
a revolution and institutionalized democracy with a new constitution, Morocco and Algeria 
made some smaller changes to the power dynamics between institutions.   
 Period III: Post-Arab-Uprisings (2015-2021) witnesses both the short-term, as well as 
the long-term effects, that the Arab Awakening had, and continues to have, on the Maghreb 
and how they extend towards Europe. The migration crisis forced the EU to reconsider the 
rhetoric towards the region, agreeing on a new Global Strategy which focused much more on 
the security threats facing the region and the need to secure stability at the borders. This, 
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however, has not been the specific rhetoric in the documents towards each country, which have 
still focused largely on democracy promotion as a guiding principle.  
 The following table shows the development in EU foreign policy towards the Maghreb. 
It summarizes the individual policies towards each country as well as the larger lines of EU 
foreign policy towards the region, with the rhetorical orientation in parenthesis.  
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2013: DCFTA negotiations 
2013: Mobility Partnership 
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1995: The Barcelona Process 
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2015: DCFTA negotiations 
2016: ‘Strengthened EU Support 
for Tunisia’. 




The end of the cold war 
marking the beginning of a new 
world order.  The 9/11 attacks 
in 2001. 
Democratic awakening in the 
AMCs – the belief in change 
and ideals. 
Economic and political difficulties 
in the AMC’s. The migration 
wave hits Europe. The covid-19 
pandemic.   
Table 6: Summary of EU Policy towards the Maghreb 
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VI Analytical discussion   
The preceding chapter has given an empirical analysis of the Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian 
case. This chapter will provide an analytical discussion, attempting to address how the EU 
functions as a foreign policy actor in the region and whether the EU can be understood as a 
promoter of democracy based on the preceding case studies as well as the interviews. The 
discussion will therefore attempt to respond to the following thesis question:  How does the 
nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor affect its ability to promote democracy in the 
Maghreb?  
The analytical discussion will be divided in two sections. First the analysis will be 
discussed within the diachronic division of periods, which will help to illuminate important 
temporal aspects on whether the EU’s role can be said to have changed before, during and after 
the Arab Awakening. The second part of the analysis is synchronic and investigates the 
paradoxes of importance that have arisen in the periodic document analysis and in the 
interviews.  
 
VI.I Periodical analysis  
The cases studied have shown that each case has complex ties with the EU, underlining the 
complexity of the research question. The following section will attempt to enlighten this 
question by addressing to what extent the EU’s role can have said to have changed over time. 
The cases are considered comparatively and in a regional perspective. The diachronically 
structured analysis is reviewed by the three periods as seen in the individual case presentations: 
(1) Pre-Arab Uprisings 1992 – 2010; (2) The Arab Awakening 2011-2014; and (3) Post-Arab 
Uprisings 2015-2021. The objective is therefore to understand the EU as a contemporary actor 
in the Maghreb by viewing it through historical lenses. 
 
Period I – Pre-Arab Uprising 1992 – 2010 
As chapter II showed, the EU had ties and agreements with the Maghreb before the 
institutionalized foreign policy came into place. The EU slowly built up its reputation as a 
global actor and decided after the cold war to institutionalize this role with the Maastricht treaty 
in 1992, of which democratic principles were key, keeping in line with the temporal aspects of 
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the time. 25 years after the Barcelona Process in 1995, the objective of creating a proper Union, 
has still not been achieved. Romeo (1998, 21) asked in 1998 whether the Barcelona Process 
could be an adequate solution to the “real and perceived security problems these countries” 
posed for Europe. She found then it was limited, lacking long-term commitment and political 
vision, as it did not understand or approach the underlying socio-economic problems that were 
present in the Maghreb. She concluded that the policy might be counter-productive; “threating 
to create a truly unsafe Mediterranean for Europe (Romeo 1998, 34)”.  
 The UfM was also a concept that was supposed to promote democratic change in the 
states of the Mediterranean, a project many will say have failed, or at least not reached the 
goals it set out to achieve (Emara 2012, 38, Bauer 2015, 37).This rhetoric of creating ‘a ring 
of friends’ continued in the first ENP of 2003. Informants II and VI spoke to the fact that Spain 
had much more in common with the Mediterranean states, than for example Sweden or Finland, 
keeping in mind that Spain as a periphery of the European Union, is forced to maintain a good 
relationship with their southern neighbors, regardless of the EU. Hence, the idea of a common 
Mediterranean identity to unite these breaches, seems to have been the goal of Sarkozy when 
initiating the UfM.  
Another aspect, regarding the role of certain member states, can be found in the UfM 
as well. The fact that the UfM was a French initiated project, seems to have made it difficult 
for Algeria to participate from the beginning, attempting to avoid the French involvement on 
domestic and international politics. The strict and complicated relationship that France shares 
with the region should not be taken lightly and must be seen in connection with the general ties 
to the EU. The importance of certain member-states driving the foreign policy of the EU 
seemed to be rather evident during the first period, as the French role was prominent in the 
EU’s affairs towards the Maghreb. As most of the informants pointed out, France has been a 
leading source in the external policies towards the region, even though period III seems to see 
a shift in that direction, with other member states taking more space.  
The popular discontentment and fear of the Islamist threat was early applied by Le Pen 
in France during the 90s, and the movement has seen large growth ever since. These concerns 
reached a peak with the terrorist attack on the twin towers in 2001, with George W. Bush 
declaring the War on Terror: as the Islamist threat became truly problematic for the West. The 
focus on stability and security became more augmented than ever before, and the tight 
relationship the US shared with Europe came to be shown in European rhetoric as well (Willis 
   
 
66 
2014, 322). The EU as a unity did not really change rhetoric, as it continued to focus on building 
democracy and securing the rule of law, but a shift in practice, and particularly so from France, 
became more evident:    
“The shift came to an abrupt end with the terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center in New York. French foreign-policy priorities demanded that every effort 
be made to combat Al Qaeda, the Taliban and terrorism worldwide. Support 
from Ben Ali and other “moderate” Arab governments was considered crucial 
(Wood 2002, 93) 
 
The security-stability nexus was therefore very important in this period, even though the 
general rhetoric towards the Maghreb did not change.   
The year  2004 did, however, mark a shift in the way the EU handled its foreign policy; 
the EU was at a point, in which it could not enlarge anymore (Ivan, Nuþ, and Mera 2013, 105). 
The eastern neighbors had now been incorporated, leaving further geographical expansion 
more difficult. This might have created some sort of vacuum of uncertainty about how the EU 
would conduct its foreign policy, which up until this point had largely focused on enlargement. 
If enlargement was the ultimate goal, how could the EU attempt to enlarge outside its 
geographical scope? Even though article 49 of the TEU states that any country can apply to the 
EU, it has become clear that there are geographical, if not more political and cultural conditions 
to this claim, exemplified in the case of Turkey.  
The ENP from 2003 did place many of the objectives on the Eastern as well as the 
Southern neighbors, and became a way to secure borders, first by incorporating most of the 
Eastern neighbors and then by attempting a similar solution in the south. Regardless, it is 
evident that the policy is affected by the 2003 ESS, focusing on the importance of democratic 
development as a way to secure stability; promoting democratic development and prosperity 
with the attempt to share everything but institution. The cooperation on democracy in this 
period was however primarily based on the logic of bargaining, rather than attempting 
substantive exchanges (van Hüllen 2019, 880). The negotiations, which primarily took place 
in the Association Agreement Councils, focused largely on a superficial harmony of each 
actors’ normative premises. If the EU was a normative actor, it seems that it would be in these 
types of negotiations where the ‘normative power’ would be used. Wood (2002, 108) argued 
in 2002 that: “While the EU, rhetorically, argues that economic growth and development 
provide the means to combat political instability, its actions have been mediocre at best”.  
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Period II – The Arab Awakening 2011 - 2014 
From the day in which Mohammad Bouazizi lit himself on fire in Sidi Bouzid, December 2011, 
the message spread extremely fast. The uncoordinated response from the EU in the beginning 
became evident in the difference of opinion between the two larger member states, France and 
Germany. Whereas Germany was quick to support the changes, the French foreign minister 
offered to send troops to Tunisia. After months of radio silence, the EU could unite, and in 
March 2011, they officially showed their support for the democratic movements stating that 
the EU was aware of the mistakes of the past, ready to make a “qualitative step forward” in the 
relations with their partners. The Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity was 
declared a paradigm shift by EU policy makers themselves, with admissions about the diverse 
policy goals as being largely incompatible, therewithin the perceived contradiction between 
values and security (Teti 2012, 267).  
“The EU is ready to support all its Southern neighbors who are able and willing 
to embark on such reforms through a “Partnership for Democracy and Shared 
Prosperity […] Despite some commonalities, no country in the region is the 
same so we must react to specificities of each of them  (EC 2011a, 2)”.  
The fact that the ENP had already been in the making, ready to be released in 2011 
might explain why most of the informants stated that there has been no supposed change in EU 
foreign policy before and after the Uprisings (Del Sarto 2016, Pace 2014, Tömmel 2013, 
Mouhib 2014). When releasing the new ENP in 2011 the EU wrote that the “Recent events and 
the results of the review have shown that EU support to political reforms in neighbouring 
countries has met with limited results (EC 2011b, 1)”. In that sense, the EU already knew and 
proclaimed again that the policies that had been in the works up until 2011 had not been 
successful. The words of the president of the Council at the time, Herman Van Rompuy, stating 
that: “Without Europe, there would still have been an Arab Spring, but without us there will be 
no Arab summer (Van Rompuy 2011)!”, indicate that the EU firmly believed in itself as a 
transformative power, vital for the success of the Arab Awakening. The new ENP stated that 
the EU was to:  
“provide greater support to partners engaged in building deep democracy – the 
kind that lasts because the right to vote is accompanied by rights to exercise free 
speech, form competing political parties, receive impartial justice from 
independent judges, security from accountable police and army forces, access 
to a competent and non-corrupt civil service — and other civil and human rights 
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that many Europeans take for granted, such as the freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (EC 2011b, 1)”.  
Ten years after the Arab Uprisings, the search for deep democracy continues, even though the 
HR of the time stated that the EU as not to going be a “passive spectator”, but that it needed to 
“support wholeheartedly the wish of the people in our neighborhood to enjoy the same 
freedoms that we take as our right (EC 2011a, 2)”.  
There is in other words a clear argument to support the fact that the EU itself wanted to 
make a change. In that sense one can ask why the new revised ENP came out as quickly, already 
carrying many of the elements that were already in place before the Arab Uprisings. The 
recasting of the past EMP, aiming to enhance political dialogue and EU funding, did not go 
beyond other the typical relations with third states (Bremberg 2016, 434). The early policies 
therefore also lacked an indication of change, even though the rhetoric was in place.  
 
Period III – Post Arab Uprising 2015 - 2021    
The Arab Awakening led to an increase in migration towards the European continent, many of 
whom came from the Maghreb, but also by transition. The migration threat has had different 
implications for the Maghreb countries, and this period highlights the different needs that the 
EU has with each of the countries. Morocco has been instrumental as a security partner for the 
EU in this aspect, more so than Tunisia and Algeria. Tunisia never played such an incremental 
role in the hindering of migration, while Algeria has been more important in the general fight 
against terror. Algeria’s experience fighting against the terrorist threat during the 90s, had 
given them expertise that was important for the EU and the neighboring countries. On the other 
hand, Tunisia seems to have been more of an experimental project of the unification of Islam 
and democracy, and the EU has cooperated close together with Tunisia during period III on 
supporting democratic transition. The Arab Uprisings therefore become a way to test the EU’s 
commitment to democracy promotion, specifically so, after the EU themselves had stated that 
they had failed in their commitment to democracy before the Arab Uprisings. 
Reviewing the cases over these three periods, before, during and after the Arab 
Uprisings, point to the fact that there have been some subtle changes in policy towards the 
Maghreb; but that also, regardless of policy, the EU has continued to focus on democracy 
promotion and the protection of human rights as important values in their rhetoric arguments 
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up until 2016, when the Global Strategy came about (Mihalache 2016). This indication shows 
a change from a more normative-based rhetoric towards a more ‘security-based rhetoric, 
followed by an ENP change, which in this case follows the rhetoric to a larger extent 
(Blockmans 2017, 140). The importance of populist parties in European government, focusing 
on migration control and border control, has been discussed as important reasons for this 
change, as they are contributing to the increased debate on the Islamist threat (Rivera Escartin 
2020). Another rhetoric change was from the difference in wording. After the Arab Uprisings 
the EU started applying the word ‘partner’, instead of ‘neighbors’, which did illuminate the 
importance of the two-way dialogue.  
This slow downgrading of the democratic dialogue does seem to pose problems for the 
NPE perspective, if one agrees that the force for good theory is based on academics and EU-
officials confidence in their own ability to function as role models. Over the three periods, it 
has become clear that the normative ambitions for this new world order have been waning and 
loosing ambition (Lehne 2020). The return of realpolitik amongst EU officials therefore seems 
to show that there is a lack of faith in the EU’s ability to be sui generis. In the case that the EU 
does not believe that it has the power to change the conception of normal anymore, then it is 
not strange that third actors do not think it either. The way Pace (2007) argues on the replication 
of the epistemic community, validating and reproducing the force for good identity in between 
policy makers, will therefore be dependent on if the EU officials actually believe in it. 
Therefore, what seems to be the return of realpolitik in the EUs foreign policy towards the 
Maghreb does question this belief. It is difficult to see how the EU can be a normative power 
if it does not believe in its own ambitions; the self-maintaining epistemic foundation therefore 
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VI.II  Synchronic analysis   
In this second section, the discussion will be structured by different paradoxes that have come 
to light during the periodical analysis and the interviews. The following paradoxes will be 
analyzed; (I) The oxymoron of a principled pragmatism; (II) The paradox of ‘Deep 
democracy’;(III) Too close yet too far away – A pan-European paradox?; (IV) The paradox of 
‘Productive Ambiguity; (V) Africa’s last colony - The paradox of the Western Sahara Conflict; 
(VI) The French Paradox – A war of collective memories?; and (VII) The paradox of external 
perceptions – The missing link? Each paradox is guided by reflections from the informants and 
discussed within the theoretical framework. 
  
I. The oxymoron of a principled pragmatism   
 
“The EU wants to block the migrants before they come to Europe, for that they 
need the cooperation of Moroccan authorities, and sometimes it breaches law 
and human rights. But the European Union close their eyes and sometimes they 
contribute to this financially and giving logistics and information about it. In 
this issue, we see that the EU is not a promoter of democracy, but on the 
contrary, contributes to human rights repressions (Informant V)”.  
 
The review of policy and practice of the EU’s role as a foreign policy actor in the Maghreb 
shows that there is a gap between rhetoric and practice. One could argue that it seems that the 
EU is coming to understand its own limitations, or distinction, with the notion of ‘principled 
pragmatism’ of the new Global Strategy. The application of such a term makes it difficult to 
evaluate the foreign policy of the EU, and more specifically, whether a pragmatic realpolitik 
will take precedence over the values enshrined in the TEU, that being freedom, democracy, 
and the rule of law. 
 When Manners wrote his first article on Normative Power Europe (NPE) in 2002, the 
EU was in the process of writing the European Security Strategy (ESS), which clearly focused 
on human rights and the promotion of democracy in its neighborhoods, as a way of securing 
stability. Nonetheless, during that time, as has been shown in the periodic analysis, the EU was 
supporting authoritarian leaders in the region. In one way, it could therefore be argued that the 
gap between rhetoric and practice was larger then, than today, because the strategy was clearly 
normatively orientated. Today, however, it seems there is less room for critiquing the 
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‘principled pragmatism’ orientation, as the term itself is an oxymoron. If one believes that it is 
possible to be both pragmatic and principled at the same time, supporting democracy and 
human rights while supporting authoritarian tendencies, well then there is not much to be 
critiqued. However, the EU still portrays itself as a democracy promoter and protector of 
human rights very clearly. This oxymoron is illustrated in the guiding quote from informant V, 
namely that, even though the EU is giving many funds to help civil society and to support 
democratic development, the protection of borders seems to have become more important.  
The discussion of pragmatism and principles is also reflected in the dilemma of values 
and interests. As has been argued, there seems to be an internal battle of interests and values 
within the EU, and to attempt a conclusion on whether it is as simple as saying that there is a 
dilemma of values and interests would entail that one firstly, would have to agree upon what 
values and interests mean (Roccu and Voltolini 2018, 4), speaking to the dangers of this 
dichotomized variable. However, the EU, within itself and as a foreign policy actor is simply 
not coherent. The dissonance between the actors creates a misunderstanding in concepts and 
the concepts therefore become a part of this dichotomic variable, ending in a dilemma between 
“values and interests”.  
“For years, we have propped up dictorial regimes, paying lip service to the need 
for them to democratize when what we were actually interested in was the 
stability they guaranteed against the Islamist threat (Borrell 2016)”.  
 
Josep Borrell, who was to become the HR in 2019, stated in 2016 very clearly how he viewed 
the EU in the Maghreb, indicating that the EU itself was unsure of what its interests in the 
region actually represented. The internal battle of interest and values therefore depicts rather 
clearly how it exports itself to foreign policy.  
However, there have been clear signals from both the ESS and the Global Strategy that 
democracy still is an important guiding principle. The EU clearly depicts itself as an actor that 
is going to protect human rights and support democratic transition. Regardless of whether the 
promotion of democracy and human rights are in the interests of the EU or in its values, or 
both, it is undeniable that the EU is defining itself by these values. Therefore, the dissonance 
between rhetoric and practice, makes it complicated to argue for the normative position.  
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If the EU was a normative actor, who had ‘learned’ from its mistakes during the Arab 
Uprisings, it does seem rather contradictory that nothing has been said about the revoking of 
powers in Morocco, as well as the Hirak in Algeria. It almost seems that one can reverse the 
question by asking to what extent Morocco is asserting power over the EU. As stated by the 
Moroccan informants, the EU is very careful in its dealings with Morocco, and so much so that 
it at times looks away. Immigration and terrorism are, reversibly, sticks that Morocco can use 
against the EU.  
The recent incident of ten thousand immigrants that were able to make their way to the 
Spanish Ceuta, because of a ‘mysterious disappearance’ of the Moroccan border police 
(Euronews 2021), really comes to show the power of Morocco in securing Europe’s borders. 
This incident is the tip of the iceberg, of a much larger problem, as information from the High 
Commissioner for Refugees shows that the number of refugees that are coming into the Canary 
Islands have skyrocketed over the last three years (UNHCR 2021). The immigrants are coming 
from safely controlled Western Sahara, which is firmly controlled by Moroccan border police. 
In Ceuta, Morocco opens its canals for one day, and the political chaos is present, not in Spain, 
but in the EU, as Ceuta is a ‘European border’. This chaos was all initiated by the Western 
Sahara conflict, which will be discussed as a paradox in itself. Regardless, Morocco’s show of 
force to the EU, was sans ambiguïté, without ambiguity (Bobin 2021).   
This point is further illustrated by the French ambassador who allegedly said that: 
“Morocco is a mistress with whom we sleep every night, of whom we are not particularly in 
love, but we must defend. In other words, we turn a blind eye (Fakir 2019, 70)”. This quote 
could be transferable to the EU as well, in regard to the migration situation. FRONTEX 
(Frontières Extérieurs), is the European Coast Guard and Border Control program, and their 
mandate is to protect the European borders. Frontex’s budget has increased every year,  
together with a rise of critiques by multiple NGOs, for restricting asylum-seekers rights to 
apply for protection (Aas and Gundhus 2015, 1). The lack of transparency has also been a 
common critique. In Morocco, Frontex is said to collaborate well with local authorities. On the 
other hand, the EU has asked Tunisia and Algeria to function as external borders in the same 
way as with Morocco, but as indicated by Informant VII, Tunisia flatly refused. Frontex is also 
in itself quite a paradoxical agent, as has been pointed out by Aas and Gundhus (2015, 14), by 
‘policing humanitarian borderlands’. Moreover, is even the policing nature of Frontex 
identifiable with NPE? As Manners argued in a later article on NPE (Manners 2006b), that 
militarizing capacities, or even the CFSP in itself, can be a threat to the EU’s distinctiveness.  
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Revisiting the arguments of Pollack (2012), Seeberg (2009) and Hyde-Price (2006), 
hence underscoring the realist argument, is that the EU cannot be a normative power when 
there is such a dissonance between the discourses and outcomes of policies. If one agrees that 
there is a need to practice what you preach, the argument is difficult to disagree with, but of 
course, it’s even more so, when the variance between rhetoric and practice impact the way in 
which the EU is perceived, which further impacts the way in which the EU can diffuse its 
normative base.    
The issue of migration also shows the short-term versus long term commitment to 
finding durable solutions from the EU’s side. If the nucleus of the EUs problematic relationship 
with the Maghreb is based on the fear of the Islamist threat, therewithin the fact that policies 
have been bargained on, because of migration issues – well then it seems rather strange that a 
‘mobility-agreement’ came into place so late in all the countries. The issue of migration is not 
limited to Morocco, Tunisia, or Algeria. It’s a ‘block-issue’, and it must be handled as such if 
the EU seeks to gain control over the southern borders. The young population of the Maghreb 
countries continues to grow. Not gaining jobs and not being able to go abroad for new 
opportunities, might pose an ever-larger security threat than any other. The youth of the region 
can therefore serve to be its biggest liability, or its greatest asset (Ghafar 2019, 181). There is 
no short-term solution to the migration problems of the Maghreb, and the demographic 
situation is, quite logically, not negotiable. Regardless of the funds sent by the EU to the youth 
ministries of the Maghreb countries, it alone will not solve the problems of radicalized youth. 
Many EU countries are in need of qualified labor and creating a mobility agreement that allows 
both actors to gain therefore seems to be a more durable solution. However, it seems that the 
perceived threat of Islamism and the dangers of migratory problems are guiding the EU’s 
policy on migration (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou 2018), thereby avoiding the actual problem.  
HR Borrell stated in 2016 that the way in which the EU had handled the Arab Uprisings 
had been a failure. Therefore, the response, or lack thereof, to the Hirak movement in Algeria 
in 2019, seems rather daunting. The EU got, from what is perceived by many Arabs as a 
‘second chance’ with the Hirak movement, and still there was no response. It does make one 
question in which way the EU’s response the Arab Uprisings was a failure; was the problem 
that the EU should have spoken out earlier, or that they should have kept silent? The same 
could be said for the RIF protests in Morocco and the violence that broke out between the 
Polisario and Morocco. When parliamentary powers were revoked in Morocco, the EU kept 
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silent, and in practice authoritarianism is now more firmly embedded in the country, than it 
was before the Arab Uprisings (Youngs and Balfour 2015).   
What seems problematic is the fact that HR Borrell has stated that the EU had to learn, 
but what is it actually that needed to be learned? The Algerians are protesting against the 
political elites, for true democracy, and the recurring peaceful protests keep underscoring this. 
If supporting deep democracy is the basis of the EU’s normative power, it seems rather strange 
that they are not supporting the current process in Algeria.  
This behavior, which continuously seems to contradict between rhetoric and practice is 
more adaptable to being a utility-maximizing strategy than a basis of normative power. The 
rhetorical commitments to human rights and democracy, while at the same time advancing 
trade relations with the authoritarian leaders of the Maghreb, therefore ascribes more to an 
empire approach, seeking to maximize its strategy in its foreign affairs. It would not be 
sufficient to state that this is a simple ‘ad-hoc’ situation, as could be argued by NPE, since it’s 
been shown through all periods that the EU has had many opportunities to adapt its stance. 
This evolution of the EU as being an imperial actor does make one think about how one of the 
first founders of the EU, Jean Monnet, warned as early as in 1963, about the dangers of 
becoming a 19th century power.   
“People, more often outside the European Community than within, are tempted to see 
the European Community as a potential nineteenth-century state with all the overtones 
this implies. But we are not in the nineteenth century, and the Europeans have built up 
the European Community precisely in order to find a way out of the conflicts to which 
the nineteenth-century philosophy gave rise (Monnet 1963, 210)”. 
The pursuit of becoming a great power, which the utility-maximizing strategy implies, limits 
the EU’s normative stance, and even risks its existence. Manners (2006b, 195) argued that such 
a pursuit, specifically a ‘militarizing process’, only could happen in a ‘critically reflexive 
context’ (for example in accordance with the UN), which is clearly not the case in the Maghreb. 
The oxymoron of principled pragmatism, therefore, seems rather fitting for the EU’s dilemma 
in the south.   
 
II. The paradox of ‘Deep Democracy’  
“Thinking about what happened in Algeria in 2019, it’s like the EU hasn’t 
learned any lessons from what happened during the Arab Spring. We are 
protesting against the political elite, so how can Macron congratulate them and 
say that France respects this? (Informant IV)”. 




The most iconic slogan of the Arab Awakening ‘al-shaab yurib isqat al-nizam’, the people 
seek the fall of the regime, is of interest to understand. Emphasis on the word al-nizam, which 
in Arabic means ‘regime’ or ‘system’ (Nordenson 2018, 76). The protesters did not want to 
simply overthrow the authoritarian leaders, but to change the whole system. The periodic 
analysis has clearly shown that the role of the EU before the Arab Uprisings was based on 
supporting these regimes; hence the paradox of ‘deep democracy’, after having aided 
authoritarian leaders. Following decolonization theory, it should be remembered that 
postcolonialists have focused particularly on the system, not just the leaders. The objective of 
the Arab Uprisings and the Hirak movements of 2019, have not been to simply remove Ben 
Ali or Bouteflika, but to change a system that is inherently corrupt, and lacking in trust.  
Europe has drawn lines over Africa and the Arab World since the Berlin conference up 
until after the second world war; lines that have had no linguistic or cultural legitimacy. When 
considering the Maghreb, it should be remembered that the systems they are ‘fighting against’, 
are indeed based on a European, and particularly so, French model. What does it entail when 
the system that one is fighting against, is a system built by colonizers, and more importantly, 
how is it democratically sustainable to impose European systems, once again upon these 
countries as a way of democratization? How can these states attempt to liberate themselves 
from a system that is not working, if it is happening again by Eurocentric means? European 
ruling has not helped them before, so it is comprehendible that they do not wish to be forced 
into the same spiral again. Thereby, perceiving the EU’s imposition of systems, as a way to 
“enforce subordination and exploitation (Kohn and McBride 2011, 5)”, as could be argued by 
the decolonization theorists.   
Informant IV’s referral to the EU’s divided response to the Arab Uprisings also shows 
how the external perceptions perspective, combined with the actual policies, aid in our 
understanding of the EU as a democracy promoter. Informant IV referred to the speech of the 
French interior minister, which proposed to send troops to help Ben Ali in Tunisia. The first 
reactions, combined with the policy reactions which came after do not support the idea of 
creating deep democracy. EU policies have been focused on supporting civil society in all three 
states, but the funds have still gone through the ruling political elite to be further distributed to 
nonstate actors (Ghanem 2019, 32). It does therefore seem like a paradox, one in which 
democracy can be promoted, but only through the political elite, which is exactly what the 
people seek to remove.  
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Applying such a pathway for democratic development indicate that the EU might be 
treating democracy promotion by myopia. The EU’s ability to influence is present, but for 
democracy promotion to be effective, there is a need for an understanding of the culture and 
the society of the place where one is attempting to push these reforms. The religious and 
cultural aspects are very important and do question to what extent EU norms in themselves are 
universal, or if it is the way in which they are promoted, which make them complicated. This 
is illustrated by Wolff (2018), who found that the EU’s way of framing religion in the Southern 
neighborhood, is prone to selectively engage with certain actors, who ‘fit the bill’ of being 
‘sufficiently moderately Islamist’. This, however, can be more problematic in the long term, as 
it can eventually lead to resentment amongst the populations, generating further insecurities 
and polarization. Colombo, Soler i lecha, and Otte (2019, 22) have also found that the EU lacks 
a detailed ‘map’ of knowledge about “societal dynamics” in the region. In addition, the neo-
colonial lenses are specifically important in this context, as norms coming from the West are 
often viewed with suspicion, as ‘alien values’ (Zielonka 2013, 48). The increasingly diverse 
rhetoric, of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’, therefore problematizes even more this dialogue.  
However, it does seem rather unlikely, keeping in mind the different mindsets, 
religions, and societies, that a democratic system in the Maghreb would look similar to the one 
in Europe. The local adaption of policies is crucial, and therefore implies that the EU would 
gain more from really adapting its policies in its attempt to diffuse norms, rather than focusing 
specifically on the pathway of carrots and sticks. Manners fourth means of diffusion revolves 
around transference, which can include the carrot-stick approach, meaning in this case that 
financial rewards lie in sight for the third party. Nonetheless, an important reflection that arises 
from these questions revolves around the EU’s ability to remain a normative power, by solely 
focusing on this type of diffusion. Is not the whole idea of the EU as a normative power, that 
it should be able to diffuse ideas based on its unique character which was funded on democratic 
principles? This argument is further illustrated by the empirical evidence which shows that 
Morocco’s ruling elite has been using the EU as a survival strategy, and that the EU simply has 
responded to the small democratic advances, rather than actually influencing it (Catalano and 
Graziano 2016, 380). This does question whether a normative diffusion is even happening in 
the first place.  
The very nature of Manners idea about the EU being unique by itself, keeps becoming 
difficult to defend. This idea could be the particular reason as to why Manners wanted to clarify 
that it was important not to focus on the militarization of the EU; namely because it would 
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confuse and undermine the EU’s normative ‘uniqueness’ (Manners 2006b, 182). The same 
argument could be used towards the policing nature of Frontex, which specifically focuses on 
securing short-term solutions on migration. This could be said  to  have been Manner’s fear 
exactly, when he wrote about the military power in a new reconsideration of NPE in 2006. 
Manners (2006b, 194) argued that the EU acquiring more military capability could tempt it to 
use short-term military responses instead of its “traditional reliance on long-term structural 
conflict prevention and transformation”. As seen in the periodic analysis it is specifically short-
term solutions that have been the norm. However, this also poses the question of how the focus 
on short term solutions impacts European interests and values in the long term. What will the 
secondary effects be, for European security, when the EU continues to support authoritarian 
regimes in the long term? Is it not a false dilemma separating values and interest, when in the 
long term, democratic societies are more likely to achieve socioeconomical development, while 
authoritarian regimes tend to harbor instability? Moreover, was that not exactly what the Arab 
Uprisings had ‘taught’ the EU? The idea of forced change therefore seems to be going against 
the unique base of the EU, whether it be the carrot-stick approach, the policing migration 
politics, or the possible sanctioning.  
 Sanctioning in general, has been found to be both based on double standards as well as 
inconsistencies, as the CFSPs foundation gives the member states the opportunity to influence 
the decision process on sanctions (Del Biondo 2015, Youngs 2020). Manners (2002, 242) 
rejects the notion of the EU’s normative power being backed by force, that be it economic or 
political. The idea of implementing a European ‘deep democratic’ system therefore seems to 
have difficulties if it, in the end is backed by force alone; and more specifically, when there are 
inconsistencies about what the term ‘deep democracy’ really means. The final idea therefore 
implies whether a ‘European democratic model’ is the only one which can serve to be a 
stabilizer in its neighborhood?  
“We have not seen any efforts from EU policy to help fulfill the dreams of a 
connected Maghreb. On the contrary, the European Union has tried and will try 
to always keep this division between these countries, because treating each one 
alone is easier that treating a political, cultural and economic block on the 
southern shore of the Mediterranean (Informant V)”.  
 
It’s no secret that there is a large economic dependency between the Maghreb countries 
and the EU, which in itself is not problematic. However, if the EU uses this dependency as a 
way to regain control, which the Association Agreements (AA) do indicate, then it seems the 
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EU does not want to have a stronger neighbor, but rather that they compete between themselves 
to lower prices. Generally, products from the Maghreb cannot compete with European 
products. The impact of the agricultural sector in the Maghreb countries is extreme, and the 
agricultural policies therefore have quite a direct impact, making Tunisia, Morocco, and 
Algeria fight to reduce prices, while the EU is protected. This idea of divide et impera, seems 
to be very in line with the empire argument, seeking to increase and regain control of its 
peripheries, also at the expense of the normative base. The intent on promoting deep 
democracy, therefore seems to run into various problems, therewithin, the clash with other 
interests, be it economic or security. However, as Zielonka (2013, 37) satirically, but 
interestingly has pointed out; “would the promotion of ‘shallow democracy’ be better?”  
 
III. Too close yet too far away – A pan-European paradox? 
“Some Europeans today, they say that the Union is a Christian Club, so they 
cannot integrate Turkey. It’s a big country. 80 or 90 million Muslim people 
joining Europe is a big issue (Informant V)”. 
 
The proximity of the Maghreb to Europe seems to be both a blessing and a curse, reminding 
oneself that North Africa already suffers from being a region which finds itself in a limbo of 
identity, that being either Berber, Kabyle, Arab and, or African. The geopolitical location of 
the Maghreb places it in a particularly interesting situation for Europe. Even though they are 
close and are named the ‘most important partners’ in discourses, how ‘close’ are they really, 
and how close can they become before it is ‘close enough’? The TEU state that any European 
country can apply for membership, while the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ puts forward certain 
financial and democratic criteria. If one agrees with (Haukkala 2008, 1603) that the open-ended 
nature of the EU’s view on membership is a key factor for the EU’s ability to promote 
legitimacy and normativity, then not allowing Turkey to join becomes an interesting 
comparison, as it has given Morocco ideas on how to work on their relationship with the EU, 
outside of the scope.  
Neither Morocco, Tunisia or Algeria is within the ‘European’ continent and therefore 
they do not have the opportunity to be fully integrated. The EU has responded with the ENP as 
an attempt to create as close of a relationship with its neighbors as possible. The Advanced 
Status given to Morocco in 2008, was probably an attempt to achieve a ‘higher status’ outside 
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of the ENP. However, both informant II, V and VIII pointed out that the Advanced Status was 
more of a perception, a relativity, rather than giving Morocco an actual advantage, as has also 
been argued by Martín (2009, 244). It could be argued that the EU is reaching limits in its 
integration with the country. This comes to light when considering Morocco’s search for new 
partners, both across the Atlantic and towards sub-Sahara Africa. The incident with Donald 
Trump recognizing Morocco’s claim over the Western Sahara, has shown Morocco’s ability to 
play the political landscape. The EU might not have the same amount of ‘carrots’ to dangle in 
front of Morocco anymore, for them to undergo reforms and adapt to the acquis 
commaunaitres. Procedural diffusion, or institutional integration, therefore, seems to be a 
channel of diffusion that has been maxed out. This idea of the EU reaching limits in its 
relationships, when there is no motivation for the North African countries, does pose problems 
for the EU’s current democracy promotion strategy. The Union is losing leverage, indicating 
that it has been particularly dependent on the element of integration and conditionality, which 
has influenced the EU’s power in the region; and hence, not the general idea of normative 
convergence.  
It could be argued that Morocco at best, has pushed the pause-button on their 
democratic transition and at worst, that they have retracted. In the ‘integration game’, the EU 
seems to be losing its advantage over Morocco, which is creating stronger relationships with 
China and the US each day. Even if integration is not possible, Diez (2006) argues that the EU 
can have ‘associative power’ on normative accounts, which could also be valuable as 
transformative power. However, when reviewing the Maghreb, and particularly the case of 
Morocco, it seems that the association element has had little impact after the migration flows 
started in 2015.  
Even though the EU is attempting to bring its neighbors into its ever-closer union, it 
does not seem to work that well in the case of Morocco. On the other hand, Tunisia, has seen 
the creation of a closer and stronger bond with the EU regarding democracy promotion, which 
is shown in the EU’s funding and aid-packages ever since the intifada. Compared to Morocco, 
Tunisia does not play such a vital role in securing stability and does not have the same ability 
to pressure the EU. Tunisia, currently being in a democratic building process, is more 
dependent on the aid the EU gives. It is interesting to consider to what extent the EU would be 
willing to support such a “laboratory project”, if it was Morocco or Algeria. Nonetheless, it is 
evident that Tunisia is acquiring the aquis commauntaires because they are dependent on the 
aid coming from the EU, hence, moving towards a more democratic structure.  
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The ability of each country to reversibly pressure the EU seems to be of high 
importance, and more so, than the aspect of association itself. In addition, it seems rather clear, 
after the treatment of Turkey, that the EU has used its pan-European rhetoric as a way of 
attempting an ever-closer union between the EU and its neighbors, but that in the end, the 
neighbors, and particularly Morocco have come to understand that the rhetoric is simply that, 
a rhetoric. The normative power of the EU therefore seems to be more dependent on the case’s 
ability to fight back, than anything else. The EU’s demands to the Maghreb, asking them to 
function as outer borders do prescribe to the ideas of ‘fuzzy borders’, as explained within the 
Normative Empire Europe theory. The borders are becoming fuzzy, but as it seems, solely 
when it comes to immigration. There is no wish from the EU for the borders to be moved for 
any other purpose, which implies that the EU is willing to apply its ‘pan-European’ idea simply 
by way of fussy borders when it comes to migration, as an empire would do.  
In contradiction to a pan-European idea, it rather seems that the EU has constructed an 
idea of the ‘Self” versus the ‘Other’, as argued by the external perception’s literature, indicating 
that the EU, in an attempt to create its own identity, is attempting to ‘distinguish’ itself from 
the outside world (Diez 2005, 614). In this way, what was supposedly an idea of pan 
Europeanism, has rather received a very physical border, namely the Mediterranean, 
distinguishing very clearly the ‘us’ and ‘them’. If the EU has constructed the idea of NPE in 
this way, then it can also be drawn back to Pace’s (2007) argument on the EU reinforcing an 
image of itself as a ‘force for good’. The idea of the EU constructing itself in such an image 
does also indicate that its uniqueness might not be all that, as the US has also created itself in 
such an image of the ‘Self’ versus the ‘Other’. In this way, the reconstruction of the EU in its 
own image fits into the description put forward by Bicchi (2006, 299), stating that the EU is 
promoting its own “highly successful model of Western integration”, showcasing a sort of ‘our 
size fits all’ attitude.  
 
IV.  The paradox of ‘Productive Ambiguity’  
“The European Union is taking more and more space politically. But we cannot say that 
it has already managed to overtake certain countries roles, which are historically linked 
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to the Maghreb and elsewhere. We have the impression that there is a kind of double 
game (Informant VI)5”. 
 
The EU’s handling of the Arab Uprisings became a kind of window display, where it suddenly 
became clear that the EU had difficulties coordinating a response in a coherent and cooperated 
way; France had one opinion, and Germany another. The lack of clarity in the response also 
showed that the normative base values of ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ portrayed problems 
of definition within the EU’s member states as well. Is the support for human rights and 
democracy only valuable within the union or should the same be accounted for outside? Should 
it only count when the EU is dealing with neighbors that are of strategic importance, or is it 
universal? It has been argued that this ambiguity between normative and functional dimensions 
has made the EU into a political system which is resistant to crisis (Costa and Brack 2014, 
247). However, the years after the Arab Uprisings have been quite turbulent for the EU, and to 
what extent the EU is actually resistant to these crises because of the ambiguity is difficult to 
say.  
 If policies and roles are not coherent, the confusion created might influence the actual 
impact that the policy can have. The EU’s normative base hinges on different ways of diffusion, 
and when the pathways are disrupted by a lack of coherency, the policies can be limited by 
themselves. Pace (2009, 49) finds that EU actions in the region limit any potential for normative 
impact, because there is a clear lack of coherence; the policies are lacking defined visions. This 
also makes one consider the importance of coherence in foreign policy. Must foreign policy be 
coherent for it to be effective? Informant VII pointed out that seeking EU funding was such a 
complex process that civil society organizations had problems with the application process. 
Not unexpectedly, the need for flexibility in the Maghreb countries is very important. 
Informant VII further pointed out that the EU was not able to adapt itself to the culture and the 
day-to-day situation. This argument therefore implies that the difficulties, and inconsistency of 
both internal as well as external relations impact these decisions. Hence, the inconsistency 
makes it more difficult to promote norms and democracy, and further limits the EU’s power as 
a normative actor.  
 
5 All quotes originally stated in Spanish or French have been translated by the author. 
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 This incoherence in the Maghreb, comes to show the very problematic foundation of 
the CFSP, as argued by Keukeleire and Delreux (2014, 158), showing that article 24 (2) of the 
Lisbon Treaty, which states the EU shall “conduct, define and implement a common foreign 
and security policy (EU 2007, 27)”, indicates that political solidarity is not self-evident, but 
must be developed. Each member state therefore has their own interests and will still act upon 
these; the term ‘common foreign policy’ is therefore misleading. However misleading the term 
may be, one’s understanding of this argument will again depend on the definition of what sort 
of interests are in play, giving credibility to the reader or author in drawing one’s own 
conclusions (Larsen 2020, 970). Nonetheless, if one follows the argument of Keukeleire and 
Delreux, namely, that the foundation of the CFSP is indeed weak, it clearly comes to show in 
the Maghreb region, where the interests that are at play are so multifaceted, to such an extent 
that it is very difficult for the countries in question to understand who is indeed representing 
whom.  
“There are the countries which have a common history and a certain advantage 
over other countries. In the Maghreb, it is essentially France, Italy and to a lesser 
extent Spain. But I find that the Germans are catching up in an extraordinary 
way in the Maghreb (Informant VI)”. 
 
Whether the EU as a unit has larger influence than each member state separately is an 
essential question to understand when one is discussing perceptions of the EU as a foreign 
actor. Most informants indicated that the EU does not have the power as a unit, which it could 
have. Now, whether this is because of the actions of each member country within the region or 
because of the EU’s general ambiguity, is hard to evaluate. Nonetheless, it remains clear that 
the interests of the member-states can cause confusion, and hence disrupt the diffusion 
channels. If rhetoric and policy of one member state is directly transferable to the perceptions 
of the union as a whole, it will be very problematic for the EU’s ability to act. Such an 
assumption would indicate that the EU cannot be a sui generis actor with a specific historical 
foundation if the members state’s rhetoric and external perceptions are directly transferable.  
The close historical relationship that France shares with the region also makes French 
resources in the region a plus for the EU in its promotional work. However, it does seem that 
utilizing mostly French sources can cause further confusion on whether the funding or the 
rhetoric is coming from France or from the EU. It is apparent that France does not want to lose 
its standing in the region, however, there is a strong need for the EU to stand in unity, making 
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it obvious that the sending missions are representing Brussels, and not Paris. Thinking about 
Manners fifth pathway, overt diffusion, which occurs from the physical presence of the EU in 
a state or organization, it should be remembered that this argument becomes increasingly more 
important. If overt diffusion is an important way to spread norms, well then it should be clear 
with who one is speaking.  
Even though it is easy and understandable for this confusion to happen, it does seem 
that the EU’s politics of silence in certain situations is aiding the idea of separating the member 
states personal politics with the Union. In early 2021, Morocco broke diplomatic ties with 
Germany, and the EU has said absolutely nothing to that regard (Cembrero 2021). The same 
could be said for an incident between Spain and Morocco, recurring over a small islet outside 
of Ceuta, called Perejil, in 2003. During this crisis the EU did not say anything, specifically 
because France said no, and supported  Morocco instead of Spain (Jordán 2018, 946). There 
are in other words games also being played between the different European states, to gain 
insight and control with the Maghreb countries on their own. This also highlights an argument 
put forward by Aggestam and Johansson (2017, 1217), arguing that there is a leadership 
paradox in EU foreign policy by showing that the member states and the EEAS are unsure 
about their roles in the policy process.  
The fast entrance of Germany as an actor in the Maghreb further underscores this 
argument, by showing that there might be an increase in competition between the member 
states. If one thinks about EU foreign policy through a neo-realist perspective (Hyde-Price 
2006), it is possible to understand that the states, in the increased multipolar world order find 
the need to secure their own interests on a larger scale. The uniqueness of the EU’s structure 
might therefore not be so unique, but rather a result of external factors. The temporal aspects 
of the periods do indicate how the changes in EU policy fits together with the overall external 
factors of each period.   
Another aspect of ambiguity and imperialism should be mentioned. Interestingly, the 
critique of the EU as being imperialist, is something which it of course negates strongly; on the 
other hand, the EU is not negating being put in the place of the imperialized, in a context where 
America is ‘putting America first’, and China is gaining more and more power on the world 
stage (Morgan 2020, 1425). Particularly the French are scared of this ‘vassalisation’, happening 
to the continent entirely, further indicating the paradoxical situation of imperialism with the 
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EU, being the continent which colonized; and now, in French eyes, is becoming a continent 
imperialized by the ‘great powers’.  
Manners argued many times that the EU could not seek to be a ‘great power’, as this 
was the whole concept which differentiated it from the others. However, in the increased 
multipolar world order, the EU seems to be attempting to do exactly that, by playing more into 
the politics controlled by realpolitik. Attempting to be a ‘rationalist foreign policy actor’, when 
in fact the EU with its 27 member states and a multitude of institutions challenge the very idea 
of rational, does not really aspire to its uniqueness. This contradiction, could therefore make 
the EU run into larger problems, diminishing its actual impact and opportunity to influence. In 
this sense, one can agree that the foundations of NPE do provide an “indispensable tool to build 
and consolidate the necessary consensus among member states (Pänke 2019, 117)”, in a world 
with increased competition.  
  Another paradox of the EU’s ambiguity in its foreign policy towards the region 
becomes quite clear in a quote from informant VII:  
“If the main interest of the European Union is to maintain stability and the status quo, 
the policy is coherent. But if the interest of the European Union is to promote political 
and social changes, it's not coherent (Informant VII)” 
 
In other words, Europe must decide, taking the discussion back into the importance of interests 
and values. Whether the foreign policy of the Union is coherent or not depends on how one 
defines the EU’s interests. This further implies that the EU probably will ‘keep on’ being 
incoherent, as the new Global Strategy is based specifically on this paradox of ‘principled 
pragmatism’. Hence, there is a double game when discussing coherency, as it is based on both 
the fight between values and interests, as well as the values and interests of each member state 
in the formation of foreign policy. There is no doubt that the process of forming foreign policy 
in the EU is a difficult task, thinking about all the institutions and the member states which are 
to be included in such a process. However, it has during the analysis become apparent that the 
general ambiguity is hurting the EU’s ability to influence democracy in its neighborhood, rather 
than being a ‘productive ambiguity’. An interesting thought connected to this can be found in 
the expressions of informants VI and IV, who indicated that there are more positive views 
towards the EU as a unity, than France. This idea therefore shows that there is much to be 
achieved if roles are rethought and remodeled, as will be discussed under the external 
perception’s paradox. 




V. Africa’s last colony - The paradox of the Western Sahara Conflict  
 
“The EU has no role in this conflict. It was the United States that reached the agreement 
on the recognition of Western Sahara as part of Morocco in exchange for Morocco's 
recognition of Israel. The European Union has said absolutely nothing about it 
(Informant VII)”.  
 
The Western Sahara conflict has been the source of many of the issues pertaining to the 
problems between the EU and the Maghreb, and it could be argued that the conflict has become 
some sort of a solidification of the EU’s ambivalent role in the region (Fernández-Molina 2017 
, Fernández-Molina and Ojeda-García 2020).  
 The Western Sahara conflict is particularly interesting because it goes back to the 
question of self-determination, often referred to as Africa’s last colony. The democratic 
foundation of being able to decide upon one’s own future is self-evident. In addition, the 
humanitarian aspect of the conflict is clear, as there are human rights violations taking place in 
the occupied territory (Ranheim 2016, 31). The European Parliament (EP) has been quite vocal 
about the humanitarian issues in the region, while the Council has been silent (Grande-Gascón 
and Ruiz-Seisdedos 2017, 79). The incoherency between the institutions has made it difficult 
to understand the role of the EU in this conflict and underscores the fact that some institutions 
can be perceived and understood as more ‘normative’ than others.  
 The EU’s difficulties with forming clear policy towards the conflict (Benabdallah 
2009), has become even more evident over the last years, where the EU has shifted between 
including the Western Sahara in agreements with Morocco. The EU-Morocco fisheries 
partnership agreement is a particular example, where the EU has been critiqued for breaking 
international law, with the inclusion of the Western Saharan territory. The European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) deemed the fisheries agreement as breaking with international law in 2016, and 
since then, the agreement has not included the Western Sahara. As might be expected, this 
ruling upset Morocco, but to such an extent that the state decided to suspend diplomatic contact 
with the EU Delegation in Rabat. In 2019, the EP, allowed again for the inclusion of the 
Western Sahara in the agreement, and during 2021, the ECJ is considering the legality of the 
trade agreement yet again. This extreme ambivalence is worth explaining in detail because it 
comes to show an affair which clearly breaks with international law and human rights. This 
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should be alarming for an institution that calls itself protector of these values. If anything, this 
portrays that the EU is moving with the landscape of realpolitik, keeping silent when it is not 
to their benefit.  
It is apparent that the Western Sahara conflict, with its local, regional, and global 
dimensions, has a big impact on EU-Maghreb relations. The EU’s handling of this conflict has 
sparked large confusion about the EU’s actual commitment to supporting international law and 
human rights. In addition, there are specific difficulties regarding whom holds the power within 
the EU when the EP and the ECJ say no, and the Council says yes. These inconsistencies in 
the protection of human rights and self-determination, also within the EU, do make one 
question the universality of the normative base, which is based specifically upon that: 
democracy and human rights. The external affairs process in the EU is, in other words, a highly 
political process, in which democracy and human rights seem to be losing the fight.  
Of course, it should be stated, as has been  argued by Wagner (2017, 1401), that ‘peace’ 
also is one of the main norms of the EU, showing that the core-norms, such as ‘democracy’ 
and ‘peace’, which are equally valued, can end up being put up against each other. Again, in 
such a way where the support for democracy and human rights come in second, because the 
securing of ‘peace’ is more important. Peace and stability are not, however, two sides of the 
same coin, and particularly not when one is thinking in short term solutions. The last thing the 
EU would want, is the re-sparking of the violent conflict between Morocco and the Polisario. 
However, the silent treatment from the EU seems to have had little impact in that aspect, as 
violent battles were taken up again at the end of 2020, 32 years after they had put their weapons 
down for the ‘Settlement Plan’ (Asala 2020).  
 Informant V pointed out the interests of Spain in the conflict, which feels responsibility 
for the situation, but also in protecting its own small territories on the African continent: “Spain 
also has interests in the unity of Morocco, because they know that once the Western Sahara is 
united, Morocco will turn to Ceuta and Melilla (Informant V)”. Spain has a responsibility to 
resolve the conflict, but at the same time it can be problematic for them, based on the exact 
same arguments as put forward on the self-determination of the Western Sahara. The small 
Spanish ‘city-territories’ of Melilla and Ceuta, lay on ‘Moroccan territory’, and have mostly 
been overshadowed in discussions, named by some as Europe’s dirty little secrets (Davies 
2010). If the Western Sahara is to be free, why should the same not apply to Ceuta and Melilla? 
The decolonization aspect of this debate is evident, as one is asking for the decolonization of 
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an area which has been recuperated by another North African state, while one at the same time 
is avoiding the problem in one’s own territory, which is partly based on the same premises.  
 The Western Sahara conflict composes an apparent break between the rhetoric and 
practice of the EU. If human rights and democracy are base values of the Union, why is there 
no actual support for the UN’s settlement plan? More importantly, if the EU does not allow 
countries into negotiations, which are involved in territorial disputes, then it also seems rather 
strange to keep dealing with Morocco to such an extent, without putting forth any demands. Or 
does the clause on territorial disputes only apply when becoming a member? Do the important 
values only matter when it is within the Union, and moreover, is all responsibility gone when 
crossing European borders? It is discernible that the Western Sahara conflict is not being dealt 
with in the way it could have been. The trade dependency the EU holds over Morocco is clear, 
but it seems that instead of using this power to discuss the Western Sahara conflict, it is being 
used to help avoid immigration over mare nostrum.  
The interconnectedness of the Western Sahara, and how it affects the EU in many ways, 
also came to show in April 2021, a few months after the Polisario had taken up arms against 
Morocco again. The Polisario leader was taken to Spain to receive treatment for covid-19 
(Landauro and Faus 2021), which could be seen as a favor to Algeria. It created a break in 
Spanish-Moroccan relations. However, it was not until May 2021, when Morocco ‘let’ 
thousands of migrants cross over to Ceuta, that the EU decided to speak up. Borders had now 
been breached, and as an EU official stated, “Ceuta is Europe, this border is a European border 
and what is happening there is not Madrid's problem, it is the problem of all (Euronews 2021)”. 
Everything which is related to the Western Sahara is immensely sensitive to Europe. Why has 
the EU not attempted to solve the conflict between Morocco and Algeria if stability is most 
important? The breach of international law and human rights in Africa’s last colony – an 
occupied territory striving for self-determination, is indisputable. The Western Sahara 
therefore becomes the very epicenter in the conflict of the European dilemma in the Maghreb.   
 
VI. The French paradox – A war of collective memories?  
 
“France played a very negative role during the uprisings in Tunisia, remembering the 
words of the French interior minister, saying to Ben Ali that they could send police 
forces… People have a very negative experience with that (Informant IV)”.  




The French colonial rule in the Maghreb can hardly be said to have been a popular rule. The 
war of memories, la guerre de mémoires, is still vividly being fought from both sides of the 
Mediterranean, and specifically so in Algeria. Information and ‘hidden’ memories are coming 
to light every so often, the  most recent being about the French government ordering killings 
of French citizens during the Algerian War (Follorou 2020). As seen during the periodic 
analysis, the way France acts, has been important for the EU’s perceived role in the region. 
Bilateral relations between France and the Maghreb countries are very strong. The question, 
however, is whether a point comes in which the relationship with France is more important 
than the one with the EU, and whether the French connection has a clear impact on the way the 
EU is perceived.  
 It is easy for the EU to use the French network in the region, naturally, because of its 
well-established structure. Because of Frances’s colonial history in the region, there are of 
course negative considerations as well as positive attributes this can bring forth. However, there 
are disagreements on how much of contemporary politics that can be explained by colonial 
heritage. Most would agree that contemporary politics cannot be explained by colonial heritage 
alone (Nordenson 2018, 75), but that at the same time, one must be aware of the impact such a 
presence has left behind. As discussed within the cases, France’s role as a colonizer was 
different in each country, resulting in different presences. However, in all three states, France 
has been a firm defender of the system, safeguarding its own interests throughout all three 
periods, adhering to the typical realist stance. The issue becomes when France also impacts, 
with this stance, the European position.   
The guerre froide, cold war, between France and Morocco in 2014-15, after the French 
ambassador’s alleged comment about Morocco being a “French mistress”, also impacted EU-
Moroccan relations. Informant I shared an interesting anecdote about Hollands’s visit during 
the crisis, stating that; “It rarely rains in Rabat, but the day when President Hollande came to 
visit, the rain was extreme, nobody said anything, but all thought it, the tension was very 
present”. It is clear that because of the strong connections France has with these countries, and 
the fact that France’s networks are being used, implies that when something goes wrong with 
French-Maghreb relations, it will likely have some impact on the relationship that the EU 
shares with the region. The resentment due to colonization is still very significant, and the 
French debacle really pointed that out. Morocco froze all diplomatic and judicial cooperation, 
which included cooperation with security and intelligence sharing, of which France is a very 
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important actor in Europe.  Of course, these kinds of cuts have impact on multilateral relations 
as well.  
Mohamed Charfi, former educational minister under Ben Ali, has stated that Bourguiba: 
“critiqued colonial France, and [that] he admired the France of human rights (Aziz 2018, 
177)6”. The idea that France was not only a country to be critiqued because of its colonial 
history, but also a country to be admired, based on its views on human rights is an interesting 
thought. This paradox of colonial history and human rights is very important when considering 
‘Europe’ as the continent and the EU as the institution. During the decolonization process, 
Bourguiba knew that Tunisia had to cooperate with France for them to continue to grow. 
Algeria however, because of the Algerian war and the harsh colonization, decided to break 
many ties with France. Algeria, however, is probably the country which also shares the most 
with France, namely, because of the political and societal infrastructure that was ‘left behind’. 
“The EU should react and take position on what’s happening in the country. I 
think the fact that there are bilateral relations make it more difficult. Why? 
Because Algerians are very sensitive to France and it’s role (Informant IV)”.  
 
The Algerian case, showcases particularly, how France’s complex and controversial 
relationship with the country can transfer the negative perceptions to the EU, as has been 
pointed out by (Çelenk 2009, 184). If the democracy promotion by the EU is being ‘diffused’ 
primarily from French diplomats, because of their already existing networks, it can make it 
more confusing. Moreover, it might be problematic to take democratic advice, if it is perceived 
as coming from a country that colonized them until only 60 years ago. The war of collective 
memories with France is still ongoing, and if this perspective transplants itself onto the EU, be 
it by coercive isomorphism or others, it will be very problematic for the EU to function as a 
‘new type of structure’. This historical and colonial role has not been properly thought out by 
the NPE perspective, as it is conspicuous that democracy and human rights promotion can run 
in into difficulties when it is being communicated from a continent which once ruled the world 
by its imperialism.  
 
6 Original quote : « Il critiquait la France colonial et il admirait la France des droits de l’homme (Aziz 2018, 
177)».  
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Even though there is not enough understanding of the imperial lens in the NPE 
framework, Manners (2006b, 183) has illuminated the need to be aware of the EU becoming 
like the 19th century powers, but then focusing on militarization; however, it also serves as an 
important thought when considering France’s role within the EU; being reminded of Macrons 
call for a European Army in 2018 (Herszenhorn 2018). France, as a leading power within the 
EU is undeniable, and of course even more so after Brexit. Arguably, it will therefore be even 
more important to be aware of France’s role in the perceived nature of the EU. This is further 
illustrated by the lack of success of the UfM’s initiation, partly because it was perceived as a 
French initiated idea.  
The French paradox of military power and colonial baggage further illuminates the need 
for coherency. The fact that the EU is viewed by the informants in this study as being less 
influential as a unit, than by some member countries, does make it even more important to 
pertain a more consistent role. For a better understanding from both sides, the EU would gain 
in assuming a larger role as a unit and making statements that are more clearly coming from 
the EU, and not by a direct line from France. No EU country can advance or promote 
democracy alone, and the perceived role of France does indicate that there might be 
opportunities that are being missed out on. The ambiguity and incoherency in the way the EU 
is perceived therefore seems to limit its ability to influence. This line of argument poses an 
important question on the foundation of NPE, which indicates that the ambiguous structure of 
the EU and its very historical foundation is what makes it unique. If the EU in the Maghreb is 
mostly perceived as France, and not as a distinct actor, well then it questions the very 
foundation of NPE’s uniqueness argument.  
 
VII.  The paradox of external perceptions – The missing link? 
“In all honesty, our perception here is that the European Union plays a 
fundamental role in promoting democracy around the world […]. Sure, there are 
privileged relationships with some countries that are close, culturally maybe, 
but the European Union is not a country, it's not a single country, it's not a 
country that colonized you. There are psychological barriers that do not exist 
with the European Union as a whole (Informant VI)”. 
 
If actorness critically depends on expectations and constructions of other international actors 
and moreover the way in which internal constituency functions with external perception (Pardo 
2015, Larsen 2014), then the role of the EU in the Maghreb can tell us a lot about how actorness 
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can be infused with historical connotations. The complexity of the Maghreb’s relationship with 
France and earlier colonizers lays foundations for the countries perceptions and understandings 
of the EU, which can result in both positive as well as negative perceptions, as illustrated in 
the quote from informant VI.  
What happens when the way that the EU is ‘diffusing’ norms, through Manners 
channels, is viewed as a method to regain neo-colonial control? Does the goal justify the means, 
at all costs? As argued in the external perceptions literature, the EU’s promotion of norms is 
limited when it is viewed through neo-colonial lenses (Larsen 2014, 905). Both informant V 
and VIII discussed the ways in which democracy was promoted in the Maghreb, attempting to 
promote certain aspects of democracy in a society without understanding it’s culture. It is 
evident that there is a need to better understand the actual societies and adapt policies thereafter. 
Even though the EU has stated multiple times that policies will be tailored to the country, it 
does not seem to include a deep understanding of the society in the first place. If the EU is 
perceived as focusing on human rights and democracy as a means to regain political control in 
an area, this will of course limit the way in which the EU can diffuse norms, especially when 
what is perceived as ‘universal’ by the EU, might not be perceived universal by the country in 
which it attempts to diffuse these norms.  
If normative power rests, not only on coercion, but also particularly on the perceived 
legitimacy of the EU (Haukkala 2008, 1603), then it is an absolute necessity for the EU to 
maintain control over its own ‘branding’. The EU has released many surveys during the last 
years, which show data on the perceptions that citizens, in the Southern Neighborhood, have 
of the EU. The overall results in the Maghreb have seen a general decline in positivity towards 
the EU, and reached an all-time low in 2020, since the beginning of the polls in 2012 (EU 
2020a, 6). In 2020, only 46% of the Maghreb stated that the EU conjures a positive image for 
them. Moreover, 35% are more likely to say that they feel well informed about the EU, a 
number which has sunk by 9% since 2019. About 35% say they are aware that the EU is giving 
financial help to their country and that the EU has an embassy in their country. On the other 
hand, the majority of the respondents in the Maghreb, with 59%, say that their country has a 
good relationship with the EU, even though it has declined by 4% since 2012. These results 
show that there is a lack of understanding of what the EU does, and that there is a general 
decline in the way the EU is perceived since the Arab Awakening.  
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In this context, it is interesting to view opinions of the EU in Tunisia particularly, as it 
is the country in which the EU has been the most involved in the development. In general, 
Tunisian perceptions have also been in slow decline over the last few years (EU 2020c, Stantec 
2019). However, when considering the EU’s role in the transition, Nouira and Redissi (2018, 
14) found that Tunisian stakeholders supported the EU having a role in the transition, but that 
they did not perceive the EU as having a decisive role in it. The interviewees in their study 
found EU support to be ‘insufficient’ and ‘limited’, and as acting out of self-interest. The EU 
is therefore perceived as supporting the transition and being an important partner, but one that, 
nonetheless, does not make a difference. The conclusion of this segment would therefore 
indicate that the statement made by former Council President, Van Rompuy (2011), about there 
not being an Arab Summer without the EU, is not anywhere near to being perceived as true, in 
the one country where it actually could be argued to have been an important player in 
democratic transition.  
Larsen (2014) argued that a regional normative power would be a more appropriate 
conceptualization, thinking specifically about the eastern neighbors where membership is 
possible. A line can, however, be drawn to the south, which has very specific economic ties 
with the EU. The importance of the economic relationships that the EU shares with these 
countries might make the domestic elites more open to viewing the EU as normative, simply 
because the economic ties are so important. In comparison, the middle and lower classes might 
view the EU more positively, simply because of the need for visas. Informant IV indicated the 
EU is primarily thought of in Algeria with regards to visas. There are, in other words, many 
variables to be thought about when one is considering external perceptions, as they can be 
based on a lot of different foundations. However, if it all is overshadowed by neocolonial lenses 
then the EU still has some work to do to get rid of this stamp.   
In general, as stated by most of the informants, the lack of initiative both before and 
after the Arab Uprisings as well as after the Hirak movement, specifically the fact that France 
said they would send forces to help Ben Ali, still reside as bad memories for most Maghrebiens. 
This indicates the importance of the rhetoric versus practice gap, in the perception of the EU 
as a foreign policy actor. The external perception of the EU is therefore inherently linked to 
the EU’s ability to act as a normative power, which further illustrates the need to understand 
NPE in a geographic context for it to be valid. The specificities of the EU’s historical ties and 
the way it is acting, in the Maghreb, makes a specific case for NPE. This is to say that the 
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conclusion of the EU as a foreign policy actor might be perceived very differently somewhere 
else, further indicating its ability to promote democracy.  
 In other words, there seems to be a missing link in our understanding of NPE, when 
external perceptions are not taken into account. The analysis here shows that even though one 
can have a general understanding of the EU as a normative power, impressions and perceptions 
will not be the same everywhere, questioning universal influence based on uniqueness. In 
North Africa, the perception of the EU as a democracy promoter is influenced by the way in 
which the colonial heritage is understood. In relation to the Kissinger phone call, all of the 
informants stated that the respective country, be it Morocco, Tunisia or Algeria, would 
eventually call France, instead of the EU. Such an assumption does indicate that there are 
colonial ties which are still vivid, combined with the large power France holds within the EU. 
How can then, the EU be a unique foreign policy actor, if it is being overshadowed by some 
member states?  
It does seem quite problematic to say that the EU, first and foremost, is a normative 
power if the outside world does not attribute it such a role. If the world’s attribution to this 
concept is a precondition for the EU to be a special normative power, then it must attribute 
accordingly, which there seems to be very different opinions about. Even though most of the 
informants said that there was a negative view of the way the EU had been acting before and 
after the Arab Uprisings, the quote from Informant VI does share some enlightening 
information that can be useful in the understanding of the EU as a foreign policy actor. 
Zielonka’s view of EU foreign policy being imperial poses an interesting comparison 
when discussing internal and external perceptions. On the one side it is important to understand 
the EU as a gathering of 27 different historical foundations, in which some have a heavy history 
of colonization, a fact which is undeniable. On the other hand, this combination also means 
that the EU has the choice to adapt its democracy promotion by applying the means which 
seem the most effective, being aware of this history. It is particularly important to be informed 
of the colonial lenses in the case of the Maghreb, enforcing a stronger relationship with other 
member states than France and Spain. Taking an advantage of and making sure that the 
advocators and negotiators from the EU, are indeed perceived as EU diplomats, could give a 
different impression; be it Germans, Belgians, or Swedes, as they do not carry the same 
baggage as other member states in the region.  
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The EU’s foundation is of course created by its member states, but the EU as an 
institution and unit, if perceived as such, does not share that story. As indicated by the quote 
from informant VI in this section, the EU is not a single country that colonized. Therefore, the 
institution, per se, does not carry the same reputation. This notion implies that the EU has the 
ability to be something new, a new type of actor, which has not colonized, which does not carry 
that baggage, and which therefore can take over a more sui generis role in the Maghreb. The 
particularity of the Maghreb is of importance here, since the region has no other choice but to 
work with Europe and is absolutely dependent on it. In a region where some member states did 
not have a heavy colonial history, the view of the EU might therefore be different, in both 
ways. A history of colonialization might also reversibly give impetus to the importance of 
seeing the EU as a non-colonizer and institution. 
This understanding means that the EU has the chance to be a unique type of actor, which 
has been so heavily argued by NPE (Manners 2002), if it is able to assume a more coherent 
role as well as being more adapted to the local, cultural, political and historical realities. 
Nonetheless, it does seem rather clear that for this role to function, and to have influence, there 
is a need for a clearer understanding of the EU as a unit. The role of certain member states must 
be kept in mind when attempting to diffuse norms in the area. Without coherency, it will be 
difficult to assume such a role.  
Another important aspect comes to show in the fit between internal perceptions within 
the EU, and the external perceptions of the EU from the Maghreb. As seen in the empirical and 
periodic analysis it became evident that the ‘Islamist threat’ to Europe, has been one of the 
most important pushes for the populist growth, and the increased focus on security (Rivera 
Escartin 2020). The interconnectedness of the European fear of the Islamist threat, combined 
with the distrust in the European apparatus of democratization, might make it more difficult to 
have actual, dialogical exchanges. The argument comes back to the idea of mare nostrum, as 
‘our ocean’, the one that once united, which now separates; going from being a meeting place 
of civilizations into a place where civilizations crash. The embroilment of ideas, in which the 
security threat is not forcibly immigration, but rather the fear of it (Kinnvall, Manners, and 
Mitzen 2018), seems to reinforce the perceptions of the other side of the Mediterranean, from 
both sides. This clash of perception is, therefore, inherently a problem, created from fear and 
anxiety within the EU, which is again affecting the way in which it functions as a security 
actor, further affecting its ability to be a promoter of human rights and democracy in its 
neighborhoods. 
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VI.III Concluding remarks on analysis  
The first part of the analysis investigated the EU’s role as a foreign policy actor in Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Algeria in a comparative perspective. The periodic analysis allowed for an 
understanding of how the EU has acted before, during and after the Arab Uprisings, showing 
that there was a continuous rhetoric on protecting human rights and promoting democracy in 
the neighborhoods until 2016. With the Global Strategy there was a rhetorical change towards 
the stability-security nexus, focusing on the securing of interests and stability, while at same 
time continuing with the promotion of norms. The periodic analysis also showed that even 
though there was a clear rhetoric towards promoting democracy, it has come in second, both 
during the first, second and third period. The small shift in rhetoric in 2016 does seem to be 
appropriate for the EU’s actual presence in the Maghreb but created a pathway towards some 
important paradoxes when discussing the EU as a normative power.  
 The synchronic analysis focused on seven important paradoxes that had surged in the 
periodic analysis. First, (I) The oxymoron of a principled pragmatism, discussed the new 
rhetoric of the EU, showing that ‘principled pragmatism’, might be a term which accurately 
describes, not only the current role the EU plays in the south, but the one it has been playing 
throughout all three periods. The EU seems torn between values and interests, which is shown 
in the large gap between rhetoric and practice. However, the dilemma of values and interests 
might be a ‘false one’, which makes it easier to support short-term solutions instead of long-
term ones. This large gap of rhetoric also impacts the external perceptions of the EU in this 
area, leaving people with a sense of not understanding the EU’s role as a global actor, further 
impacting its ability to diffuse norms.  
 The second paradox, (II) The paradox of ‘Deep democracy’, discussed the EU’s lack 
of real engagement with the region and how the perceptions of the Eurocentric way in which 
democracy is promoted, can make the promotion less influential. The idea of divide and 
impera, was also debated, showing that the EU’s change towards a more country specific 
policy, also can be problematic, as it is perceived as being a way to hinder true development in 
the region. It therefore questions the way in which democracy is perceived by the EU and 
within its member states, asking to what extent the EU is actually willing to support democracy 
in the first place.  
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 The geopolitical difficulties of the Maghreb region in its relations with the EU was 
analyzed in the third paradox, (III) Too close yet too far away – a pan-European paradox? 
questioning the impact of association and proximity of the EU’s normative power. Throughout 
the periods, the Maghreb region has been promised more association if reforms have been 
caried out, but it seems that the EU is coming to an ending with its ‘carrots’, reaching limits in 
its approach. This is exemplified in the Advanced Statuses being more of perceptions, in 
addition to the Barcelona Process, which is far from being realized. The proximity and 
particular context of the Maghreb therefore seems both to be both a blessing and a curse.  
 In the fourth paradox, (IV) The paradox of ‘Productive Ambiguity, it was argued that 
the EU’s lack of coherency is problematic for its ability to impact the Maghreb. The 
incoherency is multifaceted, by the way of policies and member states. Because of its complex 
history with some member countries, the EU’s lack of clarity seems to confuse actors in the 
region, questioning the EU’s power as a unit, which in turn questions the very foundation of 
the uniqueness argument.   
  The ambiguous role of the EU becomes very clear in the conflict over Africa’s last 
colony, as discussed in paradox (V) Africa’s last colony - The paradox of the Western Sahara 
Conflict, which is illustrated in the EU’s lack of control and impact. Human rights violations 
and the breach of international law seem not to have been important enough for the EU to push 
it on Morocco’s agenda, and more importantly, for the EU not to trade with occupied territory. 
The Western Sahara could be the very crystallization of the EU’s role in the region, in which 
there are institutional differences within the Union on how to view the conflict, particularly 
between the Council and the EP, causing further confusion. The latest development, of 
Morocco’s show of force during the Ceuta events in May 2021, illustrates even further how 
this stalemate conflict keeps causing large problems.  
 The importance of colonial heritage becomes evident in (VI) The French Paradox – a 
war of collective memories? with the complex relationship the Maghreb shares with its former 
colonizer. There are both positive and negative connections to France, but that regardless of 
connotation, are so strong that the EU seems to come in second. The general negative 
perceptions of France’s role, especially during the Arab Uprisings and the Hirak Movement, is 
another indication of how this relationship impacts multilateral relations. The incoherency in 
communication has also shown to be important for the EU’s normative power, as it is evident 
that democracy and human rights promotion can run into difficulties when communicated from 
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a country which once ruled the world through its imperialism. The neocolonial lenses are 
therefore of high importance.  
The last paradox, (VII) The paradox of external perceptions – the missing link? shows 
the interconnectedness of all the previous paradoxes. The EU’s ability to diffuse norms depends 
on many variables, but which particularly depends upon the geographic specificity. In the 
Maghreb, it is becoming evident that the EU does have the ability to be sui generis, both 
because of, and in relation to the role of its former colonizers. Even though France, Spain and 
Italy are seen through neocolonial lenses, the EU as an institution does not seem to be perceived 
as such if it is communicated through the right channels. The paradox of the French role in the 
region therefore illuminates the external perceptions perceptive. The EU can be an important 
actor in the region, if it can mend its gap between rhetoric and practice, as well as creating a 
more coherent role as a unit. The creation of the EU as the ‘Self’, and the rest as the ‘Other’ 
reinforces this debate, however, as seen, the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ might be equally important 
for the survival of NPE as it is for the Empire.  
 Revisiting the introduction quote in this thesis from HR Borrell on the fact that 
Europeans must relearn the language of power, and deal with the world as it is and not as they 
wish it to be, serves as an interesting concluding remark. After the analysis, both periodic and 
synchronic, it does not seem that Europeans must relearn it, rather it seems that they have 
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 VII Conclusion – a crystallization of the European 
dilemma?  
The EU is not repainting its own image as, avant-garde, anymore; to the contrary, it seems to 
be losing belief in itself as sui generis in this multipolar world. By relearning the language of 
power, the EU moves away from its ability to play the role as the unique actor it has the 
requisites to be. Because in the end, there are no other post-national structures that come close 
to the power the EU holds in world affairs today.  
 Incoherence and problems of conceptualization of interests and values are problems 
that limit the EU’s ability to be this normative power in the Maghreb. The EU´s dilemma on 
how to be a new democratic structure in a world which seemingly forces it to play a game of 
power politics is crystallized in the Maghreb. The solidification of this dilemma becomes clear 
when analyzing what remains of the EU’s ambitious project of creating a common and peaceful 
Mediterranean; when today, what is left of this idea, are simply the skeletons of an imagined 
process. The lack of success after the Arab Awakening is highly illustrated by the results, or 
lack thereof, of the ‘democratic developments’ that the Maghreb countries have seen until 
today; results which can only be considered as rudimentary. The conditions which provoked 
the Arab Awakening are by no means resolved, and if these circumstances are not dealt with, 
they will continue to spark even more turbulence in the neighborhood in the long term.   
In what can seem as an addiction to short-term solutions in the region, the EU has only 
kept the status-quo and will continue to do so as long as there is this ‘false dilemma’ of values 
and interests, thinking that the only way to secure borders is for it to do so at the expense of 
democracy promotion and human rights. The regimes in the Maghreb seem to understand that 
the EU finds itself within this dilemma, taking advantage of exactly that. For the authoritarian 
leaders in the region this impasse implies that they are truly valuable, and that the EU seems to 
be willing to go to extreme lengths to protect the European ‘Self’ against the ‘Other’.  
The identity of the EU can be understood as unique, but only if it can play such a role. 
The difference between the EU’s own words, and what it actually does, only reaffirms the 
perceived identity of EU democracy promotion as a paradox in itself. The EU’s new ‘principled 
pragmatism’ simply confirms Bull’s thought from 1982, namely that the civil power seems to 
be a contradiction in terms. The same could be said for Normative Power Europe, if it cannot 
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bridge its gap between rhetoric and practice, and its perceived dilemma between values and 
interests.  
Main findings  
One of the first findings is that the EU’s role in the Maghreb seems to be a struggle between 
the focus on stability versus democracy promotion, in such a way that one seemingly dominates 
at the expense of the other. The EU cannot find a balance between the stability nexus and the 
normative nexus, and therefore keeps contributing to the idea that the two are not compatible. 
Cooperating with authoritarian governments has been put before the need to truly engage with 
the Maghrebi societies. The lack of full commitment seems to result in short term solutions, 
and specifically so, on the spending of funds towards solving the migration crisis.  
The EU’s problem of balance becomes most clear in the dissonance between rhetorical 
discourse and policy outcomes. In this study it is shown by the lack of early support for the 
Arab Uprisings – and yet again, with the lack of support for the Hirak Movement in 2019. The 
absence of actual support for the Saharawi cause, and the self-determination of the Western 
Sahara becomes a clear example of this differentiation. The EU had stated time and time again 
that they had made mistakes in their approach towards the region, but a lack of real change in 
policy makes the statement more fictional, rather than a true wish for change. The wish of 
course, might be there. However, democracy promotion seems to drive the EU’s foreign policy, 
only when there is no clear conflict with its security interests.  
A novel finding focuses on the combination of external perceptions to understand NPE 
in the Maghreb. The member states who carry colonial baggage can be damaging to the EU 
where there is a lack of coherence. However, when and if the EU is perceived as a unit, it seems 
the Union can be something unique and new in the Maghreb, rather than a façade for certain 
member states. It can therefore seem that some historical connections to certain countries, like 
France, affect the way in which the EU is perceived – in a positive way. The EU as a unit has 
not been a colonizer – and the EU’s foundation seems to put a ‘buffer’ on the colonial 
conception. The EU can therefore be sui generis if it can distinguish itself clearer from the 
policies of the EU member states.  
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Strengths and weaknesses of the study  
This study yields meaningful advice on how the EU functions as a foreign policy actor in its 
closest neighborhood to the south. This study, by applying a comparative model allows for an 
understanding of the variation which is seen in the different cases within the Maghreb, and 
moreover, it can state something about the Maghreb as a whole. As in all research on 
international relations, it is very difficult to rule out all other factors, and there might be other 
variables that can contribute and explain the thesis question, which have not been considered 
in this thesis.  
The methodological difficulties with the NPE framework are valid critiques to this 
study as to any other study which applies NPE as theoretical framework. Nonetheless, by 
focusing on ideational as well as material factors, the thesis says something about the way the 
EU is indeed acting and being perceived - and how this can affect its ability to function as a 
democracy promoter by normative means. The findings in this thesis do show that there is a 
need for geographical sensitivity when discussing the NPE framework, and that it is apparent 
that the normative power framework must be understood within context, for it to be properly 
applied, questioning NPE’s very universal foundation.  
 
Implications for future research  
As this thesis has found, and studied qualitatively, that the role of the EU as a democracy 
promoter, seems to vary on geographical sensitivities, it would be of interest to further 
investigate on a larger scale. The Maghreb is in a peculiar position, very close to the EU, yet 
too far away, a position which has implications for all its dealings with the EU. A larger 
comparative study, with the inclusion of other AMC’s would be very valuable, to understand 
how the member countries perceived identities can affect the way in which the EU promotes 
democracy. Specifically, it would be interesting to understand the implications of the collective 
memories of the colonial history, and how this impact the EU’s dealings in detail.  
 As an attempt to minimize the gap between theory and policy, this thesis points to 
specific implications that EU policy has in the region, and how these policies are being 
influenced by the external perceptions perspective. An important point for policy makers would 
involve how the lack of cultural and local adaptability, specifically impact the way in which 
democracy promotion functions in the region. Another point would be the power of the idea of 
the ‘force for good’ perspective and the upholding of the sui generis character.  





Aas, Katja Franko, and Helene O. I. Gundhus. 2015. "Policing Humanitarian Borderlands: 
Frontex, Human Rights And The Precariousness Of Life."  British journal of 
criminology 55 (1):1-18. doi: 10.1093/bjc/azu086. 
Aase, Tor Halfdan, and Erik Fossåskaret. 2007. Skapte virkeligheter : kvalitativt orientert 
metode. Oslo: Universitetsforl. 
Abdelmoumni, Fouad. 2013. "Le Maroc et le Printemps arabe."  Pouvoirs 145: Le Maroc  
(2):123-140. doi: 10.3917/pouv.145.0123. 
Aggestam, Lisbeth, and Markus Johansson. 2017. "The Leadership Paradox in EU Foreign 
Policy."  JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 55 (6):1203-1220. doi: 
10.1111/jcms.12558. 
Ahrens, Bettina. 2018. "Normative power Europe in crisis? Understanding the productive 
role of ambiguity for the EU’s transformative agenda."  Asia Europe Journal 16 
(2):199-212. doi: 10.1007/s10308-018-0507-8. 
Arroyo, Heliodoro Temprano. 2015. The Maghreb: Macroeconomic Performance, Reform 
Challenges and Integration with the EU. Luxembourg: European Commission. 
Asala, Kizzi. 2020. "Military Tensions Rise in Morocco-Polisario Western Sahara Conflict." 
accessed 15.02.21. https://www.africanews.com/2020/11/13/military-tensions-rise-in-
morocco-polisario-western-sahara-conflict/. 
Aziz, Clause. 2018. Carthage-Tunis : D'Hannibal à la révolution de Jasmin. Edited by 
Clause Aziz. Paris: Éditions de la République. 
Bårnes, Vibeke Bårdsdatter, and Mariann Løkse. 2011. Informasjonskompetanse : håndbok i 
kildebruk og referanseteknikker. Kristiansand: Høyskoleforl. 
Bauer, Patricia. 2015. "The European Mediterranean Policy after the Arab Spring: Beyond 
Values and Interests."  Middle East Critique 24 (1):27-40. doi: 
10.1080/19436149.2014.998922. 
Benabdallah, Karima. 2009. "The Position of the European Union on the Western Sahara 
Conflict."  Journal of Contemporary European Studies 17 (3):417-435. doi: 
10.1080/14782800903339362. 
Bicchi, Federica. 2006. "‘Our size fits all’: normative power Europe and the Mediterranean."  
Journal of European Public Policy 13 (2):286-303. doi: 10.1080/13501760500451733. 
Bindi, Federiga, and Irina Angelescu. 2010. The Foreign Policy of the European Union 
Assessing Europe's Role in the World. Edited by Federiga Bindi. 2 ed. Washington, 
D.C: Brookings Institution Press. 
Blockmans, S. 2017. The Obsolescence of the European Neighbourhood Policy. London: 
Rowman & Littlefield International. 
   
 
102 
Bobin, Frédéric. 2021. "L’Espagne au cœur de la géopolitique migratoire en Méditerranée." 
accessed 22.05.21. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2021/05/20/l-espagne-au-c-
ur-de-la-geopolitique-migratoire-en-mediterranee_6080852_3212.html. 
Bogaards, Matthijs. 2019. "Case-based research on democratization."  Democratization 26 
(1):61-77. doi: 10.1080/13510347.2018.1517255. 
Borrell, Josep. 2016. "Crisis, Identity and Raison d’Être of the European Union."  IEMed. 
Mediterranean Yearbook 2016 The European Union Standing the Mediterranean 
Test:82-89. 
Borrell, Josep. 2020. "Embracing Europe’s Power." Project Syndicate, February 8th 2020 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/embracing-europe-s-power-by-josep-
borrell-2020-02?barrier=accesspaylog. 
Bremberg, Niklas. 2016. "Making sense of the EU's response to the Arab uprisings: foreign 
policy practice at times of crisis."  European security (London, England) 25 (4):423-
441. doi: 10.1080/09662839.2016.1236019. 
Brunnstrom, David. 2009. "EU says it has solved the Kissinger question." Reuters. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-president-kissinger-idUSTRE5AJ00B20091120. 
Bull, Hedley. 1982. "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?"  JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies 21 (2):149-170. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.1982.tb00866.x. 
Carr, Edward Hallett. 2016 [1939]. The Twenty Year’s Crisis, 1919 - 1939: Reissued with a 
new preface from Michael Cox 1ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Catalano, Serida L., and Paolo R. Graziano. 2016. "Europeanization as a Democratization 
Tool? The Case of Morocco."  Mediterranean Politics 21 (3):364-386. doi: 
10.1080/13629395.2015.1129778. 
Cebeci, Münevver. 2012. "European Foreign Policy Research Reconsidered: Constructing an 
‘Ideal Power Europe’ through Theory?"  Millennium 40 (3):563-583. doi: 
10.1177/0305829812442235. 
Çelenk, Ayşe Aslıhan. 2009. "Promoting democracy in Algeria: the EU factor and the 
preferences of the political elite."  Democratization 16 (1):176-192. doi: 
10.1080/13510340802575916. 
Cembrero, Ignacio. 2021. "Marruecos suspende repentinamente sus relaciones con Alemania 
sin dar explicación." El Condiencial accessed 16.03.21. 
https://www.elconfidencial.com/mundo/2021-03-01/marruecos-suspende-relaciones-
con-alemania-pero-no-explica-el-motivo_2973099/. 
Chaban, Natalia, Ole Elgström, Serena Kelly, and Lai Suet Yi. 2013. "Images of the EU 
beyond its Borders: Issue-Specific and Regional Perceptions of European Union Power 
and Leadership."  J Common Mark Stud 51 (3):433-451. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12004. 
Chaban, Natalia, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O’Loughlin. 2019. "Understanding EU crisis 
diplomacy in the European neighbourhood: strategic narratives and perceptions of the 
EU in Ukraine, Israel and Palestine."  European Security 28 (3):235-250. doi: 
10.1080/09662839.2019.1648251. 
   
 
103 
Cherif, Youssef. 2019. "Tunisia and the EU: Too Close, Too Far." In The European Union 
and North Africa: Prospects and Challenges, edited by Adel Abdel Ghafar, 87-120. 
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Collier, David. 2011. "Understanding Process Tracing."  PS: Political Science &amp; 
Politics 44 (4):823-830. doi: 10.1017/S1049096511001429. 
Collier, David, and James Mahoney. 1996. "Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in 
Qualitative Research."  World Pol 49 (1):56-91. doi: 10.1353/wp.1996.0023. 
Colombo, Silvia, Eduard Soler i lecha, and Marc Otte. 2019. "A half-empty glass: Limits and 
dilemmas of the EU’s relations to the MENA countries."  Middle East and North Africa 
Regional Architecture : Mapping Geopolitical shifts, Regional Order and Domestic 
Transformations Working Papers (NO. 32, March 2019):1-31. 
Costa, Olivier, and Nathalie Brack. 2014. How the EU really works. Farnham, Surrey 
(England) Burlington (Vt.): Ashgate. 
Council, EU-Tunisia Association. 2018. "Decision NO 1/2018 of the EU-Tunisia Association 
Council of 9 November 2018 adopting the EU-Tunisia strategic priorities for the period 
2018-2020 [2018/1792]." Official Journal of the Europeaen Union accessed 09.03.21. 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22018D1792. 
Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy : participation and opposition. New Haven: Yale university 
press. 
Davies, Nick. 2010. "Melilla: Europe’s dirty little secret." The Guardian, accessed 15.05.21. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/17/melilla-migrants-eu-spain-morocco. 
Del Biondo, Karen. 2015. "Norms or Interests? Explaining Instrumental Variation in EU 
Democracy Promotion in Africa."  J Common Mark Stud 53 (2):237-254. doi: 
10.1111/jcms.12169. 
Del Sarto, Raffaella A. 2016. "Normative Empire Europe: The European Union, its 
Borderlands, and the ‘Arab Spring’."  JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 54 
(2):215-232. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12282. 
Diez, Thomas. 2005. "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering `Normative 
Power Europe."  Millennium 33 (3):613-636. doi: 10.1177/03058298050330031701. 
Diez, Thomas. 2013. "Normative power as hegemony."  Cooperation and conflict 48 (2):194-
210. doi: 10.1177/0010836713485387. 
Diez, Thomas, and Ian Manners. 2007. "Reflecting on normative power Europe." In Power in 
World Politics, edited by Berenskoetter F and Williams MJ, 173–188. London. 
Diez, Thomas, Stephan Stetter, and Mathias Albert. 2006. The European Union and Border 
Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration. Edited by International 
Organization 60 (3): Cambridge University Press. 
Diez, Thomas, Stephan Stetter, and Mathias Albert. 2006. "The European Union and Border 
Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration."  International Organization 60 
(3):563-593. doi: 10.1017/S0020818306060218. 
   
 
104 
Duchêne, François. 1972. "Europe’s Role in World Peace." In Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen 
Europeans Look Ahead, edited by R. Mayne. London: Fontana. 
Dworkin, Anthony. 2020. A return to Africa: Why North African States are looking South In 
Policy Brief edited by European Council on Foreign Affairs. Maastricht European 
Counci on Foreign Relations  
Dworkin, Anthony, and Fatim-Zohra El Malki. 2018. The Southern Fron Line: EU counter-
terrorism cooperation with Tunisia and Morocco In Policy Brief edited by European 
Council on Foreign Affairs. Maastricht European Council on Foreign Relations  
EC. 2005. "Accord Euro-Medditerranneen establissant une association entre la Republique 
Algerienne Democratique et Populaire d’une part, et, la Communautee Europeenne et 
ses Etats Membres, d’autre part ". European Commission accessed 30.01.21. 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/accord_association_fr.pdf. 
EC. 2011a. "Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, The 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
regions: A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Propesperity with the Southern 
Mediterranean." Eur-lex, accessed 16.01.21. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0200&from=EN. 
EC. 2011b. "Joint communication to the European Parliament, The Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee  of the Regions - A new response 
to a changing Neighbourhood ". Eur-lex, accessed 16.01.21. https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0303:FIN:en:PDF. 
EC. 2013. "Joint Proposal for a Council Decision on the Union position within the 
Association Council set up by the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an 
association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one 
part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, with regard to the adoption of a 
recommendation on the implementation of the EU-Morocco Action Plan implementing 
the advanced status (2013-2017) ". Eur-lex, accessed 2013/0107 (NLE) https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013JC0006&from=EN. 
EC. 2014. "EU and Tunisia establish their Mobility Partnership." European Commission, 
accessed 03.04.21. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_14_208. 
EC. 2015. "Joint communication to the European Parliament, The Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee  of the Regions - Review of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy ". Eur-lex, accessed 17.01.21. 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/joint-
communication_review-of-the-enp.pdf. 
EC. 2016. "Joint Communication to the Eueropean Parliament and the Council : 
Strengthening EU support for Tunisia." European Commission, accessed 09.03.21. 
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/af317533-8623-11e6-b076-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en. 
EC. 2017a. "Priorités communes de Partenariat entre la République Algérienne Démocratique 
et Populaire (Algérie) et l'Union européenne (UE) au titre de la Politique européenne de 
voisinage révisée." Le Conseil d’Association. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/10._pps_alg_text_council_09_03_2017_st03101.fr17.pdfv. 
   
 
105 
EC. 2017b. "Relations between the EU and Tunisia. MEMO 17/1263." European 
Commission, Last Modified 10.05.2017. 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_17_1263. 
EC. 2020a. "The EU in brief ". Communication department of the European Commission 
accessed 15.12. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en. 
EC. 2020b. "Rapport sur l'état des relations UE-Algérie dans le cadre de la PEV renouvelée 
Avril 2018 – Août 2020 ". The European Commission, Last Modified 18.11.20, 
accessed 02.02.2021. 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/swd_2020_285_algeria_enp_country_report.pdf. 
EC. 2020c. "Trade Policy Algeria." The European Commission, Last Modified 23 April 
2020, accessed 07.01.2021. https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/algeria/. 
EC. 2020d. "Trade Policy Morocco ". The European Commission, Last Modified 23 April 
2020, accessed 07.01.2021. https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/morocco/. 
EC. 2020e. "Trade Policy Tunisia ". The European Commission, Last Modified 23 April 
2020, accessed 07.01.2021. https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/tunisia/. 
EC. 2021a. "European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement - Algeria ". ec.europa.eu, 
accessed 29.01. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/algeria_en. 
EC. 2021b. "European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement - Morocco ". ec.europa.eu, 
accessed 29.01. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/morocco_en. 
EC. 2021c. "Voisinage méridional: l'UE propose un nouvel agenda pour la Méditerranée." 
Commission Europeénne accessed 09.03.21. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/news_corner/news/southern-neighbourhood-eu-proposes-new-agenda-
mediterranean_en. 
EEAS. 2012. "Relations Tunisie-Union Européenne: Un partnernariat Privilégie: Plan 
d’action 2013-2017." European External Action Service accessed 04.02.21. 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/plan_action_tunisie_ue_2013_2017_fr_0.pdf. 
EEC. 1957. Traité institutant la Communauté Economique Européenne et documents 
annexes. edited by EU: EUR-Lex : Access to European Union law  
Emara, Khalid. 2012. "Is Sarkozy’s Union for the Mediterranean Going to Work? ." In The 
Foreign Policy of the European Union Assessing Europe's Role in the World, edited by 
Federiga Bindi and Irina Angelescu. Brookings Institution Press. 
EP. 2019. "Join Motion for a Resolution on the situation of freedoms in Algeria. 27.11.2019." 
[Plenary Session], accessed 02.02.2021. 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2019-0193_EN.pdf. 
   
 
106 
ESS. 2003. "A Secure Europe in a Better World ", accessed 12.12.20. 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15895-2003-INIT/en/pdf. 
EU. 1998. "Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of 
Tunisia, of the other part." Official Journal of the European Communities https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:d3eef257-9b3f-4adb-a4ed-
941203546998.0008.02/DOC_4&format=PDF. 
EU. 2007. "Treaty of Lisbon ". Official Journal of the European Union, accessed 03.03.21. 
http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/688a7a98-3110-4ffe-a6b3-
8972d8445325.0007.01/DOC_19. 
EU. 2020a. "EU perceptions in Southern Neighbourhood countries: New poll results (2020)." 
accessed 29.03.21. https://www.euneighbours.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2020-
11/Open%20South%20opinion%20poll%20report%202020_0.pdf. 
EU. 2020b. "Morocco : Southern Neighbourhood." https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/near_factograph_morocco_en.pdf. 
EU. 2020c. "Opinion Poll - Tunisia ". Kantar Public 
https://www.euneighbours.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2020-
11/Factsheet%20Tunisia%20EN%202020.pdf. 
EU. 2020d. "Tunisia : Southern Neighbourhood." https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/near_factograph_tunisia_en.pdf. 
EUGS. 2016. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe -   A Global Strategy for 
the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy. edited by European Union Global 
Strategy: European External Action Service  
Euronews. 2021. "Ceuta: Europe ‘will not be intimidated’ on issue of migration, says EU." 
euronews.com, accessed 19.05.21. https://www.euronews.com/2021/05/18/scores-of-
migrants-swim-to-spain-s-ceuta-enclave-from-morocco. 
Fakir, Intissar. 2019. "EU - Morocco Relations: Finding a New Balance." In The European 
Union and North Africa: Prospects and Challanges edited by Adel Abdel Ghafar, 53-
86. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2008. "Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative 
Methods: Putting It Together Again." In The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Methodology, edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady and David 
Collier. Oxford University Press. 
Fernández-Molina, Irene. 2017 "The EU, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the 
Western Sahara Conflict: Executive Continuity and Parliamentary Detours." In The 
Revised European Neighbourhood Policy., edited by Bouris and Schumacher. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Fernández-Molina, Irene, and Raquel Ojeda-García. 2020. "Western Sahara as a Hybrid of a 
Parastate and a State-in-Exile: (Extra)territoriality and the Small Print of Sovereignty in 
a Context of Frozen Conflict."  Nationalities Papers 48 (1):83-99. doi: 
10.1017/nps.2019.34. 
   
 
107 




Follorou, Jacques. 2020. "De 1956 à 1962, la France a ordonné à ses services secrets 
d’assassiner des citoyens français." Le Monde, accessed 15.05.21. 
https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/09/25/de-1956-a-1962-la-france-a-
ordonne-a-ses-services-secrets-d-assassiner-des-citoyens-francais_6053582_3210.html. 
Forsberg, Toumas. 2011. "Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of 
an Ideal Type*."  JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 49 (6):1183-1204. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02194.x. 
Geddes, Andrew, and Leila Hadj-Abdou. 2018. "Changing the path? EU migration 
governance after the ‘Arab spring’."  Mediterranean Politics 23 (1):142-160. doi: 
10.1080/13629395.2017.1358904. 
Geddes, Barbara. 2003. Paradigms and Sand Castles : Theory Building and Research Design 
in Comparative Politics. Ann Arbor, UNITED STATES: University of Michigan Press. 
Gegout, Catherine. 2010. European Foreign and Security Policy : States. Power, Institutions. 
Toronto, UNKNOWN: University of Toronto Press. 
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in 
the Social Sciences. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Gerring, John. 1999. "What Makes a Concept Good? A Criterial Framework for 
Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Sciences."  Polity 31 (3):357-393. doi: 
10.2307/3235246. 
Gerring, John. 2004. "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?"  American Political 
Science Review 98 (2):341-354. doi: 10.1017/S0003055404001182. 
Gerring, John. 2011. Social Science Methodology: A Unified Framework. 2 ed, Strategies for 
Social Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gerring, John. 2017. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. 2 ed, Strategies for 
Social Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ghafar, Adel Abdel. 2019. "Conlusion." In The European Union and North Africa, edited by 
Adel Abdel Ghafar, 179-185. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Ghafar, Adel Abdel, and Anna Jacobs. 2019. "EU-North Africa Relstions in an Age of 
Turbulence." In The European Union and North Africa: Prospects and Challenges, 
edited by Adel Abdel Ghafar. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Ghanem, Dalia. 2019. "Algeria: The EU’s Real Partner or a “Tough Suburb of a Prosperous 
EU Metropolis”?" In The European Union and North Africa: Prospects and Challenges 
edited by Adel Abdel Ghafar, 17-52. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Ghanmi, Lamine. 2019. "European support for Algeria’s protests finds no takers." The Arab 
Weekly Last Modified 01.12.2019, accessed 02.02.2020. 
https://thearabweekly.com/european-support-algerias-protests-finds-no-takers. 
   
 
108 
Gordon, Neve, and Sharon Pardo. 2015. "Normative Power Europe and the Power of the 
Local."  Journal of common market studies 53 (2):416-427. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12162. 
Grande-Gascón, María Louisa, and Susana Ruiz-Seisdedos. 2017. "The EU’s Reluctant 
Engagement with the Western Sahara Conflict: Between Humanitarian Aid and 
Parliamentary Involvement." In Global, Regional and Local Dimensions of Western 
Sahara’s Protracted Decolonization. , edited by Raquel Ojeda-Garcia and Irene 
Fernández-Molina. New York Parlgrave Macmillan  
Hallstein, Walter. 1962. United Europe: Challenge and Opportunity: Harvard University 
Press. 
Haukkala, Hiski. 2008. "The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case 
of European Neighbourhood Policy."  Europe-Asia Studies 60 (9):1601-1622. doi: 
10.1080/09668130802362342. 
Herszenhorn, David M. 2018. "Macron wants Europe to buy its own military hardware." 
accessed 11.12.2020. https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-wants-europe-to-build-its-
own-military-hardware/. 
Huddleston, R. Jospeh, Harshana Ghoorhoo, and Daniela A Maqeura Sardon. 2021. "Biden 
Can Backtrack on Trump’s Move in Western Sahara." FP Foreign Policy 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/09/biden-can-backtrack-on-trumps-move-in-
western-sahara/. 
Hyde-Price, Adrian. 2006. "‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique."  Journal of 
European Public Policy 13 (2):217-234. doi: 10.1080/13501760500451634. 
Ivan, Adrian Liviu, Ruxandra Nuþ, and Claudia Mera. 2013. "The EU - Morocco Relations in 
the Framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy." In EURINT Proceedings 
2013, edited by Center for European Studies, 104-115. Alexandru Ioan Cuza 
University: Centre for European Studies  
Jaidane, Riadh. 2019. "L’Union européenne et les transitions démocratiques en Afrique : 
réflexions sur le cas tunisien."  L'Europe en Formation 388 (1):135-147. doi: 
10.3917/eufor.388.0135. 
Joffé, George. 2020. "Shame-faced no longer?"  The Journal of North African Studies 25 
(2):159-166. doi: 10.1080/13629387.2020.1709329. 
Johansson-Nogués, Elisabeth, and Adrià Rivera Escartin. 2020. "Supporting the Tunisian 
transition? Analysing (in)consistencies in EU democracy assistance with a tripartite 
nexus model."  Democratization 27 (8):1376-1393. doi: 
10.1080/13510347.2020.1792886. 
Jordán, Javier. 2018. "Una reinterpretación de la crisis del islote Perejil desde la perspectiva 
de la amenaza híbrida."  Revista general de marina 274:941-952. 
Katznelson, Ira. 2003. "Periodization and preferences: Reflections on purposice action in 
comparative historical social science." In Comparative historical analysis in the social 
sciences, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
   
 
109 
Kellstedt, P.M., and G.D. Whitten. 2018. The Fundamentals of Political Science Research: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Keukeleire, S., and T. Delreux. 2014. The Foreign Policy of the European Union, The 
European Union Series Baskinstoke: Palgrave. 
Keukeleire, Stephan, and Tom Delreux. 2017. "EU Foreign Policy in Times of Existential 
Crises: Instability in the Neighbourhood, Brexit, Trump, and beyond." In The Foreign 
Policy of the European Union edited by Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, 408. 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kinnvall, Catarina, Ian Manners, and Jennifer Mitzen. 2018. "Introduction to 2018 special 
issue of European Security: “ontological (in)security in the European Union”."  
European Security 27 (3):249-265. doi: 10.1080/09662839.2018.1497977. 
Kohn, Margaret, and Keally McBride. 2011. Political Theories of Decolonization: 
Postcolonialism and the Problem of Foundations. New York: Oxfgord University 
Press. 
Landauro, Inti, and Joan Faus. 2021. "Western Sahara independence leader to leave Spain 
soon amid diplomatic row." accessed 04.06.2021. 
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/lawyer-polisarios-ghali-ask-spanish-court-drop-
war-crimes-case-2021-06-01/. 
Larsen, Henrik. 2014. "The EU as a Normative Power and the Research on External 
Perceptions: The Missing Link."  JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 52 
(4):896-910. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12109. 
Larsen, Henrik. 2020. "Normative Power Europe or Capability–expectations Gap? The 
Performativity of Concepts in the Study of European Foreign Policy."  JCMS: Journal 
of Common Market Studies 58 (4):962-977. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12998. 
Lehne, Stefan. 2017. Is there hope for EU Foreign Policy. edited by Carnegie Europe. 
Brussels: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
Lehne, Stefan. 2020. "Securing the EU’s Place in the World." Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, accessed 05.03.2021. 
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/11/17/securing-eu-s-place-in-world-pub-83246. 
Lenz, Tobias. 2013. "EU normative power and regionalism: Ideational diffusion and its 
limits."  Cooperation and Conflict 48 (2):211-228. doi: 10.1177/0010836713485539. 
Lenzu, Marian Daniela 2019. "Joint declaration by the European Union and Morocco for the 
fourteenth metting of the Association Council " [Press Release ], Last Modified 
27.06.2019, accessed 27.01. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2019/06/27/joint-declaration-by-the-european-union-and-the-kingdom-of-
morocco-for-the-fourteenth-meeting-of-the-association-council/. 
Longo, Franchesca. 2010. "Justice and Home Affairs as a new Tool of European Foreign 
Policy " In The Foreign Policy of the European Union Assessing Europe's Role in the 
World, edited by Federiga Bindi. Washinton, D.C: Brookings Institution Press. 
   
 
110 
Mahoney, James. 2004. "Comparative-Historical Methodology."  Annual Review of 
Sociology 30 (1):81-101. doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110507. 
Mahoney, James, and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. 2003. Comparative Historical Analysis in the 
Social Sciences, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Mahoney, James, and Kathleen Thelen. 2015. Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis, 
Strategies for Social Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Manners, Ian. 2002. "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?"  Journal of 
common market studies 40 (2):235-258. doi: 10.1111/1468-5965.00353. 
Manners, Ian. 2006a. "The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas 
Diez."  Millennium 35 (1):167-180. doi: 10.1177/03058298060350010201. 
Manners, Ian. 2006b. "Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads."  
Journal of European Public Policy 13 (2):182-199. doi: 10.1080/13501760500451600. 
Manners, Ian. 2008. "The normative ethics of the European Union."  International affairs 
(London) 84 (1):45-60. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00688.x. 
Manners, Ian. 2010. "Global Europa: Mythology of the European Union in World Politics."  
Journal of common market studies 48 (1):67-87. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
5965.2009.02042.x. 
Manners, Ian. 2012. "The European Union’s normative power in global politics." In Key 
Controversies in European Integration, edited by Neil Nugent and William E. Paterson, 
190 -205. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Manners, Ian. 2013. "Assessing the decennial, reassessing the global: Understanding 
European Union normative power in global politics."  Cooperation and Conflict 48 
(2):304-329. doi: 10.1177/0010836713485389. 
Manners, Ian. 2015. "Sociology of Knowledge and Production of Normative Power in the 
European Union’s External Actions."  Journal of European Integration 37 (2):299-318. 
doi: 10.1080/07036337.2014.990141. 
Martín, Iván. 2009. "EU–Morocco Relations: How Advanced is the ‘Advanced Status’?"  
Mediterranean Politics 14 (2):239-245. doi: 10.1080/13629390902990877. 
McCormick, John. 2002. Understanding the European Union : a concise introduction. 2nd 
ed. ed, The European Union series. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Mihalache, Iulian. 2016. "Principled pragmatism in EU foreign policy: A return to 
Realpolitik or rapprochement with Russia."  The Centre for Geopolitics  & Security in  
Realism Studies (September 9th, 2016):9. 
Mišík, Matúš. 2019. "The EU’s Democratization: Normative Power Europe Meets External 
EU Perception Literature." In Democracy Promotion and the Normative Power Europe 
Framework, edited by Marek Neuman, 37-52. Springer  
MohammadVII. 2011. "Les discours du roi. Texte intégral du discours adressé par SM le Roi 
à la Nation. Mars 2011." Royaume du Maroc, accessed 12.03.21. 





Monnet, Jean. 1963. "A FERMENT OF CHANGE."  JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies 1 (3):203-211. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1963.tb01060.x. 
Moran, James. 2019. "Winds of change for EU-Morocco relations." Center for European 
Policy Studies, accessed 15.01. https://www.ceps.eu/winds-of-change-for-eu-morocco-
relations/. 
Morgan, Glyn. 2020. "Is the European Union imperialist?"  Journal of European Public 
Policy 27 (9):1424-1440. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2020.1786597. 
Mosley, Layna. 2013. Interview Research in Political Science. Edited by Layna Mosley. 
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Mouhib, Laila. 2014. "EU Democracy Promotion in Tunisia and Morocco: Between 
Contextual Changes and Structural Continuity."1-22. doi: info:doi/. 
Müller, Patrick. 2019. "Normative power Europe and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the 
EU’s peacebuilding narrative meets local narratives."  European Security 28 (3):251-
267. doi: 10.1080/09662839.2019.1648259. 
Nordenson, Jon. 2018. Fra opprør til kaos : Midtøsten etter den arabiske våren. 2nd ed. 
Oslo: Universitetsforl. 
Nouira, Asma, and Hamadi Redissi. 2018. "Assessing EU Democracy and Human Rights 
Policies from the Perspective of Tunisian Bottom-Up Actors." (MED) RESET, Instiuto 
Affari Internazionali. 
Noureddine, Raja. 2016. "Normative Power Europe and in Field of Human Rights: is the EU 
a Force for Good in the World? ."  Australia and New Zealand Journal of European 
Studies 8 (2):111-118. 
Pace, Michelle. 2007. "The Construction of EU Normative Power."  Journal of common 
market studies 45 (5):1041-1064. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00759.x. 
Pace, Michelle. 2008. "The EU as a ‘force for good’ in border conflict cases? ." In European 
Union and Border Conflicts edited by Thomas Diez. Cambridge University Press. 
Pace, Michelle. 2009. "Paradoxes and contradictions in EU democracy promotion in the 
Mediterranean: the limits of EU normative power."  Democratization 16 (1):39-58. doi: 
10.1080/13510340802575809. 
Pace, Michelle. 2014. "The EU's Interpretation of the ‘Arab Uprisings’: Understanding the 
Different Visions about Democratic Change in EU-MENA Relations."  Journal of 
common market studies 52 (5):969-984. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12159. 
Pace, Michelle, and Francesco Cavatorta. 2012. "The Arab Uprisings in Theoretical 
Perspective – An Introduction."  Mediterranean Politics 17 (2):125-138. doi: 
10.1080/13629395.2012.694040. 
   
 
112 
Pänke, Julian. 2019. "Liberal Empire, Geopolitics and EU Strategy: Norms and Interests in 
European Foreign Policy Making."  Geopolitics 24 (1):100-123. doi: 
10.1080/14650045.2018.1528545. 
Pardo, Sharon. 2015. Normative power Europe meets Israel: perceptions and realities 
(Europe and the world). Lanham, MD: Lanham, MD: The Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishing Group. 
Pollack, Mark A. 2012. "Living in a material world: a critique oof ‘normative power Europe’ 
" In Key Controversies in European Integration, edited by Neil Nugent and William E. 
Paterson, 190 -205. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Powel, Brieg Tomos. 2009. "A clash of norms: normative power and EU democracy 
promotion in Tunisia."193-214. doi: info:doi/. 
Ramadan, Tariq. 2012. Islam and the Arab Awakening. New York Oxford University Press. 
Ranheim, Christian. 2016. Fred i Sikte? . In Studentenes & Akademikernes Internasjonale 
Hjelpefond. Oslo: SAIH. 
Rivera Escartin, Adrià. 2020. "Populist challenges to EU foreign policy in the Southern 
Neighbourhood: an informal and illiberal Europeanisation?"  Journal of European 
Public Policy 27 (8):1195-1214. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2020.1712459. 
Roccu, Roberto, and Benedetta Voltolini. 2018. "Framing and reframing the EU’s 
engagement with the Mediterranean: Examining the security-stability nexus before and 
after the Arab uprisings."  Mediterranean Politics 23 (1):1-22. doi: 
10.1080/13629395.2017.1358895. 
Rogan, Eugene L., and Gunnar Nyquist. 2011. Araberne : historien om det arabiske folk, The 
Arabs:  A history. Oslo: Gyldendal. 
Romeo, Isabel. 1998. "The European union and North Africa: Keeping the Mediterranean 
‘safe’ for Europe."  Mediterranean Politics 3 (2):21-38. doi: 
10.1080/13629399808414652. 
Rubin, Herbert J., and Irene Rubin. 2012. Qualitative interviewing : the art of hearing data. 
Edited by Herbert J. Rubin and Irene Rubin. 3rd ed. ed. Vol. 3. Thousand Oaks, Calif: 
Sage. 
Scott, James M., and Brandy Jolliff Scott. 2020. "Ideas and Interests: European Democracy 
Aid and the Democracy-Security Dilemma, 1990-2010."  All Azimuth 9:61-81. 
Seawright, Jason, and John Gerring. 2008. "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study 
Research:A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options."  Political Research 
Quarterly 61 (2):294-308. doi: 10.1177/1065912907313077. 
Seeberg, Peter. 2009. "The EU as a realist actor in normative clothes: EU democracy 
promotion in Lebanon and the European Neighbourhood Policy."  Democratization: 
The European Union’s democratization agenda in the mediterranean: A critical inside-
outside approach 16 (1):81-99. doi: 10.1080/13510340802575858. 
Sjursen, Helene. 2006. "The EU as a ‘normative’ power: how can this be?"  Journal of 
European Public Policy 13 (2):235-251. doi: 10.1080/13501760500451667. 
   
 
113 
Staeger, Ueli. 2016. "Africa–EU Relations and Normative Power Europe: A Decolonial Pan-
African Critique."  JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 54 (4):981-998. doi: 
10.1111/jcms.12350. 
Stantec. 2019. "Sondage d’opinion 2018 – Tunisie (fiche d’information)." European Union, 
accessed 01.02.21. https://www.euneighbours.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2019-
03/TUNISIA%20fr.pdf. 
Stilz, Anna. 2015. "Decolonization and Self-Determinatiton."  Social Philosophy & Policy 32 
(1):1-24. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0265052515000059. 
Teevan, Chloe. 2019a. "EU - Morocco: A win-win partnership? ."  Moroccan Institute for 
Policy Analysis 2021:15. 
Teevan, Chloe. 2019b. The EU, Morocco, and the Stability Myth. Sada - Middle East 
Analaysis 2021 (15.01). 
Teti, Andrea. 2012. "The EU's First Response to the ‘Arab Spring’: A Critical Discourse 
Analysis of the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity."  Mediterranean 
Politics 17 (3):266-284. doi: 10.1080/13629395.2012.725297. 
TEU. 1992. Treaty on European Union. edited by Offical Journal of the European Union. 
Maastricht Offical Journal of the European Communities. 
Thagaard, Tove. 2013. Systematikk og innlevelse : en innføring i kvalitative metoder. 3. utg. 
ed. Bergen: Fagbokforl. 
Tjora, Aksel Hagen. 2017. Kvalitative forskningsmetoder i praksis. 3. utg. ed. Oslo: 
Gyldendal akademisk. 
Tömmel, Ingeborg. 2013. "The New Neighborhood Policy of the EU: An Appropriate 
Response to the Arab Spring?"  Democracy and Security 9 (1-2):19-39. doi: 
10.1080/17419166.2012.736306. 
Tonra, Ben, and Thomas Christiansen. 2004. Rethinking European Union foreign polocy 
Edited by Thomas Christiansen and Emil Kirchner, Europe in Change Manchester & 
New York: Manchester University Press. 
UFM, Secretariat of the. 2020. "25 years: 1995 - 2020 Barcelona Process Union for the 
Mediterranean ". UfM, accessed 9th of November. https://ufmsecretariat.org/who-we-
are/history/. 
UN. 1973. "UN Charter." accessed 04.03. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-
text. 
UNHCR. 2021. "Country Profile - Spain." Operational Data Portal - Refugee situations, 
accessed 20.05.21. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/esp. 
Usherwood, Simon, and John Pinder. 2018. The European Union : A Very Short Introduction 
Fourth Edition ed, Very Short Introductions. Oxford Oxford University Press. 
van Hüllen, Vera. 2019. "Negotiating democracy with authoritarian regimes. EU democracy 
promotion in North Africa."  Democratization 26 (5):869-888. doi: 
10.1080/13510347.2019.1593377. 
   
 
114 
Van Rompuy, Herman. 2011. "Remarks by Herman Van Rompuy President of the European 
Council at the European Parliament Conference of Presidents. 28th of June 2011. 
EUCO 32/1/11 REV 1." European Council 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_11_209. 
Vermeren, Pierre. 2016. Histoire du Maroc depuis l'indépendance. 5e éd ed, Repères: La 
Découverte. 
Wagner, Wolfgang. 2017. "Liberal Power Europe."  JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies 55 (6):1398-1414. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12572. 
Walt, Stephen M. 2005. "The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International 
Relations "  Annual Review of Political Science 8 (1):23-48. doi: 
10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104904. 
Wesselink, Edzard, and Ron Boschma. 2012. "Overview of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy: Its History, Structure, and Implemented Policy Measures."  SEARCH (Sharing 
Knowledge Assets Interregionally Cohesive Neighborhoods) WP1/04 Search Working 
Paper (January 2012). 
Willis, Michael. 2014. "Politics and power in the Maghreb : Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco 
from independence to the Arab spring." In. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Wolff, Sarah. 2018. "EU religious engagement in the Southern Mediterranean: Much ado 
about nothing?"  Mediterranean Politics 23 (1):161-181. doi: 
10.1080/13629395.2017.1358905. 
Wood, Pia Christina. 2002. "French Foreign Policy and Tunisia: Do Human Rights Matter?"  
Middle East Policy 9 (2):92-110. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4967.00059. 
Yacobi, Haim, and David Newman. 2008. "The EU and the Israel–Palestine conflict." In The 
European Union and Border Conflicts: The Power of Integration and Association, 
edited by Mathias Albert, Stephan Stetter and Thomas Diez, 173-202. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Yin, Robert K. 2014. Case study research : design and methods. 5th ed. ed. Los Angeles, 
Calif: SAGE. 
Youngs, Richard. 2020. "The New EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime: 
Breakthrough or Distraction?  ." Carnegie Europe, accessed 15.2.2021. 
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/12/14/new-eu-global-human-rights-sanctions-regime-
breakthrough-or-distraction-pub-83415. 
Youngs, Richard, and Rosa Balfour. 2015. "Arab views on Democratic Citizenship - and on 
EU Support ". Carnegie Europe, accessed 15.12.2020. 
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2015/10/22/arab-views-on-democratic-citizenship-and-on-eu-
support-pub-61729. 
Zamfir, Ionel, and Alina Dobreva. 2019. EU support for democracy and peace in the world In 
EU policies -  Delivering for for citizens edited by EPRS . European Parliamentary 
Research Service. European Parliament: Communication department of the European 
Commission  
   
 
115 
Zielonka, Jan. 2008. "Europe as a Global Actor: Empire by Example?"  International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 84 (3):471-484. 
Zielonka, Jan. 2013. "Europe's new civilizing missions: the EU's normative power 
discourse."  Journal of Political Ideologies 18 (1):35-55. doi: 
10.1080/13569317.2013.750172. 
Zoubir, Yahia H., and Karima Benabdallah-Gambier. 2004. "Morocco, Western Sahara and 



















   
 
116 
Annex I. Interview invitation7  
Do you want to participate in the research project 
 
"Assessing the role of the EU in the Maghreb – a 
Crystallization of the European Dilemma?" 
 
This is a question for you to participate in a research project where the purpose is to investigate 
the EU's role as a foreign policy actor and democracy promoter in North Africa. In this letter, 
we give you information about the goals of the project and what participation in this project 
will mean for you.  
 
Purpose 
The purpose of this project is to gain an in-depth insight into the effects of the EU as a 
democracy promoter in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The interview will be part of my 
master's thesis at the Department of Comparative Politics at the University of Bergen, and aims 
to answer the following research questions: 
 
How does the nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor affect its ability to promote 
democracy in the Maghreb? 
 
Who is responsible for the research project? 
The University of Bergen is responsible for the project. 
 
Why are you asked to participate? 
You are receiving this inquiry due to your knowledge about Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia in 
relation with the EU. The criteria on which the selection of candidates is based, is therefore the 
specific professional competence you possess, which either revolves around how you as a 
national official or European official working in either Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia view 
interaction with the EU. About 10 people will be interviewed. 
 
What does it mean for you to participate? 
Participation in this project will involve participation in an interview that will last around 30 
minutes. The interviews will be semi-structured, which gives the opportunity to speak 
relatively freely about your experiences. The interview will include questions about how you 
see the EU's role in the region and how it has developed over time. This involves questions 
about the EU’s reactions to the Arab Uprisings and whether EU foreign policy could be said to 
have changed. If so, how these changes affect the Maghreb. The interview will record audio 
and notes will be taken throughout the interview.  
 
It is voluntary to participate. 
It is voluntary to participate in the project. If you choose to participate, you can withdraw your 
consent at any time without giving any reason. All information about you will then be 
 
7 Both the interview invitations as well as the interview guides have been translated to Spanish and French by 
the author. The project has been accepted by NSD and data stored safely on UiB’s own secure servers.   
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anonymized. There will not be any negative consequences for you if you do not want to 
participate or if you later choose to withdraw. 
 
 
Your privacy – how we store and use your information 
We will only use the information about you for the purposes we have described in this letter. 
We treat the information confidentially and in accordance with the privacy regulations. 
- In addition to me, Maia Gartland Hoff, as a master's student, my supervisor at the 
Department of Comparative Politics, Kjetil Evjen, will have access to your information. 
- Names and information will be stored separately, and the informant will be anonymized 
in the assignment text to prevent informants from being recognized. The data material 
is stored in a password-protected folder on my computer. 
- When completed, the master's thesis will be available through the University of 
Bergen's open digital research archive (BORA). 
 
What happens to your information when we end the research project? 
The project is scheduled to end on 02.07.2021. Personal information, audio recordings and 
transcripts will be deleted no later than six month later, 02.01.2022. 
 
Your rights 
As long as you can be identified in the data material, you have the right to: 
• access the personal information registered to you, 
• have personal information about you corrected, 
• have personal information about you deleted, 
• obtain a copy of your personal information (data portability), and 
• send a complaint to the Ombudsman or the Data Inspectorate about the processing of 
your personal data. 
 
What entitles us to process personal information about you? 
We process information about you based on your consent. On behalf of the University of 
Bergen, the NSD - Norwegian Center for Research Data AS (Norsk senter for forskningsdata 
AS) has assessed that the processing of personal data in this project is in accordance with the 
privacy regulations. 
 
Where can I find out more? 
If you have questions about the study, or want to exercise your rights, please contact: 
• Student: Maia Gartland Hoff at the Department of Comparative Politics, University of 
Bergen. E-mail: ------------ and telephone; ------------ 
• Thesis advisor: Kjetil Evjen at the Department of Comparative Politics, University of 
Bergen. E-mail: ------------ and telephone; ------------ 
• Our privacy representative: Janecke Helene Veim. 
 
If you have questions related to NSD's assessment of the project, you can contact: 
- NSD - Norwegian Center for Research Data AS, by email 
(personverntjenester@nsd.no) or telephone: 55 58 21 17. 
 
Best regards 
Maia Gartland Hoff 





Thesis Advisor   Student 
Kjetil Evjen  Maia Gartland Hoff  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Declaration of Consent  
I declare that I have received and understood the information given to me about the project 
Assessing the role of the EU in North Africa – a crystallization of the European Dilemma? I 
declare that I have had the opportunity to ask questions. I agree: 
¨ to be interviewed 
¨ to the fact that information about me is published so that I can be recognized. This will 
only apply if the informant wishes to provide information that goes beyond the intended 
objective of the interview, and the informant will be informed and given the opportunity 
to reserve the use. 
¨ to the fact that my personal information is stored after the end of the project, until no 
later than 02.01.2022 
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Annex II. Interview guide   
Interview guide for officials in the Maghreb 
Part I – Introduction 
This study uses interviews to gain information about the perspectives of officials and 
academics that have worked in the Maghreb. As an informant your information will be 
anonymized. You have the right to withdraw at any moment during the interview.  
 
I.  Can you describe your previous/current working experiences? How have they been 
or are related to the Maghreb?  
 
Part II – General questions on the EU as a foreign policy actor  
I. How would you characterize the EU as an actor in world affairs?  
- Do you see the EU as a ‘democracy promoter’? Why/why not?  
 
II. Do you find that the role of the EU as a foreign policy actor has changed over time? 
- If so, in what way?  
 
III. What role would you assign the member states in the forming of EU foreign policy?  
- Do you find that some actors have larger influence than other?  
 
Part III - Specific questions towards EU policy in North Africa 
I. How would you explain the relationship between the EU and the Maghreb countries?  
- Do you find that EU foreign policy in North Africa accurately prescribes to 
the EU’s overall goals in world affairs?   
i. Why/why not? 
 





II. How would you describe the EU’s reaction to the Arab Uprisings?  
- Has EU foreign policy changed from before and after?   
- If there have been changes, what kind of changes are we talking about?  
 
III. Do you find that the EU has a coherent policy towards the Maghreb? 
- In your experience, how would you describe the communication between the 
EU and the different states?  
- Would you say that the EU, as a unit, has larger influence in the Maghreb than 
the member states?  
i. Why/why not?  
 
IV. Would you say that the EU has a positive effect on democratic development the 
Maghreb?  
- Why/ why not?  
 
Part IV – Closing  
I. How do you see the EU as global actor in the future?  
II. Is there any addition information that you would like to add?  
III. Would it be possible to contact you if there are any follow-up questions?  
 
